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Abstract
The weight of academic research and popular opinion is now decidedly in favour of the 
proposition that privately-owned firms are more efficient and more profitable than state- 
owned firms, and the multilateral aid agencies that “count” in the developing world 
(particularly the World Bank) firmly advise countries to reduce the size of their state sectors. 
The limited empirical evidence that exists suggests that non-privatising reform measures, such 
as price deregulation and market liberalization, can improve the efficiency of SOEs, but it is 
far from established that these reforms would be even more effective if coupled with 
privatisation.
This research investigates performance of both private and state-owned enterprises through 
looking at results since the outbreak of the intensive privatisation programmes in Europe at 
the beginning of the 1980s. Many theories like the property rights theory, the principal agent 
theory, the Austrian school of economics and the public choice school stress the superiority of 
privately-owned over state-owned companies without addressing how corporate performance 
should be measured in light of their analysis. In other words, those theories point to the 
effectiveness of private firms compared to state-owned while the measurement of 
performance remains underdeveloped. Quite apart from how different theories of (the benefits 
of) (private) ownership are related to empirical outcomes, there are problems with standard 
measures of corporate performance, such as total factor productivity, for example, in light of 
the Cambridge Critique.
Because of these problems, another method, factor analysis, has been used for measuring 
corporate performance on a sample of private and public firms. Our overall empirical study 
results indicate that corporate performance is characterised by two characters: size and
profitability. In most of the statistical exercises (total of 42 cases) size and profitability were 
the main characteristics although in some cases ownership was added to those characters but 
as a separate factor without any relation with the variables representing size and profitability. 
Our finding undermines the arguments stressed by the theories in favour of private ownership 
that this is a major distinguishing aspect of corporate performance.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Privatisation as an extensive programme emerged in western European countries at the 
beginning of the 1980s, as governments seeking cost reductions turned to the private sector to 
provide services that would ordinarily have been provided by governments. This withdrawal 
of state involvement in industry, which came to be known as “privatisation,” takes place 
through a number of policy initiatives. The most common is a change from public to private 
in the ownership of an enterprise (or part of an enterprise). Alternatively, public enterprise 
may remain in existence while privatisation takes place without transfer of ownership of 
assets. Falling into this category are liberalisation involving deregulation of controls on entry, 
price, output and profit, as well as the adoption of a commercial approach, whereby the 
provision of a good or service moves from the public to the private sector, but with ultimate 
responsibility for providing the service remaining with the government, frequently referred to 
as “contracting-out”.
In what is now a very extensive literature on the relationship between public and private 
sectors as well as on privatisation and its various aspects, the question of comparison between 
public and private firms’ performance and privatisation performance remains open. The aim 
of this thesis is to investigate public and private sector performance alongside privatisation 
performance. It has been over twenty years since the beginning of intensive privatisation 
programmes in the UK, and other European countries subsequently adopted similar policies 
beginning in the early 1980s; there is thus, adequate in principle evidence available to make 
such an investigation possible. The questions regarding public and private firms’ performance 
and privatisation performance which this thesis aims to answer may be summarised in the 
following three points:
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1. Does the available evidence support the idea that private and privatised firms 
outperform state-owned firms?
2. Is ownership an influential aspect of corporate performance, as claimed by the many 
theories in favour of privatisation?
3. Is competition a significant phenomenon in determining corporate performance?
Central to these questions is the fundamental issue of the method used to measure corporate 
performance, given that different economic theories have suggested different methods. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that the issue of method has not been sufficiently addressed 
by theories in favour of privatisation, a point that will be examined in more detail in chapter 2. 
The absence of a generally accepted method of measuring corporate performance has led to 
contradictory results in the comparison between public and private sector performance, 
including privatisation performance, according to empirical studies, which are covered in 
chapter 3.
State involvement with the market and with the operation of public enterprises, as 
documented in the literature, is justified in various ways, notably preventing “market 
failures;” establishing firms in those areas where the country has a dynamic comparative 
advantage; and intervening in circumstances where the capital market is incomplete or 
undeveloped, or in projects that require large capital initially, as for instance in cases 
requiring large infrastructural investment, or where there are macroeconomic considerations. 
It seems that privatisation and market liberalisations are used as a replacement for the role 
government might otherwise take to deal with market failure. Such measures are taken in the 
name of the improvement of the economy as a whole through the superiority of market forces.
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A comparison between the private and public sectors and the effect of privatisation on the 
index of the shift in property relations might well show that privatised companies have many 
more opportunities to be involved in the rest of the economy (Fine, 1997a). Public sector 
firms have a completely different economic role to that of similar firms in the private sector: 
they do not compete with private companies, or try to promote situations in which the private 
sector is given greater opportunities for development. The adjustment from public to private 
ownership will result in the abandonment of those restrictions as well as in a complete 
reversal of strategic goals in favour of profitability (Fine, 1997a). This process is also 
directed by globalisation, which requires relatively small public sectors compared to private 
sectors, because private sectors provide more opportunity for investment and profit making. 
It is inevitable during the adjustment process to a greater market economy that making 
industrial policy in the new situation, with relatively small public sectors, is even more 
difficult (Fine, 1997a).
Positive views of privatisation point to a number of benefits resulting from its adoption. 
Because privatisation undermines the role of the unions, it permits a tough labour policy, 
which deals with the problems caused by inefficient workers and thereby makes controlling 
employment levels much easier. It also permits the public sector economy to become familiar 
with ‘the enterprise culture’ as well as with the mechanism of the market place, leading to the 
rationalisation of asset portfolios and the strategic reorganisation of investment. This in turn 
leads to improvement of the company’s balance sheets, introducing sensitivity and product 
quality improvement while providing adequate facilities for merging as required by the 
economics of international competition. Furthermore, since public managers and politicians 
act in favour of each other, issues such as wage levels, investment plans, borrowing
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requirements and restructuring projects are assumed to be resolved by this internal 
relationship. Privatisation supposedly breaks up this relationship and introduces a more 
efficient process of decision-making.
A final argument in favour of privatisation identifies a number of financial benefits to the 
policy. Firstly, the sale of public enterprises results in the removal of their capital investment 
programmes from the public sector accounts; consequently, public sector borrowing is 
reduced. Secondly, it has been argued that private companies have more direct and faster 
access to the international capital market than public companies do. Thirdly, privatisation 
contributes to the growth of the stock exchange, and can widen the capital market by bringing 
in many new investors. Fourthly, privatisation helps minimise the commercial risk and 
therefore reduces economic problems for the government in different periods, especially when 
the market is volatile or in recession. It seems, however, that the above principle does not 
apply to private companies. As Vickers and Wright (1988: 8) argue, ‘it should be pointed out 
that such rescue operations have not been restricted to the public sector, and nationalisations 
have often been precisely the result of bailing out private firms in dire financial difficulty’1.
The expansion of the public sector prior to the oil crises at the beginning of the 1970s led to a 
higher proportion of gross national product spending in the public sector. This provided 
goods for which there is always extra demand, for instance, in education and health care. 
Extra demands for public goods also generate criticism and dissatisfaction. The argument of 
whether and how the public sector can allocate resources in the way that consumers can be 
satisfied remains open (Clarke, 1993). Moreover, it has become apparent that bureaucracy in 
the public sector has caused inefficiency and inflexibility. As far as managerial behaviour is 
concerned, there is supposed to be a tight link between the management of public sector
4
enterprises and the government; this opens the way to political interference, and thus to 
further difficulties in strategic planning. Difficulties have mounted when governments 
involved in public industries face external constraints on further borrowing. Responding to 
these difficulties, governments have undertaken a series of reforms in order to improve public 
sector performance, including measures such as limitations on the amount of money pumped 
into public sector industry, limitations on employment levels, introduction of assessments of 
staff and organisations as well as costs and outputs, and introduction of a competitive base for 
performance indicators and performance measurements (Clarke, 1993).
However, in order to understand privatisation in greater depth, it is necessary to view it from a 
number of different angles. Privatisation, the act of handing down an economic activity from 
one party to another, involves a much deeper adjustment than one concerned only with the 
redistribution and redefinition of property rights. For example, it is generally believed that 
privatisation leads to an expansion in share ownership through the sale of a governmental 
economic activity to shareholders. What happens in reality seems to be the exact opposite. 
Much empirical evidence suggests that privatisation actually results in a further consolidation 
of economic power and an increased concentration of corporate ownership.
From this, it can be concluded that privatisation should be analysed with an eye to the close 
relationship between economic and political power. On one side, the number of shareholders 
increases sharply, while on the other side there is a further consolidation of economic power 
in the hands of huge corporations, which demand much greater flexibility in employment laws 
and much less power for trade unions. This shows how privatisation, which may begin with 
the aim, for example, of economic efficiency, actually results in an extension of political 
power, which affects a far wider range of the members of society.
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From the consumer’s point of view, the primary concern in relation to privatisation and its 
broader macroeconomic impact has always been what happens to quality of service, i.e., 
whether prices remain unchanged and whether or not the scope of service declines. In order 
to respond to these public concerns, governments have deployed a range of remedies, from 
establishing regulatory committees to a policy of subsidies to the privatised industries. 
Whether such responsive policies succeed in meeting the consumers’ demands remains an 
open question. However, the conflict between regulator and regulated has a greater impact on 
consumer benefits. There is no doubt that the regulated will resist all regulations that limit 
their power to make decisions in different areas. This resistance on the part of the regulated 
has limited the room for manoeuvre of the regulators. In addition there are legally defined 
matters, such as the level of investment, training, employment, etc., over which regulators 
have very limited power. It has to be concluded that privatisation adjustment involves a 
process in which suppliers have increasing freedom over their decisions, while consumers 
have less.
In the two decades or so since the first intensive privatisation programme by the British 
government, it has become clear that the success of any privatisation programme depends to a 
large extent on economic and political preconditions. The comparison between the processes 
of privatisation in different European countries shows clearly how privatisation performances 
can differ as a result of variations in the economic and political preconditions. As Wright 
(1990: 49) points out, ‘simple comparisons of the efficiency and effectiveness of private 
sector and public sector management cannot readily take account of their very different 
objectives. This fact confounds comparative assessments of public and private sector 
efficiency’.
Another important point is who may benefit directly from privatisation. Some financial 
institutions can make enormous amounts of money by arranging the sale of assets including 
their commissions. Their political advisors also benefit, specifically in terms of their salary as 
directors of previously publicly owned companies. Conyon’s study (1995) clearly 
demonstrates that directors5 salaries have jumped upwards sharply compared to their salaries 
before privatisation. What we can conclude from this very determined effort toward 
privatisation is that privatisation has been a very specific point in the conflict between those 
who benefit from the implementation of this process, and those who are forced to accept 
demotion. There is also an issue of loss of confidence among civil service employees when 
the public sector is perceived to adopt private sector norms, which may have significant 
consequences: where public sector employees see the process of adjustment as not likely to 
work in their favour, and thus do not expect work conditions to improve, inefficiencies may 
rise substantially (Fine, 1997b).
Privatisation as an economic adjustment is also inextricably bound up with ideology. This 
ideological involvement raises a wider range of issues, from casting doubt on the legitimacy 
of government to public service ethics (Fine, 1997b). The expectation that the private sector 
will perform much more efficiently than the public sector has led to the adoption of private 
sector norms in the public sector. Whether this is helpful or not in enhancing the efficiency of 
the public sector, is however a matter for debate. As Hague (1996: 200) stresses, in most of 
the market economies, the efficient, and profitable sectors are dominated by private firms, 
whereas the public sector is left with activities which are socially unavoidable but 
economically non-profit-making and unattractive, such as healthcare, food provision, housing, 
and education for the poor. Due to this monopolization of profitable enterprises by the private
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sector and the imposition of economically less viable functions on the public sector, the 
comparison between the two becomes relatively unjust.
Heald (1983: 298) describes privatisation as ‘an umbrella term for many different policies 
loosely linked by the way in which they are taken to mean a strengthening of the market at the 
expense of the state’. Privatisation, then, is not a single determinate policy, but encompasses 
a range of variant policies. In addition, neo-liberalism has attached itself to the policy of 
privatisation, with the object of lowering taxation and inflation, cutting back on public 
involvement in industry and on more restrictive budgetary macro-economic policies, changing 
labour market policies by increasing “flexibility,” squeezing the size of public administration 
and abandoning subsidiary policies to different industries. It must be added that massive 
technological advances have eased the entrance to natural monopoly in several industries 
(such as telecommunications) for the private economic agent, while economic crisis in other 
industries (particularly rail transport, coal and steel) has undermined governments’ economic 
activities (Vickers and Wright, 1988).
The question may arise of why privatisation has become such a widespread policy. The 
answer to this may not be straightforward. Some might point to the policy shifts towards a 
right-wing laissez-faire policy such as that associated with Thatcherism and Reaganism at the 
expense of Keynesian / welfarism. However, the emergence into prominence of this neo­
liberal perspective may not be sufficient to explain the wider adoption of the policy, 
especially for those who seek objective explanations in terms of market domination. As Fine 
(1997a: 373) points out, ‘more secure grounds for explaining the emergence of privatisation
are to be found in the shifting conditions under which the accumulation of capital has been 
occurring’.
In relation to this approach, three factors should be emphasised. The first is concerned with 
the production process of the restructuring of capital, which has changed in terms of the 
internationalisation of production, with implications for state ownership. New technology has 
caused the old divisions between various sectors of the economy to break down. This leads to 
a new era in the relation between the public and private sectors, in which the former seems 
increasingly to be confined and restricted compared to the latter, as Fine argues (1989 and 
1990).
The second point relates to the effects of globalisation and new technology, which have 
revolutionised the financial sectors. From the emergence of this global process and its 
strength, it would appear that privatisation both gives and takes benefits at the same time. In a 
more and more competitive environment, which increasingly promotes the financial sector, 
privatisation seems to have a significant role.
The final and the most noticeable point in explaining the rise of privatisation is to be found in 
the relationship between capital and labour. The implementation of the privatisation process 
involves reorganisation and restructuring of the balance between these two parties. As a 
result, the balance has shifted in favour of capital, at the cost of much higher levels of 
unemployment. Privatisation and its effects cannot be ignored in enhancing the flexibility of 
the labour market, shifting the balance in favour of capital and resulting in significantly 
weakening labour.
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The theoretical literature on privatisation suffers from different shortcomings. As Fine 
(1997a: 14) emphasises, the theoretical literature on privatisation is sorely limited in its ability 
to address the issue with which it is concerned. This is not simply a matter of omission that 
can be corrected. The whole approach is deficient for its undue generality, for being 
exclusively concerned with static conditions of resource allocation and efficiency as opposed 
to the dynamics of industrial change, and for its lack of socio-economic, political and 
historical content. The reasons for this lie in part in the attempt to impose previously 
developed theory to a host of very different circumstances.
This observation suggests that the theoretical literature on privatisation cannot offer an 
effective explanation for this economic adjustment in every circumstance. The general 
direction of existing theories, and particularly their failure to take into account the process of 
historical change, inevitably undermine the reliability of the theoretical literature on 
privatisation. Not surprisingly, the low standard of existing theoretical work has provided the 
opportunity for theories such as the new political economy, the new industrial economics, and 
neo-Austrian theory to assert the benefits of the privatisation process, with no significant 
intellectual opposition.
This thesis, by contrast, will engage directly with the empirical and theoretical issues arising 
in relation to the privatisation process, in order to answer the questions raised by this 
introduction. Chapter 2 presents a review of the theoretical literature on privatisation, with 
particular attention to the treatment given by various theoretical approaches to the issue of 
measuring corporate performance. Theories to be considered are the property rights school, 
the public choice school, the Principal Agents theory, the Austrian school of economics, and 
the new synthesis, comprising the new political economy, the neo-Austrian school of
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economics and the neo-institutional economics. Each of these approaches has concentrated on 
some particular aspect of the relationship between public and private sector.
Chapter 3 provides a literature review of empirical studies on the relationship between public 
and private sector and privatisation, focusing mainly on the most well known studies. The 
discussion will be methodological, and will consider how the studies are conducted, what 
criteria have been used for measuring coiporate performance, and what the results show.
Chapter 4 offers a critique of the conventional method of measuring coiporate performance, 
total factor productivity, outlining various problems with this method, and summarising some 
of the criticisms that have been made of the neo-classical school with which this method is 
associated. It then proposes as an alternative the method known as factor analysis, arguing 
that this method is more suitable and presents, in principle fewer problems in measuring 
corporate performance. Factor analysis looks at the correlation between the different variables 
involved, searching out systematic patterns. Today it can be undertaken easily using the 
assistance of the SPSS programme, which is widely used in other social sciences, such as 
psychology and sociology. This chapter will therefore explain and justify our decision to use 
factor analysis in our investigation of the outcomes of privatisation. It will also give a more 
general outline of the research method and process, which gives particular emphasis to local 
difference. The research is based on an exploration of the privatisation experience in several 
different European countries, each with its own particular economic structure and dynamic, 
and these need to be investigated separately. Furthermore each sector of the economy differs 
from others in terms of its finance, markets, international position, technological prospects, 
political context, etc. Thus we intend to avoid drawing any conclusions that might disregard 
these factors. Our aim in looking at the privatisation experience in various European countries
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is not to find a general theory or explanation, but to analyse the effects of privatisation in 
different contexts.
Chapter 5 and 6 are devoted to the discussion of our investigation results, derived from factor 
analysis of different types. Type-one factor analysis, in chapter 5, compares the performance 
of public and private companies of 14 European countries for two years, 1998 and 2000. 
Calculations are carried out for each country for the two years, and at the end of this section a 
cross-country analysis presents the combination of results for the countries involved for the 
two years. Type-two factor analysis, in chapter 6, looks at privatisation performance by 
comparing the performance of public and privatised films for the same two years, 1998 and 
2000. The third-type experiment, in chapter 6, examines the characteristics of variable 
ownership by adding some new parameters to the main variables. The last-type of factor 
analysis, again in chapter 6, investigates the effect of competition on coiporate performance 
by adding a new variable called, concentration. It is confined to Sweden. Finally, the main 
findings and conclusions are summarised in a brief closing chapter.
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Notes
l-It has been argued that selling state assets provides money for the government to run public sector 
requirements as well as reducing large budget deficits. This may true for a short period, but not in the longer 
term. As Vickers and Wright (1988: 8) stress, ‘it should be noted, however, that asset sales improve short-term 
cash flow in a once-and, for- all manner: in general they do not enhance a government’s long-term net worth, 
and may even cause it to deteriorate i f  profitable assets are sold o ff too cheaply’.
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Chapter 2 
Review of public versus private ownership in terms of theory of 
relative performance and likely implications for measurement of 
performance
2.1 Introduction
This chapter’s aim is to examine theories of the relationship between the public and private 
sectors. The main purpose is to draw out the empirical implications of theory for assessing the 
performance of private versus public enterprises. As a general procedure, their strengths and 
weaknesses will be discussed. Specifically, our aim is to find out whether and how they are 
useful for measuring corporate performance.
A dramatic change has occurred in industrial policy in most European countries from the 
beginning of the 1980s. The change has led to a significant shift towards private ownership in 
many different industrial sectors. Also a new era has begun in the relationship between the 
private and the public sectors. Minimizing the size of the public sector and reducing the role 
played by the state in the economy have become a policy goal for most governments in nearly 
all parts of the world. In order to implement this movement, privatisation has played a 
significant role.
Privatisation is not a simple matter of transferring ownership from the public to the private 
sector. This simplistic view is misleading and does not take into account many aspects of this 
type of economic action (Veljanovski, 1987) '. The emphasis on privatisation and the 
theoretical benchmark for its legitimacy and usefulness have changed from that of the early 
1980’s. Current thinking has moved from a position in which differences in performance
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derive solely from differences in ownership to one that considers the measurement of 
performance irrespective of ownership. An increase in market competition has been regarded 
as more important than change in ownership for improving performance and efficiency (Cook 
and Kirkpatrick, 1995). Empirical studies purport to show that market competition is the 
catalyst for economic efficiency that is to be achieved under either public or private 
ownership (Millward, 1988).
What is revealed by this simple shift in understanding of the determinants of public/private 
sector is that ownership as such is not the only important factor but, by the same token, why is 
only one further factor - competition - considered? Of course, regulation, whether of private 
or public, was soon to follow. But why stop here rather than adding each and every factor 
that may or may not contribute to economic performance over and above that of ownership 
(itself liable to be too crudely seen as the simple dichotomy of public and private, with many 
different forms within each of these broad categories)?
This all suggests that a deeper point is involved, and the theory of public/private sector 
performance inevitably depends upon a more general stance on economic theory -  a 
conception of how the economy functions ranging from methodology at one extreme to which 
factors are included or excluded at the other. Consequently, the treatment of public/private 
sector performance is liable to be generally influenced by prevailing economic theory. At the 
time that privatisation came to the fore as a policy in practice, the new information-theoretical 
approach to microeconomics was also emerging. Indeed, as in many other areas, privatisation 
has served as a convenient application for the theory of market imperfections and asymmetric 
information. It becomes a principal-agent problem as Fine (1997a: 8) stresses, ‘privatisation 
proved a natural application, even though such factors are far from being its sole nor most
15
important determinants’.
Further, quite apart from privatisation being interpreted within the current fashions attached to 
economic theory, there is an influence in the opposite direction. Privatisation itself offers a 
topic to be addressed and so does its experience in practice as it evolves. Thus two main 
features have characterised the whole issue of privatisation. As Fine (1997b: 376-377) 
stresses: ‘first, the issue of privatisation has been interpreted within the existing fashions of 
the discipline. This has involved the new microeconomics and industrial economics around 
transaction costs, property rights and informational imperfections and asymmetries. Second, 
the literature has tailed upon market developments as they have arisen in sequence with the 
progress of privatisation itself ...what to privatise, how to privatise, and how to regulate’. 
Subsequently, the privatisation literature, which focuses on the redefinition and redistribution 
of property rights, has been taken a step further to investigate the actual results of 
privatisation. Fine (1997a: 15) argues that from its own perspective, ‘this is nothing other 
than the exercise of those newly formed property rights’.
If the performance of public versus private sector performance is to be understood, the 
theoretical framework for doing so is crucial. Before looking at empirical studies on relative 
performance our objective is to concentrate on several economic theories that favour the 
private sector and privatisation. The purpose is to take out from the theory the likely 
implications for measurement of performance. In other words, we shall investigate how those 
theories are applicable in practice for evaluating relative performance. What are the 
implications of the theory for outcomes and how might they be measured?
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To illustrate more precisely, for instance, the mainstream economics traditionally points to the 
efficient resource allocation through the price mechanism, whereas neo-Austrian economics 
points to the freedom of entrepreneurship as the most effective way for enhancing 
performance of the economy as a whole. How these approaches can be useful for measuring 
economic performance is an important question.
We examine the latter approach alongside the property rights theory, the public choice theory, 
the principal-agent theory, as well as the “new synthesis,” which is comprised of the new 
political economics, the new institutional economics and the neo-Austrian school of 
economic. The main goal as mentioned is to evaluate them for their implications for 
measuring economic performance.
All these theories generally favour private ownership and view state ownership as inefficient, 
especially in a competitive market. To summarize broadly, the property rights school 
emphasises the role of ownership; private ownership is believed to improve corporate 
performance through incentives, and market phenomena are seen as disciplinary mechanisms 
for allocating resources efficiently. The public choice school emphasises the idea that the 
public sector acts against the public interest and efficiency - while the private sector is 
controlled by market discipline, the public sector serves the interests of managers or 
politicians. Principal-agent theory, on the other hand, emphasises the relationship between 
the principal shareholders and the agent (company managers) and tends to claim that the latter 
can be made to work more favourably on behalf of the former. In the presence of market 
discipline the Austrian school of economics stresses the role of the entrepreneurial factor in 
the market, and relaxation of any barriers is believed to improve entrepreneurs’ behaviours. 
According to the new synthesis, creating greater competition is assumed to be more important
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than ownership. The new political economy sees government activities in markets as inducing 
rent seeking behaviour. The neo-Austrian School stresses individual behaviour as a dynamic 
phenomenon. The new institutional economics divides institutions into market and non- 
market institutions; it separates the internal organisation of a firm from its external market 
relations and further asserts that since the economic agent cannot have adequate information 
for decision-making, non-market institutions cannot behave optimally.
As a generalisation, it can be concluded that the different theories offer plenty of opportunity 
for empirical investigation, while difficulties in measurement of comparative performance in 
practice remain unsolved. Yet the problem of how to measure relative performance has rarely 
been taken forward on the basis of the theories. Our findings emphasise how those theories 
that favour the private sector and support privatisation policy have scarcely broached their 
implications for measuring corporate performance.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In section two, the property rights school is 
discussed in detail. The main features of the theory are presented in order to give a broad 
picture. Its strengths and weaknesses and specifically its implication for measuring corporate 
performance are examined closely in a separate subsection. The same procedures are used for 
evaluating the other theories. The public choice school, the Austrian school of economics, the 
principal-agent theory and the new synthesis are discussed in successive sections. Each 
section has a subsection in which the critical points of each school will be discussed as in the 
property rights section. The last section will be devoted to concluding remarks in which a 
brief summary of the main points, our critical assessment, and its implications for the next 
chapters will be presented.
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2.2 Property Rights Theory
The argument of property rights theorists is that differences in performance between private 
and public firms depend on their ownership arrangements. In other words, various forms of 
property ownership give rise to different economic incentives and in the end to different 
economic results. As Furubotn and Pejovich (1972: 1138) argue: ‘different property rights 
assignments lead to different penalty-reward structures and, hence, decide the choices that are 
open to decision makers’.
The property rights school puts much emphasis on methodological individualism and the role 
of individuals as the source of decision-making. Individuals as a unit make decisions instead 
of firms or any other organizations or institutions. They are viewed as seeking maximum 
utility while the prevailing system of property relations imposes limitations. According to the 
property rights theorists, who owns a resource is not as important as who has the right to use 
the resources. In a general form, this refers not only to the right to use material things, but 
also to so-called human rights, i.e. the rights of voting, freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion. As Pejovich (1990: 27) points out: ‘the property-rights definition applies to all rights 
of an individual vis-a-vis other people’.
The following elements of the right of ownership are the most important subcategories of 
property rights: the right to use an asset, the right to have suitable returns from the asset, and 
the right to change that asset’s form or its substance. The last element seems to be an 
important part of the right of ownership. It implies that the owner has the rights to transfer all 
or some of the rights in the asset to others at mutually agreed terms. It asserts that the right of 
ownership is an exclusive right; but it is not an unrestricted right as it is subject to legal 
limitations. Thus, exclusivity and transferability are the main characteristics of ownership by
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which the owner is free to choose what to do with an asset, subject only to limitations of the 
law. A combination of the owners’ rights, utilization of that property, and the acceptance of 
the consequences of any given decision, will create incentives for the owner to seek the best 
use for assets. Therefore, the resources will move to their highest-valued uses under private 
ownership, which provides adequate incentives for those actions.
How these considerations apply to the real world, in the case of a joint-stock company, for 
example, is an open and important question. Modern economic activity is nowadays based on 
cooperative activities, and the efforts of the individual are part of overall efforts made by all 
participants. As a result, compensation is not easily determined on an individual basis. 
Adding to this, because it does not come about via a single or singular action, measurement of 
corporate performance faces a multitude of difficult problems. In such a complex situation, 
the role played by individuals is impossible to determine (Tittenbrun, 1996).
In order to deal with such measurement problems it is necessary to explore certain property 
rights further, especially the right to be a residual claimant, the right to revise employee 
conditions of work, or, more simply, to hire and fire, and the right to sell these rights. 
Regarding revision of employee’s conditions in the modern corporation, however, a sensitive 
reward system has to be introduced to encourage the cooperating employees to put in optimal 
productive efforts. This brings an acute need for introducing a monitoring system by which it 
would be possible to discourage shirking. The question that arises is what happens if the 
monitor self shirks? The only person one can expect not to shirk is the owner of the firm.
In modern corporations, ownership is typically dispersed among many shareholders. 
Individual owners incur high costs in monitoring managerial decisions, which enforce
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residual-maximising behaviour. This reduces the ability of smaller shareholders to control 
managerial behaviour, even though the managers’ decisions affect the shareholders’ wealth. 
As a result, managers might, and in some cases will, pursue their own interests at the expense 
of the owners’ interests. The greater the dispersion of ownership, the greater is the managers’ 
opportunity to pursue own welfare.
But property rights proponents argue that there are several effective ways to offset those kinds 
of behaviour. One way is competition among managers of different companies, leading to a 
hidden monitoring system, managers monitoring managers themselves. Moreover, the capital 
market also acts as a second outsider to monitor managerial decisions. If a manager’s 
decisions are inappropriate, it will lead to lower profits, lower share prices, and the threat of 
takeover bids, all of which are to the detriment of the manager. Inside the company, because 
the overall performance of the firm is the initial priority, higher-level management is 
interested in checking shirking by lower level management. Lower managers, on the other 
hand, are also motivated to monitor upper level managers because if  the company performs 
well, the success of the firm will increase the chance of their own success, vis-a-vis a new 
managerial posts outside the company. A second way is forming incentive payment based on 
the corporation’s profits.
A third way involves diversification of labour and duties. In the owner-manager company 
one person is dealing with a wide range of duties and it is unlikely that he or she will have 
sufficient competence to fulfil all duties in an efficient way. In contrast, a modem company 
distributes duties among competent staff so that each duty is handled expertly. Finally, the 
saleability of shares combined with knowledge of various company past records and expected 
future share prices can provide adequate material for an appropriate investment decision
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(Alchian, 1977).
These factors can create a discipline, which in turn safeguards anticipated behaviour of 
managers. Alchian (1977: 231) stresses this guarantee as ‘Managers can move to new jobs; 
and they compete for jobs by superior performance on present jobs’. Hence, the system 
encourages them to put in much effort to seek a high return for shareholders since that, in 
turn, increases their own value for the managerial post in the labour market. As a result, 
market control is a powerful disciplinary force for inefficient managers. These economic 
forces are strong enough to protect both the shareholders’ wealth and the tendency for 
resources to seek their highest-valued uses. Pejovich (1990: 64) stresses that: ‘... the bundle 
of property rights in a corporate firm provides some powerful incentives for top management 
to pursue policies and decisions that tend to maximize the firm’s market worth’.
These arguments can be interpreted as an economic rationale for privatisation and against 
nationalised companies. The form of ownership can make a difference for economic 
performance. The reason is that private ownership introduces a system of incentives that do 
not apply to public enterprises. The basic difference is that ownership rights allow the private 
owner to sell shares, while the public owner is unable to do so (Alchian, 1977). This brings 
about two fundamental results. On the one hand, takeovers in the public sector become 
impossible and, on the other hand, there is no possibility of specialisation regarding different 
areas of work among owners.
The property rights theory believes that ownership of public property is a compulsion on 
individuals. Moving from one community to another involves acquiring new shares in public 
ownership without paying for it. This kind of ownership does not exist under private
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ownership. Because property in public enterprises is not transferable, issues such as the 
capitalisation of future value based 011 current decisions and residual claimants must be ruled 
out. Increases in value of public assets are dispersed throughout the community, and at the 
same time enhanced profitability and cost reductions in a public enterprise could be refunded 
to the public through tax reductions. Other phenomena relevant to public enterprises can be 
pointed out, such as: each person’s wealth and his own activity have a much weaker 
relationship to public ownership which leads to a weaker incentive to monitor the behaviour 
of decision-makers in public enterprises; competition for managerial jobs is much weaker 
than in privately owned corporations; and efficiency incentives for public enterprise managers 
are assumed to be weaker because there is no link between their compensations and financial 
performance. As a consequence, managers of those films have greater opportunity for 
shirking than managers of private companies (Zeckhauser and Horn, 1989). Hence, when an 
enterprise is owned by the entire society, 110 individual member has the incentive to take care 
of it and inefficiency is an inevitable consequence.
Thus, the property rights analysis of public ownership comes to the conclusion that public 
enterprises are less economically efficient than private enterprises. Forms of ownership lead 
to differences in the rewards-penalties systems. Inefficiency will arise when property rights 
are dispersed and motivation is diminished across individuals. Even though there is a similar 
divergence between ownership and management in the modern corporation that does not lead 
to any major change in the performance of private enterprise. The problem of how 
shareholders are able to monitor management in a large corporation can be resolved by 
introducing other phenomena.
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2.2.1 A Critical Assessment of Property Rights Theory
Important questions regarding shareholder ownership are whether they own the company in 
reality or are only a lender of money to an economic activity, and which comprises the higher 
risk. Can having the right to sell your shares at any time and the right to dividends after a 
period of time be regarded as ownership of the company? One could consider that, because 
they have the right to vote, shareholders are owners. What happens in reality is that daily 
routine decisions are made by managers, not by the shareholder, and important policies will 
be decided in the shareholders’ meeting. Those shareholders who have acquired a large 
number of shares have the greatest effect on which future polices are going to be 
implemented. It is obvious that smaller shareholders have little or no effect on decisions 
regarding the future of the company. Demsetz (1967: 358-9) puts forward the idea that: 
‘Effective ownership, i.e., effective control of property, is thus legally concentrated in 
management’s hands ... shareholders are essentially lenders of equity capital and not owners 
... What shareholders really own are their shares and not the coiporation. Ownership in the 
sense of control again becomes a largely individual affair. The shareholders own their shares, 
and the president of the corporation and possibly a few other top executives control the 
corporation’.
Whether this is true or not can be investigated further by raising this question: what are the 
differences between the owners of bonds issued by government or by any financial 
institutions and the smaller shareholders as far as the ownership is concerned? Showing 
clearly that there are no differences between these two types of owners, Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972: 789) write that: ‘instead of thinking of shareholders as joint owners, we can think of 
them as investors, like bondholders.... If we treat bondholders, preferred and convertible 
preferred stockholders, and common stockholders and warrant holders as simply different
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classes of investors ... why should stockholders be regarded as “owners” in any sense distinct 
from the other financial investors? ’ This can be counted as a significant reason why smaller 
shareholders have limited incentive to monitor managerial behaviours.
Who owns the public enterprises, the government or the public as whole, is unknown. This 
uncertainty can be seen in the statement made by Nutter (1974: 222), ‘If an abstract entity 
such as the state is to be called the owner, then government must be the concrete agency 
charged with trusteeship. Government will be ... responsible to some group of persons for 
whom it is acting as agent, and it will presumably be responsive at least indirectly to their 
interests. Ultimately, then, the persons controlling government are the effective owners of 
state-owned enterprises, while government or some part of it serves as manager’.
The concept of what comprises public ownership is also another ambiguity as far as the 
property rights argument is concerned. It is assumed that the public at large owns this kind of 
property. While it might be clear that what is called publicly owned differs area to area, only 
the enterprises which are owned by the central government can be counted as owned by the 
whole public of a particular country. However, different enterprises owned by local 
authorities are also assumed to be publicly owned, although any benefits or losses resulting 
from those enterprises will presumably remain restricted to the public from those areas, not 
the entire population of the whole country.
The ambiguities and inconsistencies are not restricted to those areas only; “mixed” enterprises 
offer a case in point. Where can they be located in the relation between public and private 
ownership? Can the degree of participation be the main criterion? Is not such a procedure a 
mechanical procedure?
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Similarity between public and private enterprises cannot be ignored; these exist in many 
different ways. It has been one of the main arguments in favour of large privately owned 
corporations that the risk will be diversified among shareholders. In the case of public-owned 
companies, if the owner is the public, then the risk will be diversifiable much more so among 
taxpayers (taken as the shareholders). Hence, why the latter has little incentive to monitor 
management compared to the former is an open question. Sappington and Stiglitz (1987: 
567) argue that: ‘many similarities exist between the everyday operation of public and private 
enterprise in practice.... Neither congressmen nor minority shareholders directly control the 
daily activities of an enterprise that is, in principle, under their control. Instead, oversight of 
the firm’s operation is delegated to a commission or board of directors’.
The outlook of the property rights school is that private ownership is important for better 
performance. It has been concluded that if managers in manager-controlled firms seek their 
own objectives then such firms will perform less well compared to owner-controlled firms. In 
contrast, Monsen, Chiu and Cooley (1968) conducted an investigation of seventy-two 
corporations among 500 of the largest industrial firms in the United States and found that 
owner-controlled firms are more efficient than shareholder companies for allocating 
resources, as manifested in a much better return on shareholders’ equity. In a study by 
Bothwell (1980), owner-controlled films had better results than shareholder companies. In a 
study of a single industry, of 1,406 banks, Glassman and Rhoades (1980) found that owner- 
controlled banks are more profitable than manager-controlled ones.
These findings do not support the property rights theory and the empirical evidence available 
declares results inconsistent with the theory’s claims. However, in the property rights
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literature, these findings are attributed to the failure of internal and external control forces, 
which are deemed to diminish managerial discretion.
According to the property rights literature, compensation to managers based on the wealth of 
the shareholders provokes the optimal effort by the former on behalf of the latter. However, 
matters are not that simple. Dividends seem to be more interesting for shareholders, yet 
capital gains and share options are said to be the most effective mechanism for inducing 
management to run the firm effectively. However, free riding by managers may not be 
eliminated by mechanisms like share option schemes, profit-sharing systems and other related 
systems (Williamson, 1970). The performance of the firm is a function of many different 
factors. The management only controls some of those factors and others will only be 
indirectly reworded or even excluded from sharing in the gains available (Tittenbrun, 1996). 
Different ways have been used to determine compensation to executives. One is by sales. 
However, both reported profits and equity market values are considerably more important 
than sales in the determination of executive compensation. Even if there were a positive 
relationship between profits and executive rewards or between compensation and sales, that 
does not undermine the possibility that managerial objectives diverge from shareholders’ 
goals. The research published in The Economist (1992b: 21), based on a study of 459 major 
US companies, dismisses the relation between executive compensation and total returns to 
shareholders.
It has been argued that share options give managers an incentive to put in optimal effort for 
achieving the company’s long-term success, and, therefore, the wealth of its owners. But 
many factors beyond the control of the manager (i.e., bull markets, inflation, takeover bids 
etc.) play a role, which can bring “unearned” gains. On the other hand, unlike normal shares,
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executive share options are a one-way street; you can win with them but cannot lose 
according to the rules applied to incentive arrangements in general (Thackray, 1983/
Figures published in The Economist (1992b: 22) show that in 1981 the average chief 
executive was paid about fifteen times more than a factory worker ($315,000 versus $21,300). 
Ten years later, chief executives of the 500 largest US corporations earned a total average 
annual pay of $2 million (including the estimated value of stock options), which is about 
eighty-five times the pay of the average factory worker. Thus, this gap has widened over time 
even though much research shows a negative correlation between the number and value of 
incentive schemes and the company’s performance (The Economist, 1992b). A related 
question, which may arise, is: what relationship is there (if any) between the gains to 
controllers (shareholders) and job occupiers (managers) as far as stock performance is 
concerned? A lower turnover of management should be expected in those companies that 
have performed poorly. But factors other than shareholders’ gains and companies’ 
performance play significant roles determining managerial compensations.
What happens in reality, regarding the effects of the market for executives, is in contrast to 
the claim made by property rights proponents. Chief executives of other companies (who 
dominate the board’s compensation committee) set the payment for the company’s chief 
executives. A self-propelled mechanism is set as The Economist (1992a: 15) indicates: ‘most 
non-executive directors are themselves executives in other firms and they are only too happy 
to raise the pay of their peers, as they are part of the same job market and therefore stand to 
benefit from generous benchmarks for their “market price”’.
The role of competition among managers claimed in the property rights literature is another
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point of consideration. The claim is that managers compete for promotions and new higher 
position jobs by giving outstanding performance in their present jobs. Anders’ study (1992) 
of 220 large companies shows that the average chief executive has stayed in office for at least 
6.5 years; while according to some other studies the normal length of time in office is 10 
years. Hence, the empirical evidence does not support the above claim unless it is by fear of 
dismissal.
The mechanism of takeover is assumed to be the last solution if incentive systems failed to 
motivate managers to maximise the wealth of shareholders. The argument is that the threat of 
takeover will lead to a removal of management that is unsuccessful in using assets efficiently. 
It is known that if  assets have been poorly managed there is always a threat of takeover by 
some outsider (in privately owned companies, but not in publicly owned companies). 
Moreover, since the market for corporate control is independent of the character of the 
product market; property rights proponents stress that the absence of competition in product 
markets may not lead to a different quality of management in monopolistic markets as 
compared with competitive markets. How these arguments can be applied to the exceptional 
economic performance of companies in Japan and Germany is an open question. Herman 
(1981: 100) proposes an idea, which seems to be closer to reality. He believes that the 
takeover threat is more probable when an enterprise has made quicker profits than normal, in 
opposition to predictions of the property rights proponents. This may lead to ‘quick gains at 
the expense of risk-taking and longer-term investment’. Hence, the likelihood of takeover 
may work in the opposite direction, and the manager may have an even greater interest in 
increasing his personal satisfaction at the expense of the shareholders.
Privatisation does not necessarily free the treat of takeover. The introduction of “golden
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shares” as a form of corporate control by the government itself, limits on the size of individual 
shareholdings, and regulation of companies all tend to reduce the risk of takeover. As Bos 
(1991: 59-60) confirms: ‘the raider knows that he too will be regulated after executing a 
successful takeover. Therefore the regulated firms are not attractive candidates for a takeover. 
Profits will be low even after takeover, while divestiture typically will be legally forbidden. 
Since the privatised utility knows it is not a good target for potential raiders, there is no 
takeover threat and consequently no influence 011 productivity’. The claim that the takeover 
mechanism will lead to efficiency improvement is dismissed by available evidence regarding 
mergers. Cowling et al. (1980) found no signs of efficiency due to mergers in nine major 
cases. Lower cost operations as an indicator of efficiency were not found by Barnes (1985), 
in a comparison study o f before and after mergers.
The property rights school’s argument is that if the stock market is efficient, then share price 
will be an efficient tool for monitoring purposes. Vickers and Yarrow (1991: 115) confirm 
that share price ‘can be used in contracts between shareholders and manager- remuneration 
packages may include stock options, for example - and it might have further incentive effects 
via the managerial labour market’. What can be concluded is that the property rights 
approach puts more weight on the disciplinary function of the market for corporate control 
and fails to realize the state’s ability to monitor. This role is explicitly expressed by Bailey 
(1987: 141): ‘the constraints on public managers are certainly greater than on private 
managers. The constraints of labour, the press, and the citizenry hold public managers to a 
higher standard of accountability than private managers’.
Summing up, this analysis shows many weaknesses of the property rights theory in (1) claims 
of superiority of privately owned firms versus publicly owned firms, and (2) in the policy
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recommendation that privatisation will lead to greater efficiency. In property rights literature, 
ownership is given a substantially greater weight for determining performance than 
organizational characteristics such as type of leadership and cultural factors. The property 
rights theory’s emphasis on ownership alone fails to acknowledge other important concepts 
relevant to performance, such as information asymmetry, the effect of various economic 
incentives, the variety of contracts, differences relevant to public/private ownership, particular 
conditions or characteristics that might cause public institutions to perform well, and 
ambiguity of goals. As Starr (1989: 29) stresses, the property rights approach ‘takes the 
market as the standard for judging value and finds public institutions deficient because they 
fail to measure up to that standard (e.g., their “shareholders” cannot sell stock)’. Another 
criticism is that human socialised actions are undermined by the individualistic property rights 
approach. The theory remains silent about how corporate performance should be measured. 
No attention has been given to this despite the fact that the theory is about a comparative 
study of public and private sectors.
2.3 Public Choice Theory
Some of the economic literature regarding privatisation is more focused on the comparative 
economic efficiency of the public and private sector (Parker, 1998). A school of thought that 
has specifically concentrated on this aspect is called the public choice school. The 
assumption is that public sector activities are assumed to be less efficient than those in the 
private sector because state economic agents are maximising their own goals instead of the 
objectives of social welfare. Additionally, state industries are managed poorly and conflict 
among participants is inevitable because there are no integrated strategically operating goals. 
As a consequence, disruptive political interventions in management, the presence of rent- 
seeking groups (notably trade unions) and financial failure cannot be separated from state-
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owned enterprises. It has been argued that, generally speaking, inefficiency can be attributed 
to the ideological and political motives for government ownership of firms. These motives 
lead to behaviour that sustains political involvement in their management.
The fundamental reason for government intervention in the market is as a result of market 
failure associated with monopoly, externalities, public goods etc. The rationale behind the 
conventional welfare economics of the public interest or nationalisation of industries should 
be seen in that regard. Such a view results in assuming that: the main concerns for public 
managers are public interests, that they will then act to fulfil those interests; that their 
behaviour can be monitored by the public or by the government; and that public managers can 
be controlled by different principles than citizens, politicians and civil servants.
The theory of public choice, like the property rights analysis, provides the rationale for 
privatisation. As Linowes (1990: 83) reveals: ‘much of the intellectual inspiration of the 
contemporary privatisation movement in the United States has been derived from the writings 
of the Public Choice school’. It involves an extension of orthodox neoclassical analysis to 
politics rather than a theory of property rights as such. The public choice school focuses on 
managerial behaviour in public enterprises. Hence, a major consideration is determining the 
public managers’ objectives or motives. Public managers, in contrast to private managers, are 
concerned with gross revenue as distinct from profits. These revenues are expected to derive 
from selling products to the consumers and from getting subsidies from the government. 
Such behaviour inevitably brings about an increase of output beyond the profit-maximising 
level. According to the theory, what public enterprises do is to equalize the marginal social 
benefit of the last unit produced to actual marginal cost of production. As a result, public 
enterprises are inherently inefficient.
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It lias been argued that output goals in the public sector leads to over-investment. A lower 
interest rate at a discount cost available to the managers of state firms can predispose the 
public managers toward using more capital (Niskanen, 1968 and De Alessi, 1969). According 
to the public choice school, pressures on the part of the government cannot remedy this 
distortion because politicians, who are in office for a limited period, cannot have long-term 
plans regarding public enterprises and their managements. This concentration 011 the short 
term results in non-optimal behaviour of public managers.
The state enterprise is assumed to occupy a double monopoly position, one with regard to 
their position in the market and another with respect to their position in attaining government 
support. Furthermore, public managers can strengthen their bargaining position and present 
their own performance favourably because of exclusive access to information (Downs, 
1967).
The position of the managers in public enterprises can be strengthened by other phenomena 
like asymmetry of information and the citizen’s limited power to monitor managers of state 
firms. Individual citizens have limited scope for action. In contrast, special groups such as 
trade unions are given more opportunity to act freely gain through rent seeking. Sunstein 
(1990: 70) explains rent-seeking as: ‘In this context, rent-seeking might be defined as the 
dissipation of wealth through efforts to redistribute resources by way of politics, rather than 
the production of wealth through markets’. The public sector has become over manned, 
overpaid and under worked with the help of trade unions. Rent seeking is the source of 
inefficiency as resources are wasted in pursuit of these rents.
In the public choice literature, Fiorina and Noll (1978) present another model in which the
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relation between the government and public firms is seen differently. The assumption is that 
politicians have power over managers to dictate decisions about pricing, investment, 
employment, etc. The aims of the politicians are to satisfy their local constituents and secure 
their own political gains. Moreover, conflict over policy often occurs because profit 
maximization is not the main criterion and the government body is not a single entity, but 
consists of a number of politicians with different objectives. As Rees (1989: 23) confirms: 
‘[the government] consists of a number of politicians and administrators with different 
priorities or emphases, which they give to the various objectives. The balance of power may 
shift among members of this group, or its composition may change as a result of elections, 
political reshuffles, career changes, and so on. As a result the implicit weights given to the 
various objectives ... may change quite sharply over time’.
It is assumed that government uses the public firms as instruments to achieve various political 
goals. It can be an attempt to reduce unemployment or other goals such as regional 
development and subsidised goods or services. The named objectives may not be consistent 
with the economic goals of public enterprise in the short or long run and may weaken 
performance. However, political motives can be achieved even if commercial success and 
efficiency are sacrificed. As authors like Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988: 12) believe: ‘the most 
common cause of inefficiency in the public enterprise sector is political interference’. 
Whether managers of public enterprises try to maximize their own power or politicians do the 
same through their own electoral interests, the end results is assumed to be inconsistent with 
efficient performance.
It is clear that the public choice viewpoint, like the previous school of thought, maintains very 
strong views about public ownership. Nationalisation is unfavourable since it will reduce
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aggregate profitability. Therefore, private enterprises, which perform efficiently, are 
preferable to public enterprises. This conclusion provides a convincing economic case for 
privatisation. Privatisation will lead to change in economic prospects and will allow profit- 
maximising entrepreneurs to be the main source of economic performance. Operational 
efficiency is guaranteed, leading to a lower cost of production. Political pressures to redirect 
the enterprise’s activities at the expense of market efficiency will be eliminated. Large 
subsidies and other special economic considerations will be minimised and the search for 
ways to reduce costs will no longer be necessary. All these remedies lead to enhanced 
economic performance.
2.3.1 A critical assessment of public choice theory
There are many examples of government involvement in the economy and concern for 
economic conditions that reveal how those actions have been necessary for the economy as a 
whole. Governments from many of the EU countries, specifically, Sweden, Austria have 
worked to safeguard employment and improve working conditions. The governments of 
Finland and France have given much attention to regional policy; and the governments of 
Sweden, Finland and France have tried to impose economic policies to rebuild state-owned 
enterprises in order to compete on an international level. Adding to this list, in Germany in 
the 1960s, government economic policy was based on an expectation that state firms should 
compete against private firms with the aim of enhancing operating efficiency (Parker, 1998).
The objectives for state enterprises differ substantially from private ones (Parker, 1998). State 
enterprise objectives are often multiple and change from time to time. Hence, it is very 
difficult for this management to follow consistent and long-term business strategies, whereas
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this may not be so for private enterprises. Additionally, it is true that a change in government 
or a change in ministry has a direct effect on the economic policy agenda (Parker, 1998). 
These restrictions and these characteristics of state enterprises differ from the private sector 
and need to be accessed differently.
Accordingly, the following questions arise in response to the public choice approach. What is 
the consequence of government intervention and why does it always lead to distortions of the 
economy? Do interventions from governments substantially affect the performance of 
enterprises (private or public)? Parker (1998) points out that many examples can be found to 
show that political intervention has led to loss-making activities in state industries in Europe. 
But, whether this profit reduction has led to social welfare reduction is unknown. A clear 
example given by Parker is government intervention in the UK and France in order to control 
prices or safeguard jobs.
The public choice school of thought claims that if adequate systems of control and monitoring 
do not exist, then self-interested managers of public enterprises ride freely without paying 
attention to whether government ministers or the voters agree with their actions. This is a 
strong assumption, which in basic form refers to human behaviour. A lot of research and 
many different experiments dismiss the idea that individuals act only in favour of their own 
interests. In an experiment conducted by Martinez Vazquez (1981) on how income groups 
voted, they found that the voters consistently voted against their self-interest and in favour of 
the poor. A similar result has been found by Marwel and Ames (1981) in testing a free-rider 
hypothesis. Taken with the statement by Starr (1988: 31) that ‘the whole point of 
“government by discussion” is to discover and express common interests not easily voiced or
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achieved in private sphere; the public choice approach simply does not comprehend this 
preference-shaping function of political democracy’. These findings lead to the conclusion 
that people are capable of sacrificing their narrow self-interest and acting in favour of the 
collective or public interest. This refutes the public choice view that preferences are fixed in 
favour of self-interest.
The public choice view of public enterprises is comprised of different elements such as “easy 
access to funds”, “subsidiary sector” etc.; in the end it considers the public sector as a sector 
of “excess of output” and “excess of inputs”. This accusation is not supported by empirical 
evidence as Dunleavy (1991: 212) clarifies: ‘in experimental studies very few decision 
makers ...the role of bureaucrat maximise without limit*. Referring to the latter, the claim is 
that higher capital-labour ratios are supposedly characteristic of the public sector. Some 
studies, for example, one by Borcherding, Bush and Spami (1977) support this claim and 
some others, for example, one by Cram and Zardkoohi (1978) reject this. Hence, it can be 
stated that the empirical evidence regarding “excess of input” is inconclusive.
Another assumption, which is made by this school of thought, is that the public sector is run 
inefficiently. Whether this is correct or not, it should not be ignored that the public sector is 
not the same across all countries and it does not remain the same within a country through 
time. Many public enterprises were established after the Second World War by governments 
throughout Europe. Empirical evidence has shown that public enterprise was efficient in 
countries such as Germany, Austria, France, and Sweden in the period of the post-war boom. 
Adding to this, Starr (1990: 112) points to an inverse aspect rejecting the above claim: ‘...it 
cannot explain the variations over time or across societies. If the influences on budget were
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always one sidedly in favour of expansion, spending should have grown rapidly even in those 
periods which it has not’.
Policy recommendations of privatisation for enhancing economic performance made by the 
public choice school, as with the property right school, are dismissed by many economists. 
Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988: 190) argue that: ‘these changes are not conditional on 
privatisation: internal reform of public enterprise is an alternative option for realising the 
same gains’. The post- privatisation period can make a clear case against many charges made 
by the school that favour the private sector over the public sector. Privatisation might 
officially mean no more pressures from specific groups or subsidises to a particular sector, but 
experience has shown that privatised firms can press for government aid via different forms, 
such as tax benefits, regulatory protection, etc. just as public enterprises did. Goldring (1993: 
28) makes this point, which opposes that made by the public choice school in favour of 
privatisation: ‘privatised industries are not genuinely private. On Tuesday the prime minister 
was answering questions about water prices in the southwest. What on earth have local water 
prices to do with the prime minister? .. .it demonstrates that privatised industries are unfree to 
run as normal businesses’. In another statement Tanoira (1987: 56) very precisely claims that, 
‘privatisation is less likely to be seen as a means for eliminating the enormous subsidises 
received by SOEs, than as a means for transferring the protection of the state to the private (in 
other words, not-so-private) firms’.
This theory, like the previous theory, does not address the issue of measuring coiporate 
performance. Most of the attention has been devoted to the relationship between public 
enterprise managers and politicians; it asserts the superiority of the private over the public 
sector without addressing how to measure coiporate performance.
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2.4 The Austrian school of Economics
What Hayelc (1984:135) stressed about “true individualism” seems to be useful in forming a 
clear picture of the Austrian school of economics’ fundamental idea. He believed that “true 
individualism” should be distinct from “the properly collective theory of society” as well as 
“the rationalistic pseudo-individualism”, which is that combined effects of individualism that 
leads to the establishment of many institutions without a fore plan. He stressed that this view 
of individualism is the only proper method for economic theory. Furthermore, he pointed out 
that any institutions, which do not result from individual actions, are merely susceptible to 
being a “spontaneous social product” like the market, money and others that are more 
efficient than actions based on “economic plans” or parliamentary law (Hayek, 1984: 137).
The accidental actions of isolated individuals can coalesce at some point and the outcomes are 
much more efficient because these actions are grounded in their private interests. This point 
contradicts the statement that individual private interest has important implications as far as 
the role of government and state industries in the economy is concerned. Public enterprises 
are said to be inferior to private enterprise. Hayek (1984: 137), clearly believes so in stating 
that: ‘...the design theories necessarily lead to the conclusion that social processes can be 
made to serve human ends only if they are subjected to the control of individual human 
reason...true individualism believes on the contrary that if  left free, men will often achieve 
more than individual human reason could design or foresee’. Deliberate arrangement and the 
role of governments ought to take place in a way that does not disrupt spontaneous actions. 
Thus, the role of government characteristic is assigned by Hayek (1989: 112) as: ‘its object 
being not to produce any particular services or products to be consumed by the citizens, but 
rather to see that the mechanism which regulates the production of those goods and services is 
kept in working order’. It can be concluded that any interference by the government other
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than in performance of the above duty is seen to disrupt the benefits of the market. This result 
is argued to be inevitable, since the spontaneous actions of individuals conform to a unique 
system based on specific information of a particular subject. The system will be destroyed by 
any exogenous actions, which are based on different, generally lesser knowledge and different 
purposes.
Besides individualism, subjectivism is another basic point in the Austrian view. As 
O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1985: 1) explain: the contents of the human mind, and hence decision­
making, are not rigidly determined by “external events”, individual actions result from 
different interactions in mind which are independent of the events that happen externally. 
This viewpoint has different implications for economic theory such as: the unpredictability of 
human action, the uncertainty in the market, the dynamic conception of time, market 
competition and its effect on the discovery or learning process, and the decentralisation of 
private knowledge. The concept of the imperfect predictability of human action implies a 
dynamic view of time, which is shared in both real and subjective views about time. This 
view differs from the conventional view of neo-classical economics in which time is the 
image of space, which can then be transformed into a static category, while changes are 
viewed as a succession of discontinuous states. This view of time follows other concepts, 
such as uncertainty and the characteristics of an individual, to arrive at the concept of 
entrepreneurship, which occupies an important part of the Austrian school of thought.
This new concept related to the market context means presenting new discoveries and creating 
new possibilities, which have not yet been introduced by other market participants. This view 
differs again from neo-classical economics, which sees decision-making as explained by 
Kirzner (1976: 118) as ‘using known available resources in the most efficient manner to
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achieve given purpose’. However, the Austrian school of thought holds a completely different 
view with Hayek (1984: 257) presenting decision making as: ea capacity to find out particular 
circumstances’. Entrepreneurs are seen to be primarily searching for new profitable 
opportunities and trying to exploit emerging profit opportunities. In this context, the role of 
price becomes an important element as a guide for entrepreneurs! Price provides all- 
important information for profit maximisation, as Hayek’s (1984: 56) claim shows: ‘most of 
the information which the capitalist entrepreneurs have consists of prices determined in a 
competitive market’.
Prices are further seen to be the product of competition. The latter gives entrepreneurs the 
opportunity to discover new ways of production through which they are able to exploit the 
circumstances and make through unconventional means profits (Hayek, 1989). Price 
information, competition, and adequate incentive through profit making will lead to dispersed 
knowledge. The latter is viewed as essential to effective decision making in the Austrian 
view. The process is like a chain, starting from competition and resulting in decentralised 
knowledge through price as a medium. As a consequence, all economic agents have the 
same opportunity to obtain the general knowledge possessed by others. Hence, competition is 
seen to lead to a discovery or learning process.
The Austrian school’s views on the characteristics of the market cany a critical view of public 
enterprise. The claim of discovery through competition is restricted by the role of public 
ownership. Nationalisation rules out the role that can be played by new entrants, and the role 
of profit! The role o f entrepreneurship will be limited and capacity for change and innovation 
are undermined (Littlechild, 1989). Free capital movement, which is conventional in the case 
of private ownership and which shifts capital from one line to another in seeking a higher
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level of return, will be restricted by introducing public ownership. Public enterprises have 
limited ability to learn from failure because the threat of bankruptcy and the role of 
uncertainty and profit have been excluded as a spur to innovation.
The Austrian position is that rational economic choice should be based on broad knowledge, 
specifically about prices. This, in turn, requires a competitive market in order to obtain 
adequate information. But competition requires private ownership if it is expected to be a 
source of innovation and a learning process as Moldofsky (1989: 18) stressed, so that 
‘individuals be free to act and dispose of their property while using their knowledge of their 
circumstances of time and place as they see fit, in order to gain access to more and better 
knowledge than would be possible with less freedom of action’. Market competition provides 
enough knowledge for economic agents to know about consumers* tastes, consumers’ 
willingness to pay, and different methods for production and so on. This knowledge leads 
resources to be reallocated efficiently, cheaper products to be produced, and lower prices to 
be maintained, (Hayek, 1984). Accordingly, privatisation acts so that competition is 
introduced and higher efficiency and responsibility to consumer demands are reached 
(Littlechild, 1986).
2.4.1 A critical Assessment of the Austrian school of Economics
An important proposition made by the school concerns the role of competition as part and 
partial of the market mechanism. But how to examine competition empirically is an open 
question even to Hayek (1984: 255) who stresses that competition ‘can never be tested 
empirically’. Furthermore, the argument presented by the Austrian school is that those who 
participate in the market can systematically learn from their experiences, leading their actions 
to become increasingly coordinated. On the other hand, the Austrian methodology is all about
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spontaneous action by human beings and claims that indeterminacy is inherent to changes in 
human knowledge. These two arguments demonstrate tension within of the school’s theory 
(Kirzner, 1976). Thus, it is a controversial point among the proponents of the school whether 
entrepreneurial actions based on discovering new opportunities move in parallel with the 
market process towards continuous discovery and increasing coordination or not. Kirzner 
sees the process moving towards equilibrium, while Littlechild (1989: 32) has another view: 
‘if a market participant acts on the basis of a perceived opportunity that turns out not to exist, 
he may further discoordinate the market’.
Subjectivism, which is also one of the main pillars of the Austrian school theory, requires 
more attention in terms of policy implications, especially those related to privatisation 
recommendations. The question of how methodological subjectivism can be reconciled with 
policy statements arises. The subjectivist point of view is that different policies are a matter 
of individual preferences. A valid question is how efficiency can be achieved when the 
preferences of a variety of different individuals are taken into account (Kirzner, 1976). 
Moreover, it is obvious that some people are in favour of privatisation and some are against it. 
Many people may prefer nationalisation and more equally distributed income to 
unemployment. A question arises as to why privatisation is the policy recommended from a 
subjectivism point of view since it is known that many do not prefer the policy? Does it not 
show a conflict between methodological subjectivism and policy recommendation?
Hodgson (1988: 121) points to another defect of subjectivism related to human consciousness 
and knowledge. He believes that: ‘we cannot hope to create a conceptual framework capable 
of handling vast quantities of information on our own...,’ with a subjectivist point of view. If 
that is the case, subjectivism seems to be a barrier to conscious decision-making and
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individuals who are able to learn from each other and affect each other do not offset this 
defect. Hodgson (1988: 237) again presents the idea that: ‘it is wrong to assume that all 
knowledge is individual in character’. Some information (often information about the 
location of other information) is necessarily centralised and institutionalised (e.g. in a 
telephone directory). It is doubtful that the ‘decentralised market can provide an effective 
signalling device for all information and all activities in a complex economic system’. 
Subjectivism and its defects seem to be endless. O’Driscoll and Rizzo, (1985: 20) ask this 
question: ‘How can individuals acting in the world of everyday life unintentionally produce 
existing institutions or, more generally, the overall patterns of social interaction’. Related to 
this, Hayek (1984: 135) presented the idea that ‘the spontaneous collaboration of free men 
often creates things which are greater than their individual minds can ever fully comprehend’. 
How these types of action are relevant to the subjectivist assumption is unknown. Social 
relations are much more complex and much broader than could fit with a notion about 
separate individual actions and inter-subjective relations. Furthermore, social relationships 
include individuals but it does not mean that they are aware of everything; for example: 
consumer and suppliers come to a relationship in the market but a lot of information about 
both sides of the action remains unknown to each side. These defects can cast a shadow over 
the validity of subjectivism as a proper explanation for social and economic relationships.
One basic question to consider is: Whether the individual action is the only action that can 
influence others in a social and economic manor? Hodgson (1988: 71) totally disagrees and 
points to the fact that: ‘the socio-economic and institutional environment has a significant 
effect on the kind of information we receive, our cognition of it, or preferences, and thereby 
much of our behaviour’. However, if  such social influences on individuals do exist, then the
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whole “methodological individualism” is suspect! Thus, the “individualist” label can only 
survive if human actions can be referred to as spontaneous and indeterminate!
The Austrian view on ownership is worth considering. Those who are sympathetic to the 
Austrian approach point to private ownership as the only way by which entrepreneurs can act 
purposefully to find better ways of production with lower cost. Hodgson (1988: 268) believes 
that: ‘there is no obvious relationship between the pattern of private or public ownership, on 
the one hand, and the fertility of these conditions, on the other’. Hence, private ownership 
might not be the only effective form of ownership as believed by the Austrian view. 
Furthermore, private ownership is not a sufficient condition for achieving optimal efficiency 
and providing a circumstance in which the entrepreneur can act optimally. As Hodgson 
(1988: 268) stresses, other conditions must exist such as: ‘the type and level of social culture, 
the level of technical and general education, and the material and institutional supports for 
entrepreneurial activity’.
What the Austrian school sees about common ownership, as distinct from private ownership, 
conforms only to the form of state ownership. Tittenbrun (1996: 100) claims that: ‘the 
Austrian fail to notice that their criticism of common ownership really only applies to state 
ownership’. However, state ownership is just one form of common ownership. Many group 
ownerships also exist which entrepreneurs may join voluntarily to pursue their own interest. 
As Jasinski (1991: 18) points out, ‘group ownership seems to be compatible with market 
economy as long as there are many groups, independent of each other, and individuals have a 
choice of whether to join them or not’. The Austrian view about ownership remains limited 
and one-dimensional and fails to see all social phenomena.
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The Austrian unilateral focus 011 the characteristic of entrepreneurship seems to inhibit 
recognition of decision-making and the whole process of production. It ignores the fact that it 
is common for workers to get involved in decision-making in capitalist countries such as 
Japan or in Western Europe. Hodgson (1988: 237) also notes that the Austrian approach ‘is 
silent about the real process of production’. Since capitalism today involves huge 
multinational corporations, the individual today differs from the individual of early 
capitalism. The characteristics of entrepreneurs have changed and take many different forms 
ranging from the characteristic of managements to an activity as a union worker. Modern 
corporations, financial market institutions, and financial intermediaries all bring about the 
separation of owners and managers and involve many different players and wider ranges of 
economic agents which do not fit within the confined meaning of ownership in the Austrian 
view. As a result, the Austrian view has limited applicability to today’s way of production 
and the process of decision-making.
The Austrian argument about information is another point of confusion. The argument is that 
privatisation will release the information required for efficient decision-making. Rowthom 
(1991: 4-5) argues that this is not always the case: ‘the information provided by the market is 
normally the result of product market competition and not private ownership’. Confining 
efficiency to private ownership is another misleading argument by the school; there are many 
examples showing that public enterprises have succeeded in acting efficiently, especially in 
the post-war era in different European countries such as Germany, Austria and Sweden.
The Austrian approach argues that privatisation increases competition and competition creates 
price information by which economic agents make better decisions which leads to superior 
outcomes. However, competition can exist without privatisation taking place (Tittenbrun,
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1996) and price signalling is not always effective. Examples can be found where the price of a 
particular product has signalled wrongly to the investors and they have lost a lot of money. 
Obviously, if  prices always signalled correctly then there would not be any losers in the 
market, which is clearly not the case. Additionally, from a microeconomic point of view it 
has been argued that, because markets are inherently incomplete and there are many public 
goods as well as externalities, the external costs and benefits cannot be reflected in market 
prices (Tittenbrun, 1996). How price alone can reflect all needed information as is anticipated 
in the Austrian view is doubtful.
How to measure corporate performance has not been considered by the Austrian school of 
economics. The public sector has been critically compared to the private sector without 
addressing how corporate performance should be measured.
2.5 The Principal-Agent Theory
The principal-agent theory is about recognition of diversity between control and ownership in 
both public and private shareholder companies. It is expected that managers pursue their own 
objectives, which can be different from those of shareholders or the voting public. Suitable 
incentives should be introduced in order to convince managers to act in favour of company 
owners rather than their own interest. Other phenomena such as a system of monitoring, and 
a system of pressure and sanctions should exist to encourage the managers to respect the 
contract. The fact that different systems of monitoring are used in the public and private 
sectors has drawn much attention.
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The principal-agent arguments are based on several points: First, if  a private firm performs 
badly profitability will fall. Second, falling profitability results in the shareholders selling 
their shares at low prices. Third, the possibility of take-over will be activated. Finally, the 
threat of bankruptcy will lead managers to put more effort into rumiing the firm more 
efficiently, (Singh, 1971), This discipline is assumed to be lacking in public enterprise. Since 
public enterprises are often monopolies, customers have no other option for preference. In 
addition, public enterprises are protected from the threat of bankruptcy and take-over. 
Because they do not belong to the capital market and there is no efficient control forcing them 
to operate efficiently, they remain inefficient (Yarrow, 1989).
The principal-agent theory views public enterprises as problematic as far as performance is 
concerned. It supposes that the general public is the principal and government ministers are 
the public’s agents, while in the next step the latter become the principals of the enterprises’ 
managers. More fundamentally, the theory assumes a public enterprise is characterised by the 
obligation to maximise some social welfare. This in turn is comprised of consumers’ and 
producers’ surpluses. The role of the government in this context is significant. There is no 
doubt of the government’s willingness to enhance economic efficiency, for political motives if 
no other. Governments have enough incentives to act in favour of the public interest. For 
example, lower prices of a product produced by a public firm give a good image of the current 
government. However, incentives are very limited. Both-types of principle-agent, the voters 
(when dealing with the government) and the government ministers (when dealing with public 
enterprise managers) suffer from considerable information asymmetries. The voters camiot 
monitor the government ministers, and their powers to impose something on the government 
ministers are very limited. Additionally, because collecting information is not costless and no
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voter is willing to pay for information, the government ministers are free to take any decisions 
without serious burdens.
Apart from this, it is assumed that governments do not act strategically to obtain maximum 
internal efficiency because of political motivations. The government actions have a variety of 
effects on individuals as well as on different groups. For instance, a cost reduction may 
adversely affect the work of a public enterprise directly, but the benefit of lower prices 
spreads over all people of that country. From a cost benefit analysis, it can be shown that the 
benefits and costs of decisions made by governments do not affect everyone in the same way. 
So, instead of voters as a whole, some groups of people who belong to a certain class of 
society may have adequate incentive to monitor government decisions. These groups, unlike 
the voters as a whole, are assumed to have the ability to affect government decisions. Given 
the further assumption that the government acts politically rather than to pursue social 
objectives, the government neglects the reduction of costs in the interest of some social 
groups. Another source of added costs is frequent intervention by ministers in the process of 
managerial decision-making and the high levels of bureaucracy in the public sector. All these 
show that the system of monitoring and control of public enterprises is relatively weak 
compared with private sector disciplines.
Applying the principal-agent problem to the operation of public enterprises, it is obvious that 
a public enterprise is run by someone who does not own the enterprise. Hence, careful 
operation of business and efforts to improve efficiency are not expected. This problem would 
be solved if an efficient monitoring system existed. However, since information cannot be 
perfect about managerial behaviours, and managers still know more about the job, the actual
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results may not be satisfactory. Because monitoring of public enterprise managers falls to the 
government as the agent of the public, it will be difficult for the public to monitor the 
government as agent. This is because they do not anticipate that the government puts in 
enough effort monitoring public enteiprise managers, (Yarrow, 1989). Privatisation would 
eliminate the inefficiency inherent to public ownership by breaking this relationship between 
the public and ministers, and between ministers and managers, and by providing a direct 
relationship between the principal and the agent (Yarrow, 1989). However, it should be noted 
that the need for dual monitoring is not limited to public enterprises; private firms also suffer 
from this problem if  they are not run by owner-managers (Yarrow, 1989).
Contrary to the public enterprises, large privately owned companies with diffused 
shareholders are assumed to maximise the expected return. The company’s managers are 
acting optimally because they believe their efforts affect the company’s growth and their 
incomes are a function of that growth. However, individual shareholders may have the same 
problem as the individual has in his or her relation with the public firm. They cannot 
effectively monitor the managers, for the same reason, as is the case with public enterprises. 
The difference this time is assumed to be the transferability of property rights. Unlike public 
ownership, shareholders have the right to sell their shares if they are not satisfied with the 
company’s performance. If undue selling occurs, then the share prices will be depressed, 
showing managerial failure to maximise profits. As a result, the possibility of a hostile 
takeover will arise. This potential threat is supposed to act as an effective device stimulating 
managerial behaviour in favour of their own shareholders. Thus, the takeover threat is the 
most important proposition of the principal-agent theory; it highlights the superiority of 
private ownership over public ownership and the importance of the market in corporate 
control.
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The potential threat of bankruptcy is assumed to be another superiority of private ownership 
over public ownership. The argument is that the manager of a public firm does not act 
optimally because public firms are not threatened with bankruptcy. This is not the case in a 
privately owned company where any careless behaviour from the managers will activate the 
threat of bankruptcy. However, the threat of bankruptcy is effective only when a company 
faces intense competition and a lower level of demand conditions (Iordanoglou, 2001).
A competitive industry is required as a precondition for private firms to maximise their profits 
without abusing market power and to help allocative efficiency to take place.2 Therefore, 
competition, which is given the most attention by the theory’s writers, is assumed to occupy 
the main role in the trade off between private and public ownership. Caves and Christensen 
(1980) stress that competition should be seen as a great enhancement improving internal 
efficiency regardless of the company’s ownership. If the level of cost is given, then public 
enterprises are supposed to be more efficient in terms of allocative efficiency, as long as they 
pursue social welfare instead of profit maximisation. However, whether the gains from 
internal efficiency are greater than the gains from allocative efficiency is the main trade off 
between the private and the public sector (Iordanoglou, 2001). For principal-agent theory, the 
superiority of private ownership over public ownership is an initial starting point and leans 
towards a policy of privatisation. Further, the enhancement of allocative efficiency of non­
competitive industries does not necessarily need public ownership. In some cases, the 
public’s interest can best be achieved by privatisation plus regulation. Otherwise, in a normal 
situation with no monopoly power in place, private ownership, which is not subject to 
regulation, is the best guarantee of superior internal efficiency (Iordanoglou, 2001).
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2.5.1 A Critical Assessment of the Principal-Agent Theory
A critical assessment of the principal-agent theory, which asserts the superiority of private 
ownership over public ownership, is a very difficult task. Firstly, a direct comparison seems 
to be impossible when the two types of owned companies do not exist in the same line of 
activity. Most public enterprises in the majority of countries occupy a monopoly or sub­
monopoly position. Hence, it is an open question how the relative detail of economic 
activities of both types of owned companies can be calculated. Even if both types of owned 
companies coexist in the same industry, many problems of assessment still remain resolved.3 
Secondly, if increasing returns to scale are to be considered then the size of the companies and 
other dimensions of the outputs of the companies under comparison must be carefiilly taken 
into account. Thirdly, the argument is that if managers are given enough incentives, then they 
will act in favour of the companies’ owners. Such a prospect can only be justified in the 
presence of information asymmetry between the owners and managers of the companies. 
Finally, in terms of efficiency, ownership seems to be less important than other factors such 
as competition or regulation.
The study by Borcherding et al. (1982: 5), which concentrated on municipally supplied versus 
privately supplied service industries with higher levels of labour intensity (cleaning services, 
fire protection, refuse collection and slaughterhouses), shows that the privately owned 
companies generally operated with lower cost structure than the publicly owned companies. 
Another conclusion of the study is that competition had a positive effect on the public firms’ 
performance. By contrast, a study by Pescatrice and Trapani (1980) that concentrates on the 
electrical utility industry, which is capital-intensive rather than labour intensive, indicates that 
the public firms operated with lower unit cost than their private opponents. They also
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concluded that the rate of technical progress was faster in public firms than in private 
companies. In contrast to this finding, Morgan (1977) found that, in the water utility sector of 
the US, the private firms had lower costs than public firms. Millward and Parker (1983: 258) 
conclude that: ‘There is no systematic evidence that public enterprises are less effective than 
private firms’.
These findings do not support the general conclusion drawn by the theory’s authors that 
publicly owned companies are less efficient than privately owned companies independent of 
the type and characteristics of the industry under consideration. Where labour is intense and 
smaller sized firms dominate, the privately owned activities have clear cost efficiency. On 
the other hand, in the case of capital-intensive companies such as utility companies and 
transport industries the mixed results do not provide enough room for generalisation.
With regard to the main arguments emphasised by the theory’s proponents, we shall 
concentrate on empirical evidence showing whether private or public firms perform relatively 
better or worse in order to indicate the validity of the theory’s propositions. One of the points 
highlighted by the theory’s proponents is the existence of the takeover threat facing privately 
owned companies if  they perform poorly. The assumption is that if profitability declines, the 
takeover threat will potentially increase, (Iordanoglou, 2001). But Singh (1992) found a 
negative relationship between profitability and the probability of takeover threat. 
Surprisingly, his finding shows that many companies that recorded excellent profitability are 
taken over rather than those with negative ability profit.
53
The takeover threat, if  valid, has to work regardless of the size of the firm. If the takeover 
threat declines when the size of firms increases, then the mechanism of the takeover threat 
will work in favour of the managers’ interests instead of being an effective device for 
controlling managerial behaviours. Singh again shows that larger sized companies are at 
significantly less risk to be taken over than smaller and medium sized ones. He also 
concludes that large inefficient firms are much safer than smaller efficient firms in terms of 
the takeover threat
Hostile takeover bids are different across countries; for example, the stock markets are less 
open to such behaviour in countries such as Germany than in the UK and USA (Parker, 1998). 
In most European countries, privatisation has taken place with clear restrictions on foreign 
investment. Governments from different countries have tried to impose restrictions by 
creating different policies such as retaining golden shares or the majority of shares, finding 
domestic investors for newly privatised companies and imposing a specific policy (for 
example, foreign investors cannot hold more than 20% of privatised companies’ shares). 
Theses types of restrictions can be found in many different countries in Europe such as the 
UK, France, Italy, Austria, Sweden and Belgium (Parker, 1998). The elimination and 
restriction of takeover bids can refute the validity of the principal-agent theory’s main 
argument for the superiority of private firms over public firms.
Another important point concerns the post-takeover period. If the takeover is a potentially 
effective mechanism then we should see an improved performance when the takeover occurs. 
Regardless of whether accounting data on profitability or the share price performance is used 
as a measurement, a lot of studies show no improvement has occurred after takeover has taken
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place. Cowling et al. (1980) emphasise that, with some exceptions, the performance of many 
companies has not improved sufficiently after mergers have taken place. Cosh, Hughes and 
Singh (1980), on the basis of a slightly different methodology and different measures of 
profitability, found weak support for the thesis that mergers had a positive effect on 
performance.
This finding again undermines the validity of the takeover deterrent. However, the most 
significant evidence, which undermines the effectiveness of the takeover threat, is the 
outstanding performance of the Japanese and German economy after the Second World War. 
Their bank-dominated system, in contrast to the stock market based system, has been 
successful without being based on hostile takeovers (Iordanoglou, 2001).
Whether managers are risk-evaders or risk-takers is a concern of the theory’s authors, but the 
worry is expressed through the idea that shareholders cannot monitor the managerial efforts. 
Whether higher or lower levels of risk are taken by the managers can be more important than 
whether managers have efficiently acted to reduce costs or not. What the proponents of free 
markets claim is that private sector managers, at least in the Anglo-Saxon world, do not 
normally take higher risk decisions (Iordanoglou, 2001). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
because asymmetric information occurs, company managers and financial market operators 
prefer a short-term investment rather than a long-term one and pursue higher rates of return 
from a risky project (Iordanoglou, 2001). The latter pursuit is comprehensible for several 
reasons: managers are trying to satisfy shareholders, their rewards relate to short-run share 
price movements rather than stock market value and the fear of takeover bids can be a 
stimulating point forcing managers to pursue short-teimism. If so, it can be concluded that
55
short-termism and, at the same time, excessive higher risk are consistent with the private 
companies of shareholder diffusions. Furthermore, the pursuance of short-term investments 
instead of long-term investments can be a source of market failure.
The theory’s view about public enterprise consists of two main points. The first point is that 
the individual (consumer or taxpayer) has no incentive to acquire costly information about 
ministerial economic decisions since the individual cannot put pressure upon the ministers. 
Because of that, as a second point, ministers and public servants may have enough room to 
pursue their own objectives. Whether these two claims are valid or not is an open question. 
Public enterprise outputs are used by a variety of customers. Apart from individual users, 
industrial users of those products as inputs are highly concerned about any decisions taken by 
pubic enterprise authorities and these industrial users may be willing to pay for costly 
information. Thus, the above claim about the users and their motives remains unsatisfied. 
Furthermore, even individual users are usually members of different organisations that may 
have power to influence government decisions and thus avoid free-rider problems. Hence, 
the claim that ministers have enough room for manoeuvring remains very limited.
Another strong assumption made by the theory’s writers is that private enterprises have a 
substantially better system of control over managerial decisions and the speed of adjustment 
is systematically faster in private enterprises than it is in public enterprises. These claims are 
very general and ignore a lot of differences among sectors and their position in the national 
economy. Differences among countries in terms of their economic, institutional and political 
structure are substantial. Furthermore, as Iordanoglou (2001) argues, many western countries 
have established different bodies for controlling public enterprises; in many cases they have
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succeeded in influencing the strategic decisions made by public enterprise managers. Those 
bodies have played an important role in disclosing much information about public enterprise 
circumstances and their positions in terms of the economic point of view; hence, it does not 
seem to be less efficient than the conventional control in private sector enterprises. 
Furthermore, Iordanogolu (2001) claims that there is no clear evidence to show the speed of 
adjustment is systematically slower in public enterprises than in private ones. Finally, it is 
important to highlight that the current government in office should have strong incentives to 
monitor public enterprise managers and guard against any fluctuation in prices and the quality 
of outputs produced by public enterprises in order to keep a good image among electors for 
the sake of future elections. This also can work as a substantial device to stimulate 
government efforts to manage public enterprise economic activities.
Another point that is argued by the principal-agent writers is that the public enterprises can 
never go bankrupt and they are well protected by the government. First of all, as Aharoni 
(1986) argues, the public enterprises can go bankrupt in the form of “liquidation”. 
Furthermore, as far as the larger firms are concerned, the protection would be the same for 
both public and private enterprises from the government point of view. All the experience so 
far has demonstrated this claim. Aharoni (1986) again presents some examples (Chrysler of 
the USA, Volkswagen of Germany, and many more), which show how governments have 
tried to rescue large firms in critical situations regardless of ownership. These examples 
challenge the claim that “soft budget constraints” exist only for public enterprises, with 
private firms being excluded. One cannot ignore the evidence that, in order to preserve 
employment, governments from different countries have tried to give a hand to those private 
firms that are found in a situation of bankruptcy.
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It can be concluded that the main propositions made by the theory’s authors have a lot of 
defects that cast a shadow over the validity of the theory. The superiority of the private sector 
over the public sector cannot be proven by general propositions that ignore structural 
differences in each sector and economical and institutional differences from one country to 
another. The reality is that there is no guarantee that privatisation brings about efficiency. 
There is also no guarantee that dispersed shareholders have the ability to monitor managerial 
behaviour since such monitoring is not costless (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988).
In terms of monitoring, it must be recognised that public enterprises have different agencies 
such as ministers, public enterprise agencies, and public holding companies watching them. 
All of those are responsible for the performance of public enterprise. More collective action 
will take place in those public enterprises; therefore, fewer problems may arise. This kind of 
official monitoring is more effective than monitoring through shareholders; therefore public 
enterprises are more efficient than private enterprises in that regard (Chang and Singh, 1993).
One of the points that is highlighted by the principal-agent theory concerns different levels of 
delegation, and the assumption is made that public enterprises suffer from an excess of levels. 
Ministers, local authorities and public enterprises managers all represent different levels of 
delegation, which is assumed to have negative effects on the performance. It is claimed that 
privatisation will bring about a reduction in the levels of delegation involved in the 
management of an enterprise. There are several important points that should be mentioned 
with regard to this claim. Firstly, the level of delegation is a function of the size of the firm 
whether the firm is a public or private one. Secondly, there is no standard way of assigning 
the levels of delegation. The matter varies from firm to firm, sector to sector and country to
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country; Detrouzos et al, (1987: 97) points out that a Japanese firm has fewer delegations than 
an American firm. Finally, whether privatisation can always reduce the level of delegation is 
doubtful. For example, the level of delegation may well be increased when a firm has been 
purchased by a foreign firm.
The claim that public managers are seeking their own interest is again suspicious. There are 
a lot of clear examples in non-democratic countries like Taiwan, Korea that show how public 
enterprises operate efficiently without proper control from the public or principals (Chang and 
Singh, 1993: 53); ‘we think preferences are often endogenously formed, so that bureaucrats 
and PE managers may to a large extent put public interest first if  they operate in an 
environment where they are required ...
The idea that the capital market disciplinary system, called the “exit” system, is the only 
efficient system for controlling firms is dismissed by many economists (see Stiglitz, 1985). 
As Chang and Singh (1993) believe, the “voice” system, which is a way of complaining 
against bad performance by different parties such as customers or disciplinary agents, may 
work more efficiently than the “exit” system. This is particularly so in the case of a monopoly 
private firm (Chang and Singh, 1993). How the share prices can work as a good disciplinary 
mechanism is doubted by Cosh, Hughes, and Singh (1990). They argue that the role of 
speculation, and the volatility of stock market prices, can undermine the role of the stock 
market as a disciplinary mechanism. To extend the idea further, the stock market may impact 
on firm behaviour and investment decisions in a negative way by encouraging firm managers 
to pursue short-term gains rather than long-term investments (Cosh, Hughes and Singh, 
1990).
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The policy recommendation of privatisation brought forward by the principal-agent approach 
gives priority to the market discipline as a virtual system. As Littlechild (1986) emphasises, 
market discipline can work through forces of competition and the take-over mechanism 
ensuring efficiency. The ability of the market system to work efficiently has been 
undermined even by proponents, of the market. Theories like the free-rider problem, 
transaction costs, etc. reject the idea that the market may work efficiently for corporate 
control (Chang and Singh, 1993). Experience suggests that, as a disciplinary mechanism, the 
take-over threat may work in a completely different way than theorised. The take-over may 
work in an opposite fashion since powerful firms may desire to take over smaller profitable 
firms in their sector to establish an empire in order to avoid being taken over themselves.
Again, this theory has not addressed the issue of measuring corporate performance. The 
relationship between principal (shareholders) and agent (managers) has been analysed and the 
private sector, which is disciplined by market characteristics, is assumed to be much more 
efficient than the public sector. The latter claim has been maintained by the theory, while the 
issue of measuring corporate performance has been ignored.
2.6 The new synthesis
The collapse of the post-war boom and, in the intellectual area, the collapse of Keynesianism 
and the idea of the welfare state system (which was not able to resolve the issue of ownership 
and the relationship between the state and the market) can be accounted significant reasons 
for the appearance of what Fine (1990) has called “the new synthesis” about privatisation. 
These events provided enough room for the new synthesis to be introduced with emphasis on 
how to deal with potential market failure, how property rights can be defined and utilised, the 
notion of asymmetric information, and the effects of transactions cost. Fine (1997a: 8)
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stresses that: ‘interestingly, the ways in which it has evolved can be seen as pulling in 
opposite directions in terms of conclusions about the relative merits of forms of public and 
private ownership... the scope of market failure has been considerably widened. It now 
includes issues such as how property rights are defined and utilised, informational 
imperfection and asymmetries, and the effects of transactions costs’. Market failure, and the 
expansion of its domain highlight again the controversial role of the state and its 
responsibilities. The new synthesis can be categorised as comprising three different schools 
of thought:
2.6.1 The New Political Economy
The new political economy highlights the role of the state in terms of rent seeking and 
remarks that state interventions cause the economy to move away from a perfectly 
competitive environment, stimulating economic agents to seek advantage in a wasteful and 
possibly illegal way. This view of rent seeking, which is a static theory of distortion from 
market efficiency, emphasises that inefficiency in the market is not sustainable without costs 
(Fine, 1997b: 380). Any economic intervention by the state, in this view, refers to rent- 
seeking behaviour under any circumstances.
2.6.2 New Institutional Economics
The new institutional economics divides market from non-market institutions and sees the 
internal organisation of the firm as separate from its external market relations. In this theory, 
the economic agent cannot obtain all available information; hence, the market transactions are 
not costless. As a result, non-market institutions such as the state and the internal 
organisation of large corporations or non-market collective action occur spontaneously; only 
individuals can engage in optimising behaviour (Fine, 1997b: 381). Principal-agent problems
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fall into this category: asymmetric information prevents agents from monitoring principals’ 
actions adequately.
2.6.3 Neo-Austrian School of Economics
The neo-Austrian school of economics, unlike the new political economy school and the new 
institutional economics, is primarily concerned with the dynamics of the market economy in 
the context of an uncertain and changing world. Issues such as the notion of equilibrium and 
formal mathematical modelling, which are important within the other two schools, are 
ignored. Instead, decentralised decision-making is given greater attention. In a dynamic 
world of change and uncertainty, individual economic agents have extensive opportunities to 
obtain adequate information and allocate resources effectively or to develop new methods of 
production.
The Austrian school emphasises the role played by individual entrepreneurial initiative in a 
dynamic way of change rather than a static context in the market for allocating resources 
efficiently. However the school’s adherence to laissez-faire does not sweep away its 
antagonistic differences with monetarists and their emphasis on neoclassical foundations. 
Furthermore, Austrian supporters of laissez-faire try to downplay the significance of 
monopolistic behaviour in the market; this is in contrast to the neoclassical framework, which 
stresses the static dead-weight loss of monopoly. For the Austrian school, new innovations 
take place through monopoly profits, and a competitive environment through entry to the 
various sectors of activity is the guarantee of progress (Fine, 1990).
Each of these three neo schools has its own feature. The neo-Austrian is highly supportive of 
laissez-faire, and hence it has become vary useful support for policymaking. The neo-
62
institutional economics and the new political economy, despite having critical views of 
government, are less influential in neo-libral policy making. However, they have succeeded 
in forming themselves into the new orthodoxy (Fine, 1990). All schools are in favour of 
privatisation and see the adjustments from the public to the private sector as a significant 
movement for enhancing the performance of the economy as a whole. What can be 
concluded about these three elements in the new founded syntheses is that, first of all, there 
are many similarities in the way that points are emphasised and points are ignored. Secondly, 
each of these, by highlighting one particular aspect (for example, rent-seeking behaviour, 
institutional forms and their role, and the characteristic of individual agents and its impact on 
economic development) shows the desire for a more active role for the market as opposed to 
the state. Finally, for both the new political economy and the new institutional economics, 
emphasis is placed upon market failure and the possibility of regulatory failure in contrast to 
the beginning in view of the other in the old public sector economics.
2.6.4 A Critical Assessment of the New Synthesis
It can be concluded that the new synthesis shifts the balance in favour of the market and 
undermines state economic activities (Fine, 1997b). The new political economy and the new 
institutional economics emphasise the notion of market failure, supplemented by the notion of 
regulatory failure, as the most important point. These problems take precedence over 
ownership as such, although privatisation has become more forward with its progress in 
practices. (Fine, 1997b: 382).
The second important point that is highlighted by the proponents of the new synthesis is that 
the market and its phenomena have potential abilities to resolve any distortions in the market 
and it regulates itself automatically. The intervention of the state is only necessary to provide
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enough room for competition by relaxing regulations and any barrier to entry into a particular 
sector. The perspective behind this idea is that consumers will be better off if  there are more 
competitors in the market. This is a quantity theory of competition, which was criticised by 
Weeks (1981). The question of whether more competition in the market is beneficial or not 
depends mainly 011 very controversial assumptions like the abandonment of externalities, 
decreasing returns to scale and partial equilibrium.
The third point, which is related to the previous one, is that the new synthesis has altered the 
way industrial economics is conceived. The previous approach, under the name structure 
conduct-performance (scp), has been undermined by the notion of an equilibrium in which 
economic agents are able to affect the choices of conduct and structure in a competitive way. 
As a result, the new industrial economics, as opposed to the old one, reduces the range of 
factors under consideration to those explanatory variables that can be readily modelled (Fine, 
1997b). This reduction causes the remaining model to be very formal and sophisticated. 
Such models do not always point to the benefits of competition. Moreover, those variables 
that are excluded can have substantial effects 011 industrial performance (Fine, 1997b).
Fourthly, an industrial policy at any particular time and in any particular country may not be 
applicable at other times and in other countries. An industrial policy has its own rationale in 
particular circumstances. This includes broader issues like trade, R&D, skills, finance for 
industry, vertical integration, small business provision of infrastructure, etc. However, the 
new synthesis authors have reduced this broader insight to competition, regulation and 
ownership (Fine, 1997b).
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The fifth respective point about the new synthesis deals with a situation in which there is no 
competition in the market and, hence, a competitive equilibrium output cannot be expected. 
A regulatory body is charged to constrain prices and consequently barricade excessive profits, 
and to monitor the level of quality and access of provision to consumers. The new synthesis 
assumes that there is a considerable distinction between artificial and natural monopoly. The 
former requires relative industrial policies and a regulatory body in order to create a 
competitive environment, while a natural monopoly does not. In practice, there are few cases 
to show how a regulatory body could not prevent a monopoly power from charging higher 
prices.
The next defect of the new synthesis is its inability to consider broader social and economic 
conditions. Its narrow insight leads to a very confined view about all economic and social 
actions and their outcome. For example, two methods can be used to explain the process of 
privatisation and its consequences. The first method, which is used by the new synthesis 
writers, is superficial and considers the process as a very simple adjustment from one owner 
to another. The second method tries to see the complexity of the issue and to extract major 
economic and social outcomes, and asserts that privatisation cannot be a simple shift to 
exercise property rights. It should be seen that the public sector involves a political process 
subject to a broader social interest. In contrast, the private sector is mainly responsive to 
market conditions and to private property rights. Even if both sectors are subject to 
competition and regulation it is hard to anticipate that private sectors can conform in the way 
that public sectors respond politically in favour of broader social interests. The new 
synthesis, by primary concentrating on competition and regulation with ownership as a 
secondary issue, is unable to realise the broader consequences of these issues. It is a failure of
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the new synthesis that it does not see the historical aspects of nationalised industries, their 
dynamic phenomena and their broader impact (Fine, 1997b).
As the final point, the theory suffers from a number of different aspects. Firstly, the theory 
seems to be a universal theory that only deals with microeconomic issues without regard for 
macroeconomic issues like unemployment, inflation, etc. Secondly, it makes no distinction 
between regulation of public firms and regulation of private firms, while both differ in terms 
of their objectives and processes. Thirdly, it does not recognise that regulators have very 
limited power over issues such as wage differentials, employment levels, R&D, skills and 
training of the workforce, etc, in contrast to prices and profits, which they do directly affect. 
All these aspects, to some extent, may have direct effects on people’s daily lives, for example, 
their right to have basic utilities (Fine, 1997b).
The new synthesis, like the previous theories, has not made specific suggestions as far as 
corporate performance and its measurement are concerned. The private corporation is seen as 
superior to public enterprise without due regard to measurement issues.
2.7 Conclusion
There are several different schools of thought behind privatisation, each of which addresses 
one particular aspect of the matter. It is worth emphasising that these schools unlike their 
recent application date as far back as 1870. Thus, schools of thought on privatisation can be 
divided into two categories based on when they emerged. The first category consists of the 
Austrian School, the Property Rights School and the Public Choice School. The second 
category, which refers to recent ideas, is comprised of the principal-agent theory, the New
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Political Economy, the new Austrian school of economics and the New Institutional 
Economics.
The property rights analysis of public ownership leads to the conclusion that public 
enterprises are less economically efficient than private enterprises. Thus, forms of ownership 
generate different rewards/penalties. Generally, the more dispersed property rights are, the 
less motivated their holders will be to use their assets efficiently. Moreover, according to the 
property rights school, the separation of ownership and management, which is characteristic 
of the modern corporation, does not lead to any fundamental change in the performance of 
private enterprise. It acknowledges that shareholders in a large corporation are not able to 
monitor management as closely as a manager-owned company, but asserts that there are other 
factors at work in the modern corporation that compensate for this.
The public choice perspective, like the theory of property rights, holds very strong views 
about public ownership. The fact that ‘public enterprises necessarily perform less efficiently 
than private enterprises,’ (Stan, 1989: 31) provides an influential economic case for 
privatisation. Privatisation allows profit-maximising decision-making to take place. Under 
public ownership, political motives, which lead to large subsidies and other concessions, are 
much more important than cost efficiency. Key public officials and ministers may pursue 
higher goals than operational efficiency leading to a higher cost of production. By contrast, 
privatisation frees an enterprise from the burden of political interference and non-market 
criteria, thus limiting politicians’ ability to redirect the enterprise’s activities in order to 
promote their personal agenda or to yield to short-term political pressures at the expense of 
market efficiency. This clarifies the objectives of the enterprise and leads to the enhancement 
of economic performance.
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The Austrian school points to the fact that continual changes over time in tastes, techniques, 
available resources, prices, plans and expectations require that individuals (economic agents) 
be allowed to arrange their property as they see fit, in order to gain access to more and better 
knowledge than would be possible with less freedom of action (Moldofsky, 1989). The 
welfare of economic agents is improved in a competitive market which allows them to learn 
what consumers want, how much they are willing to pay, what factors and methods of 
production are available and so on. This process continuously ensures that resources are 
reallocated to new preferable uses in the best possible way. The competitive market provides 
an environment in which products will be produced by someone who can do so more cheaply 
than anybody who does not produce it, and that each product is sold at a lower price, (Hayek, 
1984). The competitive market, whose foundation is price and shared economic knowledge, 
can generally only exist in the context of private ownership. It follows that privatisation, via 
the introduction of competition, will improve efficiency and sensitivity to consumer demand, 
with a better quality and range of goods and services (Littlechild, 1986).
Principal-agent theory also views critically the state-owned enterprises. It asserts that, in the 
case of public enterprises, there is no efficient mechanism by which the principals (the public) 
can control the actions of their agents (officials); thus, inefficiency is allocated to state 
enterprises. In general, the agents (government officials) pursue their own goals in a world 
of information asymmetries, incomplete contracts and the absence of clear objectives. If the 
reverse were the case, then the ownership would be a problem and agents could have acted 
according to contracts. Moreover, because the incentive is weak and unrelated to the profit 
motive in state enterprises, agents have no enthusiasm to achieve the highest efficiency level 
(Bos, 1991). In contrast, private ownership sets a precise restriction on the managerial 
behaviour by linking it to expected future profits. If profits are expected to decline, it will
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squeeze share prices and increase takeover bids. Large shareholders clearly know the 
consequences of poor managerial performance; hence, they have enough incentive to motivate 
managerial behaviours. More importantly, because managerial salaries in the private sector 
are linked to profit, stock options and bonuses, while in the public sector it is tied to fixed 
salary scales, the managerial motives will differ leading to different effort and outcomes.
The new political economy sees rent seeking behaviour from government intervention into the 
market. It also sees these interventions as destroying a perfectly competitive environment. 
The new institutional economics sees the internal organisation of the firm as separate from its 
external market relations. It also sees that the economic agent has limited power to obtain all 
available information and that market transactions are not costless. Non-market institutions 
cannot act optimally, but individuals can. The neo-Austrian school of economics, unlike the 
two other schools sees the market economy as a dynamic phenomenon in an uncertain and 
changing world. Individual economic agents are assumed to be the main source of decision­
making; that decision-making is based on all the information and knowledge they are able to 
obtain.
The most important conclusions that can be extracted from the study of these three newly 
founded schools of though, are that:
1- The characteristic of the new ownership is much more important than the role played 
by competition and regulation.
2- Private sector economy and, in this regard, privatisation are much more favourable 
than public sector economy.
All the above schools are in favour of privatisation and see the adjustments from the public to 
the private sector as a significant movement for enhancing the economy as a whole.
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The literature is mainly devoted to the relation between state and market as well as public and 
private sectors with the assumption that each of these opposes the other. It perceives that the 
market and private sectors are more favourable than the state and public sector. These 
subjective roles for the market and the private sector reduce the important role played by the 
state and the public sector in the economy. It is assumed that the role of the state and the 
public sector undermine the role of the private sector and limits economic development as a 
whole. Such a view inevitably has led to over generalising the role of privatisation. As a 
result, there is pressure for privatisation in principle, even if the allocation of those same 
resources to the further improvement of the public sector would result in a better outcome 
from a social perspective. Of course, when resources are limited, the public sector is 
employed to produce those commodities and services that are neglected by the private sector 
because the production initially requires a huge amount of capital or it is perceived by the 
private sector as unprofitable.
Apart from analysing the strengths and weaknesses of all those schools of thought, the main 
purpose, which was pursued throughout this chapter, was to determine whether they have any 
recommendations for measuring corporate performance. What we have found emphasises that 
those theories do not have any suggestions for measuring corporate performance. They have 
concentrated on the relationship of public and private sector without addressing how 
corporate performance should be measured. Each of them evaluates a particular aspect of 
those sectors, with their sympathies for the private sector made apparent, but they do not 
advocate how to measure the superiority of the private sector compared with the public sector. 
This defect casts a shadow over those theories’ legitimacy and usefulness as theoretical 
benchmarks for any economic action.
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Notes
1. As Veljanovski (1987: 77) stresses from his own property-rights perspective that ‘privatisation involves 
much more than simple transfer o f ownership. It involves the transfer and redefinition of a complex 
bundle o f  property rights which creates a whole new penalty-reward system which will alter the 
incentives in the firm and ultimately its performance5.
2. Internal efficiency depends upon the costs o f  a firm for a given level and composition o f  output. 
Allocative efficiency depends upon the firm's level and structure o f output (and the corresponding level 
and structure o f  prices) given its cost structure.
3. For example, for proper comparison o f  private electricity companies, their output dimensions must be 
controlled for differences in the number o f  differences in the size and nature o f  regions served; and 
differences in quality such as security o f supply.
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Chapter 3
Review of Data on Public and Private Comparisons 
Strength and Weakness
3.1 Introduction
Having examined the various privatisation theories in the previous chapter we attempt to 
review empirically case studies on public and private enterprises, making comparisons and 
determining their strengths and weaknesses. A review of the literature on the relationship 
between public and private enterprise and their relative performance that followed the wave of 
privatisation shows an enormous number of works in this field. The number of publications 
increases sharply if government and consultancy papers as well as books are added. Fine 
(1997: 376) reports that more than 3,000 articles have been found in academic journals over 
the previous few years.
The British privatisation programme, which started in 1980, can be counted as the first major 
experiment in moving from public to private ownership. It is claimed with a certain measure 
of pride that privatisation has been the UK’s most successful recent export and many other 
countries, whether developed, developing or transitional, followed the UK’s lead. On this 
basis, most empirical studies have appeared in the wake of privatisation beginning in 1980 in 
the UK and then afterwards in other countries. The related economic issues, for instance, the 
economics of regulation, emerged at a later stage.
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In most empirical studies, the leading emphasis is upon economic efficiency. It has been 
argued that the private sector is generally more efficient than the public sector. The latter is 
deemed to be inefficient because it faces no threat of bankruptcy or takeover, and it has no 
private shareholders to be satisfied and to serve as an external disciplinary force. Therefore, 
managers in public enterprises will pursue their own preferred goals. On the other hand, 
managers in private firms have an incentive to allocate resources efficiently to the extent that 
they face market mechanisms. The private sector supposedly derives its strength from the 
neo-liberal idea that the market is the best mechanism for allocating resources (Fine, 1997b).
The belief that public firms are less efficient than private has in part been motivated by, or at 
least been used to justify, the appearance of privatisation programmes around the world. It 
also has influenced debate over economic and industrial policy. The empirical studies 
published in recent decades can be categorised as either those that focus on the relative 
performances of public versus private enterprises or those that concentrate on the performance 
of the privatised enterprises.
For the former, the most important international surveys are those of Borchending et al., 1982, 
Millward and Parker, 1983, Boardman and Vining, 1989, and Vining and Boardman, 1992. 
These surveys reveal different results. For instance, Millward and Parker (1983) conclude that 
the empirical evidence does not support the idea that public firms exhibit higher cost than 
private firms. On the other hand, the surveys by Borchending et al. (1982) and Vining and 
Boardman (1992) confirm that private enterprises are more efficient than public enterprises. 
Other authors have looked at the relationship between public and private sector from a variety 
of angles or criteria. Significant authors are: Forsyth and Hocking (1980), Finsinger (1984), 
Faere, Grosskopf and Logan (1985), Foreman-peck and Waterson (1985), Sappington and
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Stiglitz, (1987), Laffont and Tirole, (1991), Hartley and Hooper, (1992), DeFraja, (1993), 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1994, 1996), Hart, Shleifer, and Visliny, (1997) and Dewenter 
and Malatests, (1998).
Studies of privatised industries can be divided into two subcategories. One consists of those 
studies that focus on the UK. The second subcategory covers studies in other countries or 
studies that include both the UK and other countries. Some studies on the UK experience have 
focused on the effects of privatisation on productivity growth, for instance, Bishop and Kay, 
1988, Dunshire, Hartley and Parker, 1991, Haskel and Szymanski, 1992, Bishop and 
Thompson, 1992, Martin and Parker, 1995. International studies include studies by Galal, 
Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang, 1992, Kikeri et al., 1992, Ramanadham, 1993, Megginson, 
Nash and Van Randenborgh, 1994, Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter, 1994, 
Galal, 1994, Newberry and Pollitt,1997, Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1997, Dewenter and 
Malatests, 1998, and Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski, 1998.
A number of difficulties arise with the empirical work on public and private enterprise 
performance. First, most studies use accounting data like output per employee, sales per 
assets, etc. Second, the data are analysed at firm level. Third, studies of the relative 
performance of public and private films are usually based on cross sectional data. With 
respect to the use of accounting data at the firm level, it is significant how inputs and outputs 
are measured. The issue of evaluating efficiency and performance is more complicated in the 
case of non-manufacturing industries because quantities and quality of service output are 
difficult to measure consistently. Moreover, allocating costs to a particular service output is 
often impossible. The second problem concerns the selection of variables, which results in
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eliminating some variables believed to have less effect 011 the final outcome. However, there 
is always the risk that this is not the case in practice.
Empirical studies on the performance of public versus private enterprises and privatised 
companies compound a wider set of issues: their methodologies, their criteria for measuring 
performance, their data set, the reasons given for different behaviours of public and private 
enterprises, etc. It should be emphasised that a particular study may differ from the others in 
terms of any of the above issues. Some studies, for instance, might try to compare the 
performance of public and private enterprises that are operating in the same sector. Some 
might use cross-sector or cross-country approaches. Costs of operation might be used as a 
criterion for measuring performance in one study while productivity or any other indicator 
might be chosen in another. The data set might cover all types of costs or some 
simplifications might be made in order to ease investigation. However, whatever the criteria 
by which performance is assessed, the reasons given for the outcome for relative efficiency, 
for example, may be associated with one or other explanatory factor, whether measured or 
not, as in appeal to the incentive structure, for example.
In general the literature assessing relative performance tends to favour the private sector. In 
assessing performance, it often assumes without question that the same criteria should be used 
whether the company is private or public. Furthermore, the criteria used are generally those 
developed for the private as opposed to public sector performance. The issue is even more 
significant when investigating performances of different companies in different countries, 
where the rationale for the public sector might vary. Moreover, the theory of individual 
performance puts much emphasis 011 the complexity of the market process, whether for public 
or private sector, whereas the empirical literature suggests simple relationships between
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economic variables on a purely technical level. This is an inconsistent approach that has been 
characteristic of many economists. How the gulf between theory and measurement is bridged 
in evaluating coiporate performance is an important feature of the literature.
It has been observed that assessing the performance of privatisation, especially in the 
industrialised countries, involves a tendency among policy makers to ignore detailed 
monitoring and evaluation of those enterprises, which have been privatised (Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1995). The monitoring and evaluation are deemed to be less important if private 
sector companies operate in a “competitive” environment; that is, there are appropriate 
independent institutions marketing the same product. But such sales competition is not the 
only means by which firms compete.
The various empirical studies will be assessed against the background of these general 
observations. In doing so, I will examine several aspects presented above: the methodology, 
the criteria for measuring performance, the data set, the reasons given for behaviour of public 
and private enterprises arising out of discussion from the previous chapter and, lastly, which 
type of enterprise, public or private, performed better. Moreover, we shall examine the 
studies in the light of the theories that were examined in the previous chapter. Do the reasons 
given for behaviour of public or private enterprises refer to those theories? This gives a 
broader insight into those theories and their usefulness for empirical studies. Are the studies 
weak in implications for empirical measurement? This is important because most studies rate 
performance without regard to underlying theory and do not distinguish between theories.
Our main results are as follows. The overview of empirical studies reveals that many studies 
suffer from methodological problems and in many others the criteria for measuring corporate
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performance are not always appropriate to both sectors. In most studies the greatest attention 
is devoted to the data and the technical problems of measurement. They tend to concede that 
the problems involved led to the subjective resolution of inconsistencies. In most studies, not 
much care has been taken to relate the empirical measurement to some theory of performance. 
Whilst primarily focused 011 empirical studies, occasional reference is made to the non- 
empirical literature as it points to such of variables that should be measured in assessing 
performance.
In this light the chapter is organised as follows. In section 2 a historical overview of changes 
in the balance between public and private enterprise will be presented. It is noted that the 
British privatisation programme has led to much pressure being placed upon developing and 
transitional countries for immediate and universal privatisation of public assets as a way out 
of their economic problems. Since the beginning of the new era it can be emphasised that the 
balance between the two sectors has shifted towards the private sector, especially in 
developed countries.
In section 3 empirical studies on the relative performance of public and private enterprise will 
be reported. Each study is assessed around some aspect of the relationship between public and 
private sectors. The conclusion as to which sector has performed better, the reasons given, the 
theoretical framework that is referenced, the methodologies of the studies, and the data set 
will be examined.
In section 4 we look at privatisation performance. Many empirical studies have been 
conducted following the wave of privatisation beginning in 1980. Each study can be placed 
into one of two categories. The first consists of those studies that compare company
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performance before and after privatisation. The second approach is based on the comparison 
of privatised companies and those companies that have remained under state control. A 
procedure identical to the previous section is used to evaluate these studies in terms of theory, 
method, data, explanatory factors given and the relationship between these.
The studies surveyed are gathered together and assessed in section 5, where they are shown to 
be subject to criticism. The concluding remarks are devoted to a summary of our findings and 
the main problems to be resolved across those studies proposing to measure corporate 
performance.
3.2 Historical overview of privatisation
Before modern privatisation programmes by Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government in 
Great Britain in 1979, the first large-scale, ideologically motivated privatisation program of 
the post war era was launched by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
1961. A majority stake in Volkswagen was offered to small investors and four years later an 
even larger number of shares in VEBA were offered. Despite initial success, the first cyclical 
downturn in stock prices forced the government to bail out many small shareholders 
(Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh 1994). A few non-European governments pursued 
privatisation during the 1965-79 periods (Megginson, Nash, and van Randenborgh 1994). 
However, the Thatcher government’s large privatisation programme is without question the 
most important historically. It also gave rise to a change in terminology from 
“denationalisation” to the more appealing “privatisation”. It was firmly established as a basic 
economic policy when British Telecommunication was publicly offered in November 1984.
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The role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the British economy was reduced to essentially 
nothing after the Tories left office in 1997 while over 10 percent of GDP was associated with 
the role of SOEs when the Tories took office eighteen years earlier. The objectives set for the 
British privatisation programme were: raise revenue for the state, promote economic 
efficiency, reduce government interference in the economy, promote wider share ownership, 
provide the opportunity to introduce competition, and expose SOEs to market discipline (For 
more information see Menyah and Paudyal, 1996). However, a major objective mentioned by 
the Tory government was in deepening the national capital market (Menyah and Paudyal, 
1996). Further, Clarke (1993: 229) emphasises ‘Thus the objective of much of the Thatcher 
governments’ intervention in the public sector was to use financial controls to extend 
Taylorism in the control of public sector workers: to centralise management control: and to 
replace locally provided public services by mass-produced commercial ones’.
The British privatisation programme in general has influenced many other industrialized 
countries to begin divesting SOEs through public share offerings. The French government of 
Jacques Chirac, which was in power from 1986 until 1988, privatised 22 companies (worth 
$12 billion). The Socialist government re-elected in 1988 did not renationalise the divested 
firms. Since 1993, the Socialist government itself has launched a new and even larger French 
privatisation programme. Among these, the largest ever French privatisation was launched 
selling the $7.1 billion French Telecom in October 1997. Several other western European 
governments including Italy, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries 
have tried to follow suit during the late-1980s and early-1990s. These programmes typically 
relied on public share offerings to achieve privatisation.
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Outside of Western Europe, not only rich countries such as Japan and Canada, but many other 
countries including, China, India, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa, 
and Soviet-bloc countries of central and eastern Europe governments have tried to use the 
opportunities to sell large companies when market conditions were attractive, or when money 
was needed to plug budget deficits. Kilceri, Nellis, and Shirley (1992) disclose that, by 1992, 
more than 80 countries had adopted privatisation programmes. As a result, 2000 SOEs in 
developing countries and 6800 SOEs worldwide were transferred to the private sector (For 
additional details, see Campbell White and Bhatia (1998) and Bowen (1997)).
According to Bortolotti, Fantini, Siniscalco, and Vitalini (1998) the role of state-owned 
enterprises in the economies of industrialized countries declined significantly from 1978 
through to 1991. That role, which accounted for roughly nine percent of GDP in OECD 
countries in 1978, had declined to less than seven percent ten years later. Since 1988 the SOE 
share of industrialized-country GDP has probably slipped below five percent. In the transition 
economies of central and Eastern Europe, this role has fallen even farther because of mass 
privatisation programmes (see Blanchard and Aghion (1996) and Pistor and Spicer (1997)). 
Meanwhile, from 1978 through 1991, the role of SOEs actually increased in some developing 
countries to about 11 percent of GDP in 1991, which was slightly higher than their share in 
1978 (Haggarty and Shirley, 1996). However, other evidence suggests that, in developing 
countries, there has been a decrease in state involvement in the economy through SOEs 
(World Bank, 1995).
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Table 1: Market Value, Sales, and Profits of the 34 Largest, Publicly-Traded Privatised Firms
Company Name Country Global 1000 Rank
Country
Rank
Marker Value 
US $ MIL
Total Sale 
US $ MIL
Total Profit 
US $ MIL
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Japan 8 1 130,911 63,665 1,081
British Petroleum United Kingdom 26 2 85,283 70,870 4,600
Deutsche Telekom Germany 32 2 73,640 37,891 1,853
British Telecommunications United Kingdom 40 6 66,261 25,504 3,307
ENI Italy 57 1 56,424 34,551 2,913
France Telecom France 59 1 56,011 26,197 2,484
Telecom Italia Italy 67 2 51,301 24,372 1,963
Telefonica Spain 78 1 45,854 15,617 1,256
Elf Acquitaine France 91 2 38,123 42,507 1,702
VEBA Germany 116 10 32,686 42,667 1,576
Volkswagen Germany 122 11 30,938 63,521 749
Total France 127 6 38,345 31,939 1,272
Gazprom Russia 128 1 32,906 20,462 1,456
Telebras Brazil 129 1 32,759 13,739 3,390
Telstra Australia 130 1 30,278 9,668 1,608
Koninklijke PTT Nederland Netherlands 150 7 26,420 7,590 1,339
Cable & Wireless United Kingdom 156 17 25,601 11,417 1,194
Endesa Spain 164 4 24,950 8,475 1,102
Singapore Telecommunications Singapore 189 1 21,499 2,952 1,127
Hong Kong Telecommunications Hong Kong 190 1 21,440 4,522 2,197
China Telecom China 199 1 20,676 1,871 599
BG United Kingdom 204 21 20,246 7,012 820
Rhone-Poulenc France 207 10 20,122 15,042 571
Telefonos de Mexico Mexico 209 1 19,999 6,873 1,455
Commonwealth Bank Australia 211 3 19,828 NA 1,391
Societe Generate France 216 12 19,548 NA 1,021
East Japan Railways Japan 221 18 18,995 18,142 510
Banque Nationale de Paris France 231 15 18,214 NA 997
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain France 239 16 17,603 17,898 939
Repsol Spain 256 5 16,694 21,208 833
Paribas France 261 17 16,327 NA 1,099
Credito Italiano Italy 265 6 16,113 NA 274
British Aerospace United Kingdom 266 27 15,918 11,850 695
Electricidade de Portugal Portugal 268 1 15,785 3,132 510
Information is from Morgan Stanley Capital International, as reported in “The Business Week Global 1000,” Business 
Week (July 13, 1998), pp. 52-92.
Global 1000 Rank refers to the company’s global ranking based on market valuation, while Country Rank refers to the 
company’s relative position among those firms from their country on the Global 1000 List.
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As table one shows, 75 of the Global 1000 and 29 of the Top 100 Emerging Market 
companies are privatised firms; thus, it can be concluded that total world stock market 
capitalization would today be substantially smaller if privatisation had not happened. 
Privatised companies account for 20.1 percent of the total capitalization of the non-US 
companies on the combined Global 1000 and Top 100 Emerging Market lists. The four most 
valuable emerging market companies all are privatised firms and former-SOEs account for 
36.6 percent of the Top 100 Emerging Market Companies’ total value.
Why have governments been so enthusiastically embracing privatisation? One answer could 
be that it is about raising money. Goodman and Loveman (1991) reveal that the worldwide 
total sales of SOEs had topped $185 billion by 1990, and Megginson and Netter (1998) claim 
that governments have raised over two-thirds of a trillion dollars just through share offerings 
and direct sales (excluding voucher privatisations) since 1977. On the other hand, the revenue 
obtained cannot be the sole reason that privatisation has become popular since it is apparent 
that the revenue received from share sales of highly-profitable SOEs would be offset by lost 
profit remittances in the future. Hence, the deeper answer must lie somewhere else. 
Veljanovski (1990: xiii) observes, ‘having read a great deal of this literature I have reached 
the inescapable conclusion that, with some notable exceptions, very little has risen above the 
commonplace. One defect in much of the work stands out and requires comment. 
Privatisation is a complex process, which takes place in the commercial market place, and in 
the political market place...one must examine the political and institutional context on an 
equal footing to the purely economic aspects’. This is the light in which to view the account 
of the empirical studies that follows.
82
3.3 Empirical Studies
3.3.1 The Relative Performance of State-Owned and Privately-Owned 
Firms
In the immediate post-World War II period western countries (outside the United States) 
adopted an economic policy, which deeply involved the national government. The 
involvement consisted of regulating the national economy and industrial sector activities 
through exclusive state ownership. Until 1979 when the Thatcher government came to power 
it was an obvious and commonly accepted belief that the government should control at least 
those sectors such as telecommunications, postal services, electric and gas utilities, airlines, 
railroads, state-owned banks and certain “strategic” manufacturing industries such as steel and 
defence productions. Thatcher’s government challenged this belief from a purely ideological 
point of view, and thereafter the other Western countries’ governments have tried to follow 
suit.
Since the beginning of this era early empirical studies were in favour of at least the economic 
competitiveness of state ownership. Vickers and Wright (1989: 23) have brought forward that: 
‘The nature of competition in the relevant market emerges as an important factor, with private 
ownership appearing relatively more efficient in competitive conditions’. The studies done by 
Caves and Christensen (1980), Faere, Grosskopf, and Logan (1985), Atkinson, Kay and 
Thompson (1986), Yarrow (1986), Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Bishop and Kay (1989), and 
Beesley and Littlechild (1989) are in favour of reforming SOEs through the introduction of 
more competition in order to achieve more efficiency; in the end, they all favour privatisation. 
However, in their empirical studies on public versus private sector efficiency, Martin and 
Parker (1997) suggest that the environment in which firms are operating is important. Public
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enterprises, for instance, are more efficient if  there is little or no product competition. They 
conclude that the statement that privately owned companies are more efficient than publicly 
owned firms is questionable because another factor, the environment, is more important for 
economic efficiency then the ownership. Yarrow (1985) stresses that product market 
competition and regulatory policies are more important for economic performance than 
ownership. However, whether these latter findings are reliable as far as the corporate 
performance is concerned seems to be doubtful.
Some economists have questioned whether these two types of ownership are comparable. 
Vickers and Wright (1989: 23) note that, ‘In truth, however, there are great problems in 
comparing the performance of public and private enterprises, because the criteria for assessing 
performance are varied, and because their activities do not always overlap sufficiently to 
permit meaningful comparison. Furthermore, private sector management has a basic duty to 
maximise profits for shareholders, which is not the case with public sector firms which are 
frequently bound by other objectives: low profitability is not necessarily inconsistent with 
efficient management’.
Many economists have first developed theoretical models and then provided empirical 
evidence to support the presented model. However, each model highlights only one aspect of 
the relation between public and private sector. Many authors have contributed to the 
movement towards markets; a leading figure among them is Frederich Von Hayek. His book, 
The Road to Serfdom (1944), which opposes the welfare state and collectivism, may have had 
the most direct impact on policymakers. Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) believe that his ideas 
were a theoretical benchmark for the policies recommended by Keith Joseph and, later,
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Margaret Thatcher that led to a market economy. Another influential economist is Kornai 
(1988) who criticizes the role of the state in creating peculiar incentives and accuses the state 
enterprises of having “soft budget constraint”. As a result, the government has difficulty in 
imposing financial discipline on SOEs.
Forsyth and Hocking (1980) conducted research on air services in Australia and tried to 
compare one public company with one private operator. Their results show very little 
difference in the airlines’ performance. Finsinger (1984) conducted an investigation of 96 
life-insurance companies in Germany, among which 12 were public firms. He found that the 
average total costs of public enterprises are less than three-quarters those of private firms and 
that the operating costs of both parts (public and private) are similar. Faere, Grosskopf and 
Logan (1985) conducted research of 123 private and 30 electric utilities operating in the U.S. 
market. They found that public owned utilities have been slightly more efficient than 
privately owned companies. In contrast to this result, Foreman-Peck and Waterson (1985) 
found an opposite result. Their experiment dealt with 171 local authorities and privately 
owned stations in the UK. The result shows publicly owned (the local authority sector) 
enterprises in this branch are less efficient on average than the private.
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) conducted theoretical investigation of the choice between 
public and private provision of goods. They point out that the preference depends on the level 
of transaction costs regardless of whether the goods and services are produced by government 
intervention or by private ownership under informational asymmetry. For privatisation they 
suggest different policies based on different circumstances. It may be that government 
ownership is more appropriate than private ownership. On the other hand, they find that it is 
not necessarily optimal to make government intervention easy, and that the government’s
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promise not to intervene is more credible under private ownership than public ownership. 
They found similarities rather than differences between private and public ownership in 
respect to performance incentives. ‘Thus, once there is delegation of responsibility and an 
effective separation of ownership and management, there is dissolution of performance 
incentives under both public and private ownership. Whether the problem is more severe 
under one mode of organization or the other, remains an open question. The answer depends 
in part on how well performance can be monitored, how effective is competition, etc., in the 
two models’.
The question of which form of ownership is more likely to promote social welfare is 
investigated by Laffont and Tirole (1991). They state that because the objective is different 
for managers of public enterprises (maximising social welfare rather than profit) the 
investment cost is suboptimal. However, the cost of private ownership is not so 
straightforward. The manager of a private enterprise must try to satisfy regulators, on the one 
hand, and shareholders, on the other hand. Hartley and Hooper (1992) set out to investigate 
whether the productivity of nationalised industries as a whole moves in the same direction as 
national trends in the UK for the years 1979-1990. The result clearly shows the average 
annual productivity growth of nationalised industries (4.4 %) was above both manufacturing 
(4.1%) and the economy as a whole (1.9 %). DeFraja (1993), observing the principal-agent 
problems, looks at the degree of inefficiency when an optimal incentive contract is in place on 
both public and private owners. He concludes that because consumers’ welfare is part of the 
government utility function, public ownership always results in a higher level of productive 
efficiency. The government will gain more if an increase in productive efficiency occurs. 
Therefore it should pay more for those gains.
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Boyclco, Shleifer, and Visliny (1994, 1996) in two successive articles have tried to show the 
inefficiency of public enterprises based on both the public choice school and the principal- 
agent theories. In their model politicians and public enterprise managers are assumed to be 
co-operating to achieve their own goals. Politicians are interested in satisfying the voters and 
public managers are ready to co-operate with them in order to promote their own positions 
further. They conclude that inefficiency is inherent with the public sector activities and the 
best remedy is privatisation, which leads to substantial improvements of public enterprises.
Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) looked at incomplete contracts and recommend private 
ownership over public ownership if lack of incentive and high costs is present. They argue 
that public and private provision of goods and services would usually result in similarly 
efficient results if complete and enforceable contracts were in place. However, incomplete 
contracts are usual in public enterprises, which bring about a lack of motivation for 
controlling costs and improving quality on the part of government managers. Privately owned 
enterprises do not suffer from this problem because their contracts are usually complete and 
enforceable. In the question of public versus private ownership and their relative 
performances the same data are consistent with the property rights school and the public 
choice theory as Faere et al (1985: 97) point out: ‘in terms of sources of scale inefficiency, 
66% of the privately owned utilities exhibited decreasing returns to scale, whereas 80% of 
publicly owned utilities were at a point of increasing returns to scale, suggesting that privately 
owned utilities have over-expanded, whereas publicly owned utilities could benefit from 
further expansions’. In contrast, several studies come to another conclusion and show that 
government ownership did not necessarily result in poor economic performance. These 
studies are more in favour of state than private ownership and point to the fact that there is no
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unambiguously preferable form of ownership. The work by Kole and Mulherin (1997) is a 
clear example of this type.
3.3.2 The Most Significant Empirical Studies
The relative performance of public versus private firms has been more extensively analysed 
than privatisation. The main international studies are by Borchending et al (1982), Millward 
and Parker (1983) and Boardman and Vining (1989 and 1992).
Borcherding et al (1982) study more than 50 empirical pieces of research from the US, 
Germany, Australia, Canada and Switzerland covering a wide range of industries airlines, 
railway services, banks and insurance companies, utilities, refuse collection, construction, and 
also some in the public services arena such as fire brigade, hospitals and forestry. They focus 
on two main points as criteria for their studies: costs of operations, and the question of 
whether ownership is more important than creating competition.
What they found confirms that public firms have higher costs than private firms in 
comparable companies (i.e. public firms are less productive or cost efficient). In some cases, 
unit costs are similar where public firms are operating in fiercely competitive environments. 
Although three studies were found in which public firms are more efficient than private ones, 
the authors of the surveys are sceptical about those results and suggest that adequate control 
was not maintained for relevant variables such as quality. They further conclude that public 
firms are adopting innovations and cost saving measures. This is due to the fact that their 
managers enjoy longer tenure periods than private managers and it seems that voters rather 
than non-voters affect their decisions.
They evaluate this evidence as support for the “property rights” approach on the grounds that 
those public firms are inefficient since in the public sector property rights are imperfectly 
defined. Moreover, it is more difficult to monitor the agents involved (i.e. managers and 
bureaucrats). The “public choice” approach is also examined by them. This examination is 
based on some results from De Alessi (1969) about managers in public firms who set out to 
improve their films’ growth rather than to maximise welfare. Despite this, overstaffing and 
overcapitalisation of firms are still the outcome. The excess of unit costs, which is linked to 
public firms, is likely to result from the public choice effects, like self-interested 
managers/bureaucrats and unionised workers extracting rents. However, the authors believe 
that higher costs are generated from transferring redistributed income. These transfers are the 
cost of having public firms. Contracting out to private providers cannot sustain this behaviour.
Boardman and Vining (1989 and 1992) have looked at the efficiency of public and private 
firms. The first study examines the economic performance of the 500 largest non-US 
industrial firms in 1983. The second looks empirically at state versus private ownership of 
Canadian firms. They review 91 studies examining which type of firm, public or private, is 
more efficient and also whether competition in the market is more important than ownership 
in determining the degree of efficiency. Industries which were examined are: electricity, 
refuse collection, water, health, airlines, railroads, banks and financial services, fire services 
and non-rail transits.
Their comparative approach uses four profitability ratios and two measures of X-inefficiency. 
The finding seems to emphasise that ownership is generally important even in those industries 
where a high degree of competition is present. Private firms generally perform better than 
public ones. However, if public firms are operating in a competitive environment, efficiency
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improvements are visible. As the previous study by Borcherding et al (1982) suggests, some 
state-owned enterprises have outperformed private enterprises, but the authors stress that this 
is because no real competition existed in those industries, which included utilities, airlines, 
railway, and health services. They concluded that this could not be used as a reliable measure 
for comparing the efficiency of public and private firms in a competitive environment.
They conduct their empirical study on the property rights hypothesis including:
1) Several measure of profitability and efficiency performance;
2) Variables for SOE ( state owned enterprise), PC (private company) and ME (mixed 
enterprise);
3) Various measures that reflect the nature of regulatory/competitive environment.
Thus, performance is formulated as
Performance = f  (Mixed, state, assets, sales, employees, market shares, concentration, 
industry and country).
They use the 500 largest manufacturing and mining corporations in the world outside the 
United States as compiled by Fortune Magazine in 1983. [In their 1992 study they use 1986 
data on the 500 largest non-fmancial corporations in Canada as compiled by The Financial 
Post (1987)]. They categorised ownership in the following way: state-owned firms (SOE), 
mixed enterprises (ME), co-operatives (co-op) and private companies (PC). They set dummy 
variables for the first three and made PCs the benchmark. Some modifications are made in 
order to look at the relative performance of SOEs and PCs in competitive environments. 
They also treated MEs like PCs except for the ownership aspect. Examples of PCs in the 
dataset are Nissan, Nestle, and Scottish and Newcastle breweries; examples of SOEs include
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British Cost Board, Vale do Rio Doce, and Petroleos de Venezuela; and examples of MEs are 
British Petroleum, Canada Corporation, and Volkswagen.
Two different types of dependent variables of profitability and technical efficiency are used to 
examine performance. The profitability is measured by utilising three criteria: return on assets 
(ROA), return on sales (ROS) and net income (NI). Two performance measures, related to 
technical efficiency or X-efficiency, are used: the log of sales per employee and the log of 
sales per asset. An equation with the log of asset per employee- the capital to labour ratio -  as 
the dependent variable is estimated. Accounting rates of return are generally not equivalent to 
economic rate of return because o f different methods of measuring depreciation.
These include assets, sales, employees and a measure of international market share to reflect 
the competitive position of each firm. In actual fact, assets, sales, and employees measure 
size, economies of scale and, to some extent, market power. Also there is evidence that the 
choice of depreciation method is related to firm size. The market share is computed as the 
ratio of the firm’s sales to the total sector sales of the 500 international firms in the data. To 
control the competitive/regulatory environment of the industry, they include concentration 
and dummy variables for each industrial sector and each country. The concentration is 
measured by a four-firm concentration ratio (the percentage of an industry’s employees
accounted for by the four largest firms in an industry). It is computed by country. They
obtained data from Fortune, R. M. Whiteside ed., Major Companies of Europe, and The 
Organization for Economic Corporation and Development and Industrial Structure Statistic to 
determine concentration. For some firms it was impossible to construct a concentration 
measure. A dummy variable is deployed: "one” is used when no concentration measure is
available and “zero” when there is.
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Industrial classifications are assigned to each company in the sample. This initially results in 
twenty-two industrial categories; next, those categories with small frequencies are combined 
with the most similar large industrial category ultimately to give fifteen industrial categories. 
A dummy variable is also included for each of the major industrialized countries in the 
sample: Italy, France, Canada, Germany, Britain, and Japan. The variable corresponding to all 
other countries is omitted from the regressions.
The variable means and standard deviations are given in a table in that article broken down by 
ownership type (PC, ME, and SOE) and for total sample. Based on the above evidences the 
authors emphasise that, as far as efficiency is concerned, ownership is the focal/main point 
rather than competition. Consequently, they criticise this idea that in those industries where 
no relevant market failures existed, privatisation is not necessary. They argue that those who 
support this idea emphasise two hypotheses incorrectly. First, it is argued that private firms 
may not always have maximum efficiency levels; since executives may seek their own 
personal objectives control them. On the other hand, public firms are viewed as efficient 
because they produce additional socio-political outputs that are not pursued by private firms.
In order to test empirically the first argument the authors surveyed 31 papers in which the 
difference in efficiency between owner-controlled and manager-controlled private firms was 
examined. They indicate that efficiency levels are higher in owner-controlled firms. It does 
not mean that inefficiency resulting from managers pursuing personal agendas must 
necessarily be equal or higher to that of public firms. The presence of X-inefficiency in both 
private and public films is worse when pressure on managers/executives is reduced. 
Furthermore, the evidence stresses that, if  X-inefficiency exists in private firms, it does not 
necessarily reach the same levels as public firms. However the authors have not answered the
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question of why ‘the observed inefficiency of public firms is higher than private 
counterparts’. The second argument is that public firms are inefficient because they pursue 
desirable social outputs, which is seen by the authors as an excuse for the higher costs of 
those firms. If this hypothesis were true, it would be possible to assume that the social 
objectives cannot be achieved by contracting out to private firms.
Millward and Parker (1983) review the literature on North American companies where public 
and private firms coincide in electricity, water supply, transport and refuse collection as in 
Australia, Indonesia and Switzerland. They come to different conclusions from the two 
previous studies. They conclude that it is hard to find systematic evidence that public 
enterprises are less cost efficient than private firms. Furthermore, the view that wages are 
higher in public firms has not been widely supported. Also, differences between public and 
private firms emerge when price and profitability are a major concern. Some case studies 
show that public firms have lower prices and higher output levels. However, they emphasise 
that competition is a key factor for raising efficiency.
Both Borchending et al (1982) and Millward and Parker (1983) share the view that in a 
competitive environment private and public firms do not differ significantly in their economic 
performance. However, Vining and Boardman (1992:218) dismiss this idea and argue that 
‘ownership does matter and there is strong evidence for superior private enterprise 
performance’. They also claim that even in competitive markets, private firms outperform 
public ones.
What these empirical studies suggest is that the statement ‘private ownership has superiority 
over public ownership’ is questionable. Vickers and Wright (1989: 23) express this idea
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clearly: ‘The evidence does not support any general propositions about the superiority of 
private over public ownership or vice versa’.
3.4 Empirical Studies on Privatisation
The World Bank and many other international institutions, as well as a large proportion of the 
literature, support the idea that privatisation has led to economic and social efficiencies and 
performance has improved substantially. As Yarrow (1986) acknowledges, the gains 
achieved without privatisation would have been difficult to sustain. This belief tends to 
strengthen the view that ownership is important for performance gains as the property right 
theorists argued.
On the other hand, many theoretical and survey articles predict that competition and 
deregulation are more important than privatisation (e.g., Bishop and Kay (1989) and Vickers 
and Yarrow (1991)). Adding to this list, some studies were conducted to examine how 
deregulation and, in general, relaxation of the market can affect the performance before 
privatisation takes place. Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993) look at the state sector reform 
that took place in Poland in 1990 over a period of three years. The reform consisted of the 
deregulation of prices, the introduction of foreign investment to many industries, and the 
tightening of monetary and fiscal policies. They conclude that hard budget constraints 
connected to tighter bank lending behaviour can lead to an improvement of performance. Li 
(1997) found a similar result by looking at the total factor productivity of 272 Chinese state- 
owned companies over the period 1980-89 and the impact of the economic reforms initiated 
in 1979.
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The evaluation of the effect of privatisation is a very difficult task because it involves several 
serious methodological constraints (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). The effect of privatisation 
also covers a broader range of issues from economical to social aspects. For these reasons the 
assessment can be based on different criteria. Measuring performance can be the most 
difficult part and there are a variety of methods. One method of assessment is based on the 
objectives set for the privatisation. A prime objective is the expansion of the private sector 
and the formation of a market-based economy. This expansion and formation has occurred 
almost everywhere that Margaret Thatcher established an economic renaissance in Britain. 
Although the claim that monetarism and privatisation have improved the British economy is 
open to debate, the privatisation in Britain was founded on pure capitalism and not the 
improvement of the British economy (Clarke, 1993).
Macro indicators can be used as criteria to evaluate privatisation performance. Whether 
privatisation increases government revenue or reduces budget deficits can be one measure of 
performance. Another macro indicator is privatisation’s impact on investment, including 
foreign direct investment. A third indicator measures privatisation performance, this time at a 
micro level, by looking at the enterprise efficiency or profitability. Different criteria have 
been used to measure efficiency such as profit margin, profit-asset ratio, labour productivity, 
production and export data, and sales performance. The fourth method is to investigate 
performance in terms of social impact by measuring the level of employment, wages, and 
associated work conditions. The social impact can also be measured by looking at labour 
redundancy, unemployment and redundancy payment, and related safety provisions as a result 
of privatisation. The final indicator can measure the impact of privatisation on economic 
welfare by employing a cost-benefit analysis.
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For evaluating the performance of privatised enterprises, two approaches have been widely 
used. One approach compares the performance before and after privatisation. The second 
approach compares the performance of those enterprises that are privatised, and those that 
remain under public ownership control. This latter approach presupposes both to be in a 
similar sector. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, which lead to 
approximation rather than ideal models (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995).
Dunshire, Hartley and Parker (1991) looked at average annual growth rates of labour and total 
factor productivity before and after privatisation of a number of British companies and 
compared these with national trends for four years. The finding reveals that British aerospace, 
a nationalised company, showed a deteriorated performance while Rolls-Royce with the same 
position of ownership performed much better at that time. They concluded that privatisation 
led to improvement in performance of British airways, BAe, and National Freight, while 
Royal factories showed a reverse result.
The World Bank report (1992) assesses privatisation performance by using the before and 
after privatisation approach and comes to the conclusion that privatisation has had a positive 
effect on economic performance. The report points to the success in Latin America (Mexico, 
Chile, and Jamaica), Africa (Nigeria), Asia (Malaysia, Korea) and developed countries (UK, 
France, Japan, and New Zealand). The main indicators used are welfare and its consequences 
resulting from privatisation using the cost-benefit analysis. Changes in welfare are 
represented by the net economic welfare as changes in consumer surplus and enterprise 
profits. Additionally, increases in investment, improvements in productivity, and output 
growth and diversification are used to show how economic welfare has improved by 
privatisation policy. For the case study twelve firms from four countries (Chile, Malaysia, 
Mexico and UK) were chosen.
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Newberry and Pollitt (1997) examine restructuring and privatisation of the Central Electricity 
Board in 1990 using a social cost-benefit analysis. They used an unconventional method by 
comparing post privatisation performance with the performance result if privatisation had not 
happened. They conclude that privatisation caused a significant improvement in performance 
with a permanent cost reduction of five percent per year, equivalent to an extra 40 percent 
return on assets. Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1997) conducted an investigation asking 
what happens to the retail prices when privatisation takes place and what happens to newly 
privatised companies competing against other private firms in an imperfectly competitive 
market. They stress that the short-term result will differ from a long-term one. That is because 
when the disciplinary role of the SOE is abandoned it results in higher prices in the short 
tenn. Hence, privatisation in such circumstances is harmful. But the outcome differs in the 
long term because the new entry into the industry will lead to a more competitive 
environment.
Dewenter and Malatests (1998) performed a comparable study using a different method. They 
looked at the profitability, labour intensity and debt level of state firms in the 500 largest 
international companies in 1975, 1985 and 1995. The companies they chose differ from 
private firms in the same sample. The effect of the business cycle is also considered. They 
found the same result as the study by Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse.
Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski (1998) compare the performance of 128 privatised 
and 90 state owned companies in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland between the years 
1990-93. They point out that the nature of firms that are privatised and those that remain 
under control of the state are different; therefore, many privatisation studies are misleading. 
Another reason for error is that in those studies data are not disaggregated sufficiently or
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controlled for sample bias. As a remedy they examine the average effects of privatisation 
depending on the ownership structure of the firms and, in order to control potential sample 
selection bias, they choose fixed-effect models of privatisation based on different control 
groups and control for the macroeconomic environment. They look at the rate of growth of 
revenue, employment, labour productivity and costs per unit of output. They found, on 
average, privatisation has led to an improvement of performance with immediate increases in 
revenue and productivity and with no sign of employment effects.
3.4.1 The Most Significant Empirical Studies
Bishop and Kay (1988) conducted a survey on privatisation performance in the United 
Kingdom from 1979 until 1988. They conclude that most privatised industries have grown 
since privatisation. The growth of these industries is more than that of those industries that 
have remained in public ownership. However, the growth is more related to the nature of the 
industries concerned than to privatisation alone. Furthermore, those privatised firms that have 
improved their relative performance were also improving before privatisation.
Bishop and Kay’s evaluation of performance is comprised of several factors: profitability 
margins, which is represented by return on capital employed, return on sales, employment and 
total factor productivity in the UK Public Sector. Data that are used is based on company 
accounts and tables containing data from each factor for each company comparing 1979 data 
(when the companies were privatised) and 1988 data. Using all these factors as criteria for 
measuring performance of 12 privatised companies and 5 public owned companies, they 
(1988:653) emphasise that ‘The significant improvement in the performance of remaining 
public sector (Companies under the government control) denies any simple views about the
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relationship between ownership and performance’. The main focus of this survey article is 
market failure and they believe that simply taking enterprises into the private sector does not 
resolve the problems of market failure.
Bishop and Thompson (1992) examine the productivity growth over 20 years of the nine 
largest nationalised industries in the UK, some of them privatised during the 1980s. They 
found that the rate of productivity growth had improved significantly during the 1980s 
compared with the decade before.
The technique used by Bishop and Thompson to examine productivity growth and public 
enterprise efficiency is based on the Tonqvist’s productivity index of growth rates of inputs 
and outputs. They point out that this procedure is an appropriate measure of technical change 
and includes efficient pricing mechanism in both, input and output markets, constant returns 
to scale, and achievement of technical efficiency. Output data, labour productivity, and total 
factor productivity over the period of two decades 1970-1990 are compared. Changes in 
public enterprise regulation have been identified significantly as the main source for 
productivity growth.
Haskel and Szymanski (1993) have tried to conduct an empirical study on privatisation 
performance in the UK from a different angle. They argue that most agency-based 
privatisation models are based on the owner-manager relation and ignore the labour market. 
However, they present a model of the manager-workforce relation in order to explain 
employment and wages when firms are privatised, government objectives become more 
commercial and markets become liberalised. Their research is based on data over the period 
of 1972-1988 on 14 UK companies which were state-owned enterprises in 1972. They found
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that changes toward commercial objectives have resulted in the fall of employment and that 
wages are slightly affected depending on the films’ market power. Wages will fall 
significantly if it loses its own power.
Regression analysis is employed by Haskel and Szmanski to estimate two different equations, 
one for employment and another for wages. The equations include dummies for changes in 
objectives. Changes resulting from privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation of markets 
are seen as the main cause of drastic changes in employment over the period of 1972-1988. 
However, changes in wages are assumed to be a function of the firm’s market power. They 
also criticise most models of privatisation for ignoring the labour market and considering just 
the agency problem between managers and owners.
Martin and Parker (1995) conducted an investigation on 11 privatised British companies over 
the period 1981-88 by using profitability, measured as return on invested capital, and 
efficiency, measured as annual growth in value added per employee hour. They found a 
variety of results. In some cases privatisation has improved performance of the firm and in 
many other cases it did not. They also made an adjustment for the business cycle and found 
some improvements in the outcome. Furthermore, they state that privatisation could improve 
the performance of some companies for just a short period while privatisation was occurring 
but not afterwards. In their opinion, a general conclusion camiot be drawn that privatisation 
can improve performance in every case.
In Martin and Parker’s study, labour productivity growth is measured through comparing 
input and output volumes changes. Hick’s neutral technical progress based on a logarithmic 
form is used to measure TFP (total factor productivity):
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where Q is the output; t is the time; V, is share of input i in total expenditure; and Nj is the 
amount of input i employed. Comparison is made between each organisation’s productivity 
growths and that of the whole economy where it should be relevant to the manufacturing 
sector in a short period of 4 years. Perfect competition, constant return to scale and the 
absence of externalities are assumed. The adopted procedure is accepted despite their belief 
that the measuring processes introduce several different distortions. They (1995: 206) point 
out: ‘In sum, the method adopted for measuring total factor productivity provides a useful 
insight into changes in productive efficiency even though the results below need to be 
interpreted cautiously recognising the possibility of some input bias and output omissions’.
The conclusion Martin and Parker found is interesting, particularly in view of the 
methodology used. They (1995: 216) observe that: ‘privatisation is not the only factor, and 
may not be the main factor, affecting performance....mixed results seem to confirm that 
privatisation does not guarantee good performance’. Also, on the next page (1995: 217) they 
stress that: ‘those organisations that operated in regulated markets do not seem to have 
performed noticeably better or worse than those operating in more competitive markets. The 
best performance overall was associated British Ports which won back business from other 
UK docks. The worst performer was Jaguar which also operates in a competitive market’.
Apart from UK studies there are three main international studies on privatisation by 
Megginson, Nash and Van Randerbergh (1994), Galal, Jones, Tendon and Vogelsang (1994) 
and Enrich, Gallais-Hamomio, Liu and Lutter (1994). Megginson et al (1994) conduct a 
comparative study by using the pre-and-post privatisation financial and operating
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performance of 61 companies from 18 countries - 6 developing and 12 developed - including 
32 industries that privatised frilly or partially during the period of 1961-1990. They emphasise 
that privatisation has led to an increase in the level of employment. Since the time that these 
changes have taken place, the firms’ real sales, profitability, capital investment, spending, 
operating efficiency and workforces have increased.
The data, collected are limited to those companies that were sold to the public through the 
issuance of shares. A sample of the firms is drawn from the World Bank listing of privatised 
firms. The impact of privatisation is examined by different performance criteria. Profitability, 
which is the first testable measure, is represented by return on sales (Net Income/sales), return 
on assets (Net Income/Total assets) and return on equity (Net Income/equity). Operating 
efficiency is measured by sale efficiency (sales/number of employment) and net income 
efficiency (Net Income/Number of employment). Capital invested is presented by capital 
expenditures to sales (capital expenditures/sales) and capital expenditures to assets (capital 
expenditures/assets). Output is measured by real sales (Nominal sales/consumer price index). 
Employment is represented by total employment. Debt to assets ratio (total debt/total assets) 
and long term debt to equity ratio (long term debt/equity) are assumed to predict leverage. 
Dividends to sales (cash-dividends/net-income) represent payout as the last variable. Data 
from these quantifiable variables are collected in order to compare the pre-privatisation with 
the post- privatisation era. The mean and median of each variable are assumed to show what 
happened to the performance of each company. The fact that privatisation has led to such a 
significant improvement in the performance of those firms has been explained by the 
inefficiency of public enterprises and the fact that they are not market-oriented.
Galal, Jones, Tendon and Vvogelsang (1994) examine a comparative study of 12 large firms 
from Britain, Chile, Malaysia Indonesia and Mexico. They compare the actual post­
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privatisation performance with the predicted performance of those firms if they had remained 
under state ownership. They argue that this method allows a social welfare analysis to be 
achieved. They emphasise that, on average, the net welfare gains in 11 out of 12 cases are 
reached and that in no case did workers lose out. They also argue that the study has shown 
that ownership is significant and a privatisation policy is beneficial.
For each country they have used three companies taken from the fields of aviation, energy, 
telecommunication, transportation and shipping, and gambling. In fact they conducted three 
case studies for each country. The method that is used for calculating welfare gain is the 
same in all case studies. All of the data are presented in terms of both current and constant 
prices. They argue that ‘constructing constant-prices time series,’ for all relevant variables 
provides a position from which to examine the performance of the enterprise. Two measures 
of performance are used: The first is total factor productivity (TFP), which is estimated by 
this equation:
TFP= benefit/all costs= X / (11+ W+ R+ rkw+ rkf)
where X is the value of output, II is the value of intermediate inputs, W is employee 
comparison, R is factor rentals, rlcw is the opportunity cost of working capital and rkf is 
opportunity cost of fixed capital.
The second measure of performance is obtained by a formula called public profitability.
Public profitability = (benefit -  variable costs)/ fixed costs= (X-II-W-R- rk) / kf.
Public profit is calculated by this equation:
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Public Profit = X-II-W-R-rkw.
The authors argued that TFP and public profitability capture only efficiency effects that 
accrue to the enterprise itself. From a social point of view, traditional consumer surplus 
should be measured in order to capture the impact of the enterprise’s activity on consumers. 
Through this kind of procedure they attempted to calculate social welfare gains from selling 
public enterprises. They point out that a policy of divesting public enterprises will result in 
welfare gains because public enterprises are subject to inefficiency. However, the results of 
the study cannot be used as a predictive model, especially in very poor countries or in the 
former centrally planned economies.
Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter (1994) conduct a study on the international airline 
industry looking at the effects of ownership on productivity growth and cost reductions. They 
have concluded that the long-term effect of a change (i.e. a shift from complete state to full 
private ownership) can lead to an improvement in the long-run annual rate of TFP growth by 
1.6 to 2 percent. Additionally, the rate of unit cost can decline by 1.7 to 1.9 percent. In 
contrast, they expect the short-run effect of a change from state to private ownership on the 
TFP and cost levels to be ambiguous.
An endogenous model is used to test panel data on 23 international airlines of varying levels 
of state ownership over the period 1973-1983. Econometric techniques are employed with 
some observations as follows;
a) The short-term effect of ownership changes is separated from long-term effects;
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b) The estimated ownership effect is isolated from other factors that might affect the 
firm’s level or rate of productivity growth (e.g. market conditions and external 
technical factors);
c) Testing to the extent permitted by the data is performed.
Total factor productivity indices are also calculated as the ratios of total output and input 
indices. Dummy variables are included to capture the effects of regulatory changes. Also firm 
and country-specific variables are represented by dummy variables to capture the possible 
effect of country-specific technology levels and progress on the level and rate of cost decline. 
A cost function, which is consistent with the Cobb-Douglas technology, is used to estimate 
cost fluctuations over the specific period. They found that productivity growth and cost 
reduction are functions of ownership, proving the point that ownership plays a key factor in 
performance.
In summary, therefore, the bulk of existing empirical studies on ownership and performance 
focus on private and public firms’ relative efficiency. They are based, in a majority of cases, 
on cross-sectional data without taking into account firm-specific and unobservable features 
that complicate and sometimes even invalidate the firm comparisons. This may be one of the 
reasons for the lack of systematic results arising from these studies. By contrast, studies 
analysing the effects of privatisation on the firm performance use time series data, which 
overcomes the problem of unobservable firm-specific effects. In general, these studies 
indicate that privatisation is positively associated with performance improvement. 
Difficulties arise, however, in distinguishing among the effects on efficiency that results from 
the change in ownership, the change in market competition and the change in the firm’s 
regulatory framework.
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3.5 A Critical Assessment
It should be noted that comparing performance over a period of time as a method of 
measuring corporate performance (as was done in these studies) makes it difficult to 
determine how much of the improvement resulted specifically from privatisation.
The above empirical evidence shows tremendous achievements by privatised companies in 
some cases. These achievements are doubtless the result of maximising profit, developing 
new methods of production, expanding qualities and enhancing sales. However, it is 
understandable that some profitability procedures are now available which were not available 
under public ownerships such as increasing prices, selling of assets, reducing manpower and 
abandoning services, which are not profitable. As Marsh (1991: 469) stresses, ‘a common 
consequence of privatisation is increased prices to customers’. Clarke (1993: 217) puts the 
matter in a broader way by saying, "if they had abandoned their commitments to social 
responsibility, the former public corporations could have recorded higher profits by precisely 
these means at any time, though whether this would have been benefited the wider economy 
or society is open to question’.
Matthews and Minford (1987) doubt the profitability of the privatised firms in the UK and ask 
for further inquiries in order to indicate where the extra profits came from. Hence, the claim 
that privatisation leads to a consumer democracy with freedom of choice is an open question 
for further investigation that involves a comparison of price indices before and after 
privatisation. In this regard Clarke (1993: 221) claims that, ‘in fact, consumer complaints 
increased markedly in almost all the privatised companies as consumers found they were 
paying more for services which often had been reduced’.
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It is important to recognize that the public enterprise that is subject to privatisation must have 
been commercially profitable at least in the last period before privatisation took place; 
otherwise, it would not be attractive to buyers. Fine (1997b: 389) points out that: ‘in many 
ways, the industries' experience before privatisations can be described as a period of 
successful restoration to commercial viability. Something that has to occur in any case before 
the private sector would be willing to purchase them’. Thus, the above empirical studies that 
makes comparisons before and after privatisation or that compare those companies that are 
privatised with those that remain under state control do not show the whole story. Even if 
collected data are chosen carefully and the results are interpreted cautiously, many factors that 
can affect the outcome directly are still ignored.
It is necessary to consider some critical conceptual issues relating to the measurement of the 
performance of public enterprises. For simplification, we will look at two categories: a) 
profitability and b) measurement concerning efficiency. Profitability is the most conventional 
measure of performance of both sectors. However, there is no single criterion by which 
profitability can be measured. Different types of criteria have been used; for example, 
operating surplus, return on equity etc. (Chang, Singh, 1993). Despite the fact that 
profitability is widely used, a question may arise: ‘Is profitability a reliable indicator for 
measuring performance, even for private enterprises?’ The following considerations suggest 
that the answer is no. Accounting procedures have an important effect on profitability 
measurement (see Edwards, Kay and Mayer, 1987). Bishop and Kay (1988, p.5) emphasise 
this problem: ‘calculation of profits over a short period may be substantially influenced by 
arbitrariness in accounting conventions, changes in accounting conventions, or actions taken 
to reconstruct company balance sheets’. The second problem is that short-term profitability
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may not be a useful indicator for long-term performance. For example, share prices cannot be 
a good indicator for profitability in the long-run, since share prices may be influenced by 
short-term considerations. To overcome this problem, it might be better to use the average 
rates of return for a certain number of years dealing with an enterprise’s performance (Chang 
and Singh, 1993).
The question of how profitability relates to public enterprise must be considered, since the 
main purpose for the establishment of public enterprise has not been making a profit 
(Millward, 1982). Many public enterprises are created by, as Vernon (1981: 14) stresses, 
‘shifting economic power from the leaders of big business in the private sector to leaders 
elsewhere, such as leaders of government or leaders of labour’. Other reasons for establishing 
public enterprises might be regional development or helping a certain ethnic group. 
Achieving macro economic objectives, maintaining unemployment at a certain level, public 
enterprise investment, and using public enterprise pricing policy as a device against inflation 
in certain periods can be added to this list (see Millward, 1982). Moreover, public enterprises 
are often used by the government to promote private industries; for example, lower prices of 
inputs like steel and electricity (Chang and Singh, 1993). As a result, profitability alone 
camiot be used as an indicator for measuring the performance of public enterprises. It does 
not mean public enterprises are performing badly because they make no profit or sometimes 
have losses.
Profitability camiot be a reliable indicator for measuring public enterprise performance 
because many factors that do not contribute to profitability have a great influence on public 
enterprise performance. Firstly, public enterprises differ across countries; public enterprises
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may perform very efficiently in one country, but not in another country. That may be due, for 
example, to institutional reasons or less skilful managers and so on. Secondly, external 
macroeconomic shocks such as severely constrained foreign exchange during a certain period 
of time can seriously affect public enterprise. Thirdly, some large public enterprises were 
originally private enterprises, but became nationalised when they faced bankruptcy (Clear 
examples are the German carmaker company, Volkswagen, and the British lorry maker, 
Leyland, which were rescued by their governments from bankruptcy). Fourthly, public 
enterprises may operate in the “wrong” industries for a particular reason, for example, in the 
coal industry in Western Europe in order to maintain a certain level of employment. Finally, 
the public enterprise’s own characteristic such as size, market power and age may have a 
great influence on performance (Chang and Singh, 1993).
All of the defects related to profitability as an indicator have been recognised by many 
economists. For these reasons, they have tried to use other procedures for measuring 
performance of public or private enterprises. One, which has been used in many empirical 
studies of public and private enterprises, is called technical efficiency. Technical efficiency 
involves looking at whether more or less inputs are used for a unit of output for different 
firms regardless of their ownership. This type of procedure is used at different levels, e.g. a 
country, an industry, a firm size. The most popular methods in this basis are the use of an 
appropriate production function and total factor productivity measurement. However, 
technical efficiency is dismissed by many economists as a performance indicator because 
there is no obvious method of constructing quantity indexes for inputs and outputs of multi­
product firms, on the one hand, and there are difficulties related to quality differences 
between products of different firms, on the other hand. To overcome those difficulties,
109
another indicator measuring cost per unit of output, which is called cost efficiency, is 
introduced. However, this creates problems of a different sort. Different prices of different 
inputs for different firms at different times are serious enough to undermine this indicator as 
much as the quantity indexes and quality differences do the former (see Cook and Kirkpatrick, 
1988).
This analysis has revealed that all the performance indicators, which have been used in 
empirical studies, involve various measurement problems. Furthermore, apart from all the 
technical defects related to various indicators, it is important to realise that these methods are 
based on the neoclassical approach. The neoclassical approach, as mentioned earlier, suffers 
seriously from some unrealistic assumptions such as constant returns to scale, perfect market 
competition and no externalities (see Fine, 1980). Given those technical problems and 
unrealistic assumptions, we believe that measuring the performance of public versus private 
enterprises should not rely on the kinds of measurement procedures discussed here.
3.6 Conclusion
The outcome of comparison between public and private sectors in terms of their relative 
performance is mixed. Bishop and Thompson (1992) in their study on the privatisation 
impact in the UK dismiss that the result is always positive and improved productivity is the 
inevitable result. The main consideration is devoted to indicate whether indeed privately 
owned enterprises perform better than publicly owned, and privatisation is a preferable 
economic policy in all circumstances, while the comparisons of performance of public versus 
private enterprises are beset with difficulties. Other studies are based on different 
methodologies and the performance measurements vary substantially. Different procedures
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have also been used; some compare the performance of public enterprises with private, while 
some compare the performance before and after privatisation.
Privatisation should be seen as a broader economic and social policy. The claim that 
privatisation will enhance economic efficiency is a very narrow and defective statement. 
Parker (1998: 11) emphasises that: ‘...privatisation and related market liberalisation are 
industrial policies only in a negative sense. Whereas in earlier years in some member states 
the state was seen as having an instrumental role in industrial development, privatisation and 
market liberalisation imply essentially that the state’s role should be limited to defining and 
protecting private property rights. Undoubtedly, privatisation involves a shift in property 
rights and therefore economic power’. As Clarke (1993: 212) claims, ‘at British steel this 
involved a cut in workers from 166,000 to 52,000 a reduction in government external funding 
from £1,119 million to £24 million achieving a net profit of £178 million instead of a net loss 
of £1,784 million on a similar £3,000 million turnover’.
In terms of defining appropriate measurements of performance of both public and private 
enterprises, it should be stressed that the criteria that are used mostly favour the private sector. 
These cause further difficulties since it is known that the public sector may operate subject to 
other constraints than the private sector. State industries were established across the world, 
not with the aim of pursuing their own efficiency, but instead looking at wider goals. This 
priority, which is different from private goals, creates a complication in comparing these two 
sectors. Associated with that, the impact of privatisation becomes much more complicated 
when there is no common agreement on what constitutes successful performance (Parker, 
1998). Privatisation studies have been concentrating on the issue of productivity efficiency,
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while the other impacts like income distribution or other social welfare implications are 
ignored (Parker, 1998).
The comparative performance of public and private sector enterprises do not show that the 
public sector enterprises are less efficient than the private enterprises. As Chang and Singh 
(1992: 42) emphasise: ‘...there exist neither compelling theoretical reasons nor unambiguous 
empirical evidence, for either developed or developing countries suggesting the pervasive 
“inefficiency” of public enterprises. The picture is far more complex than one of ‘efficient’ 
private enterprises versus inefficient public enterprises’. Parker (1998: 34) stresses that: 
‘more generally, research cautions against drawing simple conclusions about public versus 
private ownership. There is a body of theoretical and empirical evidence, which suggest that 
market for corporate control is likely to be a weak deterrent against inefficiency, especially in 
large private sector firms’.
It is hard to make substantial improvements happen when privatisation takes place. There are 
many restrictions in practice, which limit chances at least in the short-term period. Parker 
(1998: 35) emphasises that ‘certainly improvement in economic performance following 
privatisation are less likely the more difficult it is to make substantial changes in the way 
enterprises are managed and operated’. Chang and Singh (1993: 45) clearly claim that, ‘The 
finding is that there is no clear-cut evidence that public ownership necessarily results in 
inferior performance’. If this claim is the case then privatisation as an economic stratagem to 
improve the efficiency of public enterprises would be of doubtful value. The available 
evidence on performance of public versus private enterprises fails to prove that public
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enterprises are inherently less efficient than private enterprises. If so, the hypothesis brought 
forward by all those theories, can be regarded as rejected.
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4.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 
Why Factor Analysis?
The purpose of this chapter is to define why we have used factor analysis for measuring 
corporate performance in the context of privatisation. Measuring corporate performance is 
complex and controversial, with different theories suggesting different approaches. The most 
widely used approach is the neoclassical, present in nearly all university textbooks for several 
decades (Parker, 1998). This approach relies on some strong assumptions such as perfect 
competition, no externalities in the market and constant returns to scale. This approach has 
been subject to the Cambridge capital critique.
Apart from its appropriate and immediate dismissal of the neoclassical approach to measuring 
performance, the critique points to serious issues in measuring and comparing corporate 
performance. They involve fundamental questions around the understanding of performance 
in capitalist economies. What is the appropriate method to determine the processes of 
production, distribution and accumulation? Prior to empirical investigation, the meaning of 
price and the source of value need to be considered. Paradoxically the Cambridge critique had 
the effect of narrowing down the question to one of whether capital is quantifiable or not. 
This has been an issue since 1950, but neoclassical theory has continued its dominance 
regardless of its lack of sound foundations in this respect.
Parallel to these theoretical confrontations about fundamental economic issues the 
neoclassical approach suggests a method called total factor productivity for measuring
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corporate performance. We will focus on the total factor productivity in order to reveal its 
main advantages and disadvantages regarding the measurement of corporate performance. 
This will reveal the reason why we do not use total factor productivity and we have a 
preference for using factor analysis instead.
In short, neoclassical theory, especially in its one-sector version as the basis for measuring 
economic/corporate performance through total factor productivity, TFP, draws upon a 
particular and questionable understanding of the capitalist economy and even accepting this 
(invalid) as if  one-sector model of the economy.
The assessment of performance of private versus public sector and the effects of privatisation 
are difficult with several heavy methodological problems. The first difficulty concerns the 
measurement of performance in principle. In practice performance has mainly been 
considered in terms of the objectives of private capital. An alternative method is to evaluate 
private performance in terms of macroeconomic targets. In this regard, one of the main 
objectives of privatisation is the reduction of the budget deficit through contributing to 
government revenue through receipts and elimination of public enterprise deficits.
The second frequently used measurements of private versus public sector and privatisation 
performance are in terms of economic efficiency or financial profitability. In both cases, a 
range of indicators can be used in assessing performance of privatised enterprises, for 
instance, profit margins, profit-asset ratios, labour productivity, sales and export performance. 
Another approach to measuring the consequences of privatisation is to look at outcomes in 
terms of social impact. Here, the main concern is employment, wage levels, and associated 
employment-related benefits. A significant issue is labour redundancy resulting from
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privatisation and the cost of unemployment and redundancy payments, and related safety-net 
provisions. Finally, more broadly, performance can be considered in terms of the effect on 
economic welfare. A cost-benefit approach is relevant. This requires the contribution of 
different effects to be measured in terms of a common unit of measurement and aggregated to 
give a single, overall impact of privatisation.
Privatisation has inevitably reduced state ownership in many countries and has had an effect 
on global stock markets. Enthusiasm for it can be summarised as follow: first, it is assumed 
that privately owned firms outperform SOEs and, second, governments have usually raised 
significant revenues through the sale of SOEs.
Thus, the rationale behind privatisation in many parts of the world is that private ownership 
improves corporate performance. A study, Megginson et al (1994), compares the pre- and 
post-privatisation performance of selected privatised firms. Other studies, which compare the 
performance of state-owned firms with either private or privatised firms operating under 
reasonably similar conditions, have shown performance after privatisation to be much more 
efficient (Boardman and Vining: 1989; Pohl et al.: 1997). Djankov and Pohl (1997) show 
that privatisations in the West have sometimes had dramatic effects on performance: British 
Steel, for example, is reported to have reduced its payroll by 40% prior to privatisation 
without losing any revenues; British Airways reduced its labour force by the same percentage, 
while actually increasing the number of flights. On the other hand, many other past and 
current studies in transition economies and developing countries show the reverse. For 
instance, a study, based on a panel of over 200 privatised and state firms in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, casts some doubt on the claims previously advanced in the 
literature (Roman Frydman, Cheryl Gray, Marek Hessel, Andrzej Rapaczynski: October
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1998). These mixed results have cast a shadow over theoretical and empirical claims in favour 
of superiority of private over public sector as well as privatisation.
Privatisation is often justified on grounds of efficiency itself categorised as productive, 
allocative and dynamic. Allocative efficiency has received less attention than productive 
efficiency. Neo-classical economics, for instance, is much concerned with productive 
efficiency and associated with static gains rather than allocative efficiency and dynamic gains 
(Parker, 1998). Allocative efficiency is tied more to the competitive environment than to 
issues of ownership. For this reason, when a monopoly firm is privatised, there are potential 
risks of allocative inefficiency. As remedy, governments have formed regulatory bodies to 
restrict monopoly power and protect consumer interests. Whether this remedy has succeeded 
is highly controversial, and the results are mixed across sectors and countries, (Parker, 1998).
This chapter is organised as follows: the second section is devoted to the neoclassical 
approach including the total factor productivity procedure. Fundamentals of the neo-classical 
approach as a benchmark for understanding the measurement of total factor productivity will 
be discussed. It measures the residual through the relation between inputs and outputs over a 
certain period of time, whether at firm, sector or national level. This procedure has been 
criticised from different angles. The next section considers various criticisms of the 
neoclassical approach. It consists of three parts covering internal critiques: the Cambridge 
Critique, limitations of the latter and more fundamental criticisms of the neoclassical 
approach.
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The penultimate section provides an informal description of factor analysis. It is a statistical 
technique used to identify a relatively small number of factors in place of many interrelated 
variables. Since measuring corporate performance is highly complex and dependent upon 
highly correlated indices, factor analysis is a useful tool for identifying patterns of 
performance. In the final section, the conclusion will briefly summarise, including the 
rationale for our preferred way of measuring corporate performance.
4.2 The Neo-classical Approach
Concentrating on neoclassical capital theory demonstrates how this theory treats different 
variables involved in the production process, and, how the relation between variables is 
determined. An aggregate production function represents the relationship between the output, 
Y, and inputs. In a one-good world it is supposed that inputs consist only of capital K and 
labour L, with the product, Y, being the same as K. Represented in mathematical terms, Y=F 
(K, L). Consequently, the logic behind an aggregated production is to represent the product 
economy as a whole by this simple formula.
From this, the validity of the neo-classical approach can be assessed, although many critics 
from different points of view find disadvantages in the whole approach. The main difficulty 
arises when the relative proportions of inputs and outputs do not remain constant. For, 
according to the above formula, the measurement of outputs and inputs must be done by 
single indices. At this stage can be observed, quite apart from the narrow technical 
deficiencies of representing an economy in this way, the approach ignores the broader social 
content of the processes.
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Based on the assumptions of diminishing marginal products, constant returns to scale, and 
perfect competition the relation between output and capital can be reduced to per capita terms 
y =f(k) and the profit rate determined by f  (k) and wages by w=f(k)-kf'(k), Increasing capital 
per worker leads to an increase in output per worker but not in the same proportion, since the 
slope of the production function declines as capital increases. On the other hand, as the capital 
per worker increases, the rate of profit decreases. From this technical analysis a significant 
economic proposition can be reached: technological relations (explicitly the production 
function f  and k in use) alone can determine distribution.
The neo-classical propositions can be summarised as:
a) A negative relation between the rate of profit and ‘capital’ per worker,
b) A negative relation between the rate of profit and the ‘capital’-output ratio,
c) A negative relation between the rate of profit and sustainable steady-state levels of 
consumption per head, and
d) In competitive environment, the marginal productivity theory is able to determine the 
distribution of income between wage earners and profit-receivers.
4.2.1 Total factor productivity (TFP)
Studies of total factor productivity (TFP) have blossomed since Solow’s (1956) classic 
contribution. From the mid-1970s studies of the quality of labour and capital inputs attracted 
great interest. The early 1990’s has witnessed renewal of interest in studies of TFP. In the 
earlier literature, the most commonly used production functions in estimating TFP were the 
Cobb—Douglas function, CES (constant elasticity of substitution), and occasionally VES 
(variable elasticity of substitution). But nowadays increasingly popular is the transcendental 
logarithmic production function or, more simply, the translog production function of
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Christensen et al (1973) and Chen (1997). The translog production function is specified as 
follows:
Y =  exp[ «0 + a ( In L + a TT + 1 / 2@ KK (In K ) 2 + (5KL In K  In L + /?^  T • In K  
+ 1/2P IL (In L ) 2 + P LT In L ■ T + S l j 3 „ T 2]
It shows the relationship between output and an exponential function of the logarithms of 
inputs. Comparison of the Cobb-Douglas function, the CES production function and the 
translog production function shows that the latter is more general. The reasons for this are 
two-fold; firstly, it is not constrained by the restriction of constant elasticity of substitution 
and, secondly, it provides a theoretical justification for the use of average factor shares in the
calculation of productivity growth. It uses data at discrete points of time to estimate the
production function.
Both supporters and critics of the neo-classical school of thought have critically assessed the 
credibility and reliability of the TFP procedure for measuring the growth of a single 
corporation, a particular sector of the economy, or the national economy. We consider both 
sets of views in order to assess the TFP approach.
4.3 Critiques Against the Neoclassical Total Factor Productivity Approach
4.3.1 Insider Critiques
Despite some favourable technical properties, the translog production function poses serious 
problems of factor input measurement (Creamer, 1972). Capital input measurement is the first 
and most serious problem; it involves the determination of capital deflators, the methods used 
for determining depreciation, the allocation of capacity adjustments, capital valuation, and the 
content of the capital inputs and the level of aggregation/disaggregation. The choice of the
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content of capital input should determine the type of price deflators to be used in making 
quality change adjustments and factor and prices, which are often estimated on the basis of 
various assumptions for lack of readily available data, are necessary since value shares must 
be estimated as weights (Creamer, 1972).
The use of capital is inevitably based on a particular situation and time period not least over 
business cycles of different periodicity. The residual or TFP might be thought to be 
understated if excess capacity is understated. This, in turn, could significantly affect the 
relative importance of capital as a source of economic growth. With this in mind, various 
studies have adopted different methods.
Kendrick (1961) and Denison (1962) made no specific adjustment for capacity utilization of 
capital. Solow (1957, 1963) and Jorgenson (1967) used the unemployment rate as a measure 
of under-utilization of capital and Griliches (1964) used the power utilization rate as a 
measure. In making a utilisation adjustment, it is important to determine whether it spreads 
over all capital sub-inputs or only to some categories, such as non-residential structures and 
producer goods, (Creamer, 1972). A third difficulty involves the choice between gross capital 
or net of depreciation. Gross capital was used by Denison (1962), Solow (1957, 1963) and 
(Creamer, 1972). Some stress that the adoption of net measures of capital increases the risk 
of overstating depreciation. Thirlwall (1972) observes that obsolescence rather than physical 
deterioration is possible to override feature of depreciation. He stresses that capital turns out 
to be economically obsolescent before it losses its physical usefulness, while obsolescent 
equipments are still capable of contributing to production. This will result in flow of capital 
service remains in use despite reaching the ended age at the rate frequently suggested by 
allowances for depreciation. Adjusting capital for physical depreciation rather than
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obsolescence is usually not possible in practice. If over-depreciation occurs, it will overstate 
the residual or TFP.
These issues however reflect deeper problems derived from the limitations of the approach 
itself. On the one hand the one-factor model with its battery of supporting assumptions is 
incapable of incorporating the real processes of business cycle, economic obsolescence and 
technologies that might be chosen aware that excess capacity will prevail from time-to-time. 
On the other hand, the very presence of those phenomena indicates that the theoretical 
assumptions are inconsistent with those used to construct the data set by which TFP is 
measured in practice. This, then, is not simply a matter of practical difficulties in constructing 
a data set, but of the underlying understanding of the economy itself,
A third problem is that physical capital cannot be measured directly. Indirect measurement, in 
turn involves two possible valuations, namely resource-cost or user-value. The commonly 
used approach is to value capital at resource-cost because of data availability. Both valuations 
highlight changes in cost, which may represent quality improvement in the capital input, 
while the value of capital in the translog production function approach shifts away from “non­
proportionality” and “embodiment”. As a result, there is always a risk of underestimating the 
value of capital when “non-proportional” quality improvements occur. An explicit example of 
this is the increases in revenue resulting from a technological innovation of a capital good that 
is greater than increases in the selling price. Gordon (1990) suggests that the above 
differences should embody nominal price changes. Another solution provided by Denison 
(1962) provides that changes in the quality of capital based on non-proportionality is included 
in the ‘residual’ TFP rather than in the measurement of the capital output. Thirlwall (1972) 
argues that valuing capital as resource-cost can be problematical; for example, when items
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used for producing other items cost twice as much, these in turn represent twice as much 
capital, which would not be reflected in the price index.
The importance of technological change embodied in the newer capital input, which is part of 
quality change, was emphasised in the earlier literature on productivity studies by Solow 
(1957), Phelps (1962) and Bliss (1968). The embodiment hypothesis is one way of viewing 
heterogeneity in labour input. The growth accounting approach, as used in many studies, has 
been adjusted according to the age-sex composition of the labour force and the level of 
education. Unlike the valuation of capital input, in which the resource-cost is a commonly 
used measure, the user-value approach is adopted when adjustments take place for education. 
Differences in income earned by different categories of the labour force are treated as a 
quality adjustment based on different levels of education. A study by Denison (1962) points 
out that 60 per cent of the difference in income is related to education, while another study by 
Griliches (1970) assumes that education explains 100 per cent of income differences.
All the points above indicate that TFP, which is a residual restricted, however, in theory to 
disembodied, exogenous and Hicks-neutral technological change in growth accounting, is in 
practice an umbrella for deviations from unrealistic assumptions and corresponding 
adjustments in data set construction (quite apart from errors in data). If capital and labour are 
measured wrongly, as in a sense they must be, the corresponding quality changes (including 
embodied technological change) will also turn up in the residual. As a result, the residual is no 
longer solely disembodied technological change but contains embodied technological change 
and other quality improvements.
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It has long been transparent that the measurement of TFP for any economy is subject to all 
kinds of theoretical and measurement errors. The methodology used and the ways that factor 
inputs are aggregated and measured have a substantial impact on the measurement of TFP and 
its correspondingly chaotic meaning or content. Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) have at early 
stage argued that TFP is a consequence of mis-measurement of factor inputs and therefore 
does not really exist as long as all inputs are fully and correctly measured. They made the 
following adjustments on the contribution of input growth to output growth:
(1) Disaggregating the price index for capital to obtain a better measure of capital 
input;
(2) Correcting capacity utilization of capital; and
(3) Taking flow prices for capital and labour services into account to obtain better 
measures of quality of capital and labour inputs.
After these corrections, Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) found that very little residual (only 
3.3 per cent of it remained). On the other hand, if  one does not make any adjustment to the 
measurement of capital and labour inputs, all the quality improvements and measurement 
errors will show up in the residual or TFP. But as already suggested the problems with TFP 
do not fundamentally derive from measurement problems but from the underlying theory. 
Even if data could be perfect TFP measurement would remain invalid.
4.3.2 The Cambridge Critique
The neo-classical model has been subject to the Cambridge critique. This section will 
establish whether this critique provides a valid alternative to the neo-classical model or not; 
that is, does it offer anything to replace what it has criticised?
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Sraffa (1960) stresses that there is no measure of capital independent of distribution and 
prices, thereby undermining neoclassical theory in its different aspects such as the production 
function, and theories of supply, distribution and growth. A very precise question is: how is 
capital measured? Joan Robinson (1953) posed the challenge of what constitutes “capital”. 
This challenge was left unanswered mitil 1960, when Sraffa reached the conclusion that there 
is no independent measure of “capital”. He rejected a physical measure except for a particular 
sort of capital, which contains a single good or a uniform bundle of goods. He emphasised 
that a prior set of relative prices causes an aggregate price measure of capital to be 
unsuccessful. Moreover, aggregate production functions depend on “capital” as a single 
factor, whereas capital goods, including fixed capital, are heterogeneous.
Robinson (1975a, vi) clearly recognises that the initial problem is not the measurement of 
“capital”, but the writer’s way of thinking about it - whether he or she is concentrating on 
institutional frameworks or social relationship nature of capitalism, in other words. These 
propositions, at least in principle, have long been accepted by neoclassical economists, 
although the practice is otherwise.
Significantly, Sraffa (1960) expresses his main concern differently, ‘concerned exclusively 
with such properties of an economic system as do not depend on change in the scale of 
production or in the proportions of “factors” This immediately reflects that we are dealing 
with a level of abstraction that eliminates continuous changes in real economic systems. 
Changes are introduced to the economic system during one “year” as a fixed time for 
producing commodities and distributing them. Economic relationships are examined over this 
period of time alone. Because of this, Sraffa found the assumption of constant returns totally 
unnecessary. This elimination of variations in scale in “factors” is sufficient for the author to
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rule out marginal productivity of inputs as determining outcomes. But it offers a weak 
alternative in its place.
Formally, of course Sraffa’s contribution has given rise to models with constant returns to 
scale and linear, input-output technology. These have, however, played little role in 
measuring economic performance, certainly by comparison with TFP and are fully compatible 
with neoclassical economic as a special case (as in the non-substitution theory).
Significantly Robinson (1974, 1979, and 1980) and Bhaduri and Robinson (1980) dismissed 
Sraffian “values” or “prices of production” and argued that the nature of these terms in his 
analysis could not be incorporated into a theory set in historical time. At best it is an example 
of comparative statistic. Robinson (1980, 134) rejects timeless comparative-static analysis and 
stresses that ‘it is a mistake in methodology to compare two technical systems...and then to 
switch one to the other’.
Thus, whilst the Cambridge critique challenges the neoclassical approach, it remains defective 
in offering any alternative especially for the measurement of economic performance.
4.3.3 The Main Criticisms
The problem with the neoclassical approach and the methodology it uses for TFP 
measurement, whether at the level of a corporate performance or at a national level, is that its 
assumptions are or cannot be met. The result is a mish-mash of measurement. For example, 
Fine (1992, 282) argues that ‘since factor shares are, by marginal productivity theory, to 
measure factor contribution to output, it is necessary to assume that the economy is perfectly 
competitive, for otherwise TFP will be measuring the monopoly position within particular
126
markets, rather than real contribution to output, and/or TFP will be measuring changes in the 
level of capacity utilisation in the absence of full employment’.
One of the most significant aspects of any corporate performance measurement is the quality 
of the commodities produced. In the neoclassical procedure for measuring corporate 
performance, quality has been set aside when adjusted by price changes in quality should be 
part of measuring corporate performance and, on a national level, should be part of the 
residual and labour inputs (Fine, 1992). This restriction of quality of inputs and outputs will 
be explored by concentrating on mathematical approaches that are part of any neoclassical 
framework. The mathematical form does not leave room for qualitative changes. Failure to 
consider qualitative changes, in any measurement, casts a shadow over the results based on 
such a framework. The quality itself simply reflects changes in technologies in use in any 
production. If these were ignored, how could one expect the resulting measurements to take 
all different aspects of the whole production process into account? One way to avoid this 
problem, even if we do not agree with any single-good model, is to use value instead of 
physical quantities, as Fine (1992, 284) suggests: ‘But, within the method already adopted for 
the measurement of heterogeneous capital stock, there is the obvious solution of measuring 
output in value rather than physical quantities. This should then take account of quality 
differences in output’.
In terms of capital stock, the value of the output index needs to be deflated according to the 
level of inflation. Inflation and other adjustments are ignored by the neoclassical procedure 
and, as a result, the capital stock and its value remain constant through time. Again, even if 
we do not agree with the one-good model, it may be possible to provide an inflation index as 
a remedy. However, whether two corporate performances are being compared or the
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performance at a national level is being measured, this remedy would be effective only if 
markets were perfectly competitive (Fine, 1992, 283). Fine states: ‘It has been shown that, 
even within the one-good economy, the measurement of output in physical terms without a 
price evaluation still requires, in principle, perfect competition in the sector concerned. Thus, 
it is legitimate to examine competition in the production of output as well as in the purchase 
of factor inputs’ (286); he also acknowledges that ‘the laissez-faire model [is] essential to 
support the use of TFP methods’.
Another point, which definitely needs to be considered, is the validity of the marginal product 
of labour, even in a one-good model. Again, the use of TFP or other neoclassical procedure 
requires a perfectly competitive market for labour in which wages will remain in balance 
between employees. Otherwise, different wages for different parties undermine the whole 
process of finding the marginal productivity of labour as the source of the distribution.
For all these reasons, the use of TFP for measuring corporate performance is problematic 
and misleading. Hence, we turn another approach, factor analysis, which is arguably less 
problematic.
4.4 Defining different aspects of factor analysis
The purpose of this section is to describe factor analysis performance and why it can 
contribute to the assessment of corporate performance. Generally, factor analysis is applicable 
across many different problems and contexts and as such it involves no economic theory. 
Factor analysis is merely a means of organising data descriptively. In other words it poses 
questions rather than starting with pre-conceived assumptions or hypotheses.
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Factor analysis determines which variables are correlated with one another. Thurstone first 
introduced the term in 1931. He used it for three main purposes. These are:
1. To determine which variables mutually reflect an underlying characteristic.
2. To reduce a large number of variables to a smaller set.
3. To help thereby to make sense of the complexity of social behaviour by reducing it to 
a limited number of factors.
In this light, let us examine the advantages (and disadvantages) of factor analysis in broad 
principle and in the context of our study. First, as already discussed, measurement of total 
factor productivity as a technique for assessing economic and corporate performance is 
invalid in principle quite apart from the empirical problems that arise in practice in terms of 
measuring inputs and outputs, especially against the assumptions of a single good, full 
employment of all factors, and perfectly competitive markets for them. Measuring total factor 
productivity does not depend upon use of econometric estimation but regression can be used 
to estimate a production function in which a trended constant term represents productivity 
increase. This indicates that TFP measurement does depend upon an underlying economic 
theory even if it is not always explicitly tested statistically.
Factor analysis does not posit any theory except in the weakest sense of including some 
variables and excluding others although this is often a matter of pragmatism in terms of data 
availability. This is an advantage for two reasons. First, economic theories of corporate 
performance suggest that there is a very wide range of possible outcomes and relationships 
between variables according to specific circumstances (initial conditions, “game” being 
played and strategies adopted) so that one theory is not liable to be validated across a wide 
range of data. Second, there is liable to be substantial multicoilinearity across the variables
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characterising and explaining coiporate performance. For these reasons, although it does 
handle a large number of variables simultaneously, multiple regression is liable to be 
inappropriate. It tests a single theory and is weakened statistically by presence of 
multicollinearity. By contrast, factor analysis is a simple device for examining regularities 
between coiporate characteristics irrespective of how they have been produced. In a sense, it 
cuts across a range of models and, in case of our own topic of interest, asks the simple 
question of whether private of public ownership is associated with differences in corporate 
outcomes. This is its strength. It investigates what is to be explained. Its weakness is that it 
does not itself offer an explanation although it can be suggestive as is the case for any 
organised descriptive interrogation of data. Thus, suppose that private firms do perform better 
than public. This might be because public finns do tend to perform better than private but are 
always privatised whenever successful (although this might also be examined in factor 
analysis by including a variable reflecting history of ownership, see below). The point is not 
whether this hypothesis is correct or not, merely to demonstrate that explanation as such is not 
being tested within factor analysis,
4.4.1 Practical procedure
4.4.1.1 Correlation Matrix
The first step in factor analysis involves computing the correlation matrix. If there are no 
significant correlations between variables under investigation, then it will be pointless to 
continue. The inverse of the correlation matrix indicates if the variables chosen are to be 
linearly dependent for which it is singular.
4.4.1.2 Sample Size
The reliability of a factor analysis depends on the size of the sample. But there are no rules by 
which the size should be determined. However, there must be more observations than
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variables. Gorsuch (1983) suggests that the size of sample should not be less than five 
observations per variable and not less than 100 individual observations per analysis.
4.4.1.3 Principal Components
There are two most widely used forms of factor analysis:
1. The principal components
2. Factor analysis (called Principal-axis factoring in SPSS).
As stated before factor analysis is principally about variance-covariance analysis. Variance 
that is shared by the scores of each variable is called Common Variance. Moreover, variance 
that is unique to a variable and it is not shared with other variables is called Specific Variance. 
The variance that refers to mistakes through measurement actions is called Error Variance. 
Hence, we can conclude that the total variance comprises three components:
Total variance = Common Variance + Specific Variance + Error Variance
The disaggregation of total variance distinguishes principal-components analysis and 
principal-axis factoring. In the former analysis all three types of variance are included in order 
to eliminate any errors. But the latter model deals only with the common variance, which is 
shared by the test. Dealing merely with the common variance will result in the exclusion of 
the unique variance from analysis. The principal-components analysis sets the total variance 
at 1 but for the principal-axis factoring, it varies between 0 and 1.
4.4.1.4 How Factors are Extracted
The first component extracted from running factor analysis accounts for the largest variance 
among all variables. The second factor expresses the next largest amount of variance, which is
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not related to or expressed by the first one. The number of factors extracted is the same as the 
number of variables, although the degree of variance expressed by successive factors 
necessarily decreases.
There are two main criteria by which one can decide which factors can be excluded from 
subsequent analyses. The first criterion is called Kaiser’s Criterion. Kaiser suggests that those 
factors should be selected which have an eigenvalue of greater than one. Selecting an 
eigenvalue of greater than one will result in excluding those factors, which explain less 
variance than a single variable on average.
The second method is a graphical method called a Scree test, which was suggested by Cattell 
(1966). In the Scree test a graph is drawn of variances for those factors that are initially 
extracted and the plot is broken down into two visible slopes. The steep slope represents the 
primary factors and the gentle slope represents the secondary factors. So it can be concluded 
that factors which lie before the point at which the eigenvalues (or explained variance) seem 
to level off should be retained.
Which criteria should be chosen for factor analysis is affected by the size of average 
communalities, the number of variables and the number of observations. If the number of 
variables is less than 30 and the average communality is greater than 0.7 or the number of 
observations is greater than 250 and the mean communality is greater than or equal to 0.60, 
then the Kaiser Criterion should be chosen, (Stevens, 1996).
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4.4.1.5 Rotation of Factors
The last step in factor analysis involves rotation of factors. The goal of the rotation is to 
maximize the variance (variability) of the "new" variable (factor), while minimizing the 
variance around the new variable. This rotation of factors increases the interpretability of 
factors and maximizes the loadings of some of the items. These items in return are used to 
identify the meaning of the factor. When there are more than two variables it is like defining a 
"space" with just two variables. Thus, when there are three variables, one could plot a three- 
dimensional scatter plot and fit in a plane through the data. However, the logic of rotating the 
axes so as to maximize the variance o f the new factor remains the same.
There are two commonly used methods: The first one is orthogonal rotation method. This 
method provides factors that are independent or unrelated to one another. The second method, 
the oblique rotation, is based on correlated factors. Selecting one method as the only right 
method is rather controversial. Both methods have some drawbacks and strengths in some 
ways. Since the orthogonal rotation is about unrelated factors, using this method will force 
factors to be uncorrelated whereas they may not be in reality (Bryman and Cramer, 1999).
4.5 Conclusion
Measuring corporate performance was found to be highly complex and controversial. Even in 
a world of perfect competition, the neo-classical method for measuring coiporate performance 
through total factor productivity is fundamentally flawed as revealed in the Cambridge 
critique. Further, in the absence of perfect competition (and a single good), mainstream 
industrial economics is a variety of models and techniques, with a multiplicity of outcomes 
and connections between variables that are mutually inconsistent. Accordingly, empirical
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work has been pursued here by the simple expedient of examining whether ownership as such 
is or is not a strong element in association with other variables that are deemed to be 
significant for corporate performance. This suggested the use of factor analysis to which we 
now turn in practice.
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Chapter 5
Results from the Empirical Study (Part One)
5.1 Introduction
This and the following chapter present the empirical results found by the use of factor analysis 
as a technique for measuring comparative coiporate performance and subsequent privatisation 
performance. Throughout the output results from the use of the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) will be discussed. The output from the package, however, is 
comprised of many different elements ranging from descriptive statistics to the rotated 
component matrix. The main focus will be on a table, the principal component matrix. In 
general further refinement of the factor analysis through rotation for example, has not 
significantly enhanced or modified the results. Consequently, the principal components alone 
are reported here but other output is available upon request.
The main purpose of this exercise is, first, to ascertain which variables are highly loaded (i.e., 
highly correlated to a factor) or, in other words, which extracted factors pick up which 
variables; and, second, to determine common characteristics.
Four types of analysis have been conducted using factor analysis. The principal type was 
designed to compare the performance of three types of companies: private, mixed, and state- 
owned. State-owned companies include companies that are owned by the federal and local 
governments of each country as well as those companies that are owned by governments of 
other countries but which are operating in the country of investigation. Mixed companies are 
those companies in which the state is one of the shareholders by virtue of holding a certain 
number of shares. Private companies are comprised of several kinds of private ownership, for
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instance, private and public through quotes in a stock market, and corporate-owned 
companies. The second type of analysis looks at privatisation performance by comparing 
state-owned with privatised company performance. The third test examines the 
characteristics of ownership, by creating some new variables and finding out how the 
ownership variable reacts to these new variables. The last investigation looks at the effect of 
concentration on coiporate performance. This chapter will analyse the findings of the first 
type of analysis. The three remaining will be discussed in the next chapter.
From previous discussion of industrial performance and of privatisation, no general 
conclusions are liable to be drawn either about the relative merits of public and private sectors 
or about the decisive factors in performance from one case to the next. For the most important 
large-scale privatisations, the most appropriate method of analysis is on a case-by-case basis. 
In any case, sample size is liable to be small once various factors are taken into account.
Most of the arguments in favour of privatisation are independent of scale of enterprise. They 
apply equally to small and large firms. So it is appropriate to take each firm to be 
representative of either the private or public sector (or mixture of both) irrespective of size. In 
practice, because of the small sample size of state-owned firms and random sampling of 
private, the latter are liable to be small. But there is an argument that smaller private firms are 
more liable to be efficient because of the greater immediacy of the profit motive for owners.
From the arguments put forward in the previous chapters it can be stressed that different 
elements of coiporate behaviour are related to one another in complex ways, suggesting the
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usefulness of factor analysis. Particular variables representing coiporate performance are 
chosen in order to reflect a judicious combination of theory derived from industrial 
economies, on the one hand, and the heavy constraints imposed by data availability, on the 
other.
It is assumed that performance is a function of turnover, profit, total assets, productivity, 
performance, ownership, concentration, and total number of employees:
Performance = f  (turnover, profit, total assets [or tassets], total number of employees, 
productivity, performance, ownership and concentration).
Data 011 turnovers, profits, total assets and total number of employees for the years 1998 and 
2000 have been collected from four different sources: Major Companies of Europe, Amadeus, 
DataStream and Statistics Sweden for fourteen European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden and UK. All the data have been converted to a same-based currency, the 
US dollar. A brief discussion of the data sources is provided in an appendix to this chapter.
Productivity is represented by a variable called PROD; another variable, called PROF, 
represents performance. The PROD variable is created through the turnover divided by the 
number of employees (essentially a crude measure of gross labour productivity) and PROF 
through profit divided by the number of employees. Throughout, with PROD and PROF 
measuring some aspect of performance, we will refer to them together as reflecting 
“productivity & performance” even though this is slightly misleading (through this analysis 
performance will be represented by Perf). We have not used the rate of profit as a variable,
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although we could have since it is given by PROD/PROF, which means that its constitutive 
elements are included in the empirical analysis.
Ownership is treated as a categorical/nominal variable. Nominal data relate to qualitative 
variables or attributes, such as gender or ownership, and are records of category membership. 
Nominal data are merely labels: they may take the form of numbers, but such numbers are 
merely arbitrary code numbers.
In type one-factor analysis (which compares the performance of state, mixed, and private 
companies of fourteen European countries) state companies are assigned a value of 0, private 
companies a value of 1, and mixed companies a value between 0 and 1 depending on the 
percentage of shares owned by the state. Two years, 1998 and 2000, have been chosen for 
analysis, and annual data for these three types of companies have been collected. The number 
of companies (state, mixed and private) taken from each country is shown in the table below. 
In addition to country-by-country experiments, two total-country experiments have been 
conducted for two years (1998 and 2000). These experiments are based on a sample taken 
from each country using the same variables.
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Table 2: List of companies based on their ownerships
Countries Years Number of companies
State owned 
companies
Mixed
companies
Private owned 
companies
Austria 1998 70 15 4 512000 60 11 2 47
Belgium 1998 100 35 5 602000 120 53 2 65
Bulgaria 1998 340 109 60 1712000 600 196 104 300
Denmark 1998 60 17 0 432000 80 30 6 44
Finland 1998 110 48 6 562000 200 75 8 117
France 1998 500 243 7 2502000 600 280 7 313
Germany 1998 500 174 67 2592000 460 177 52 231
Italy 1998 70 30 3 372000 90 41 4 45
The Netherlands 1998 90 40 5 452000 120 55 1 64
Norway 1998 120 43 14 632000 200 66 33 101
Poland 1998 340 148 19 1732000 420 172 33 215
Portugal 1998 60 8 5 472000 60 10 4 46
Sweden 1998 756 344 33 3792000 750 338 37 375
The UK 1998 200 90 0 1102000 200 100 0 100
Total-Countries 1998 3316 1344 228 17442000 3960 1604 293 2063
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section is devoted to type-one factor 
analysis, in which country-by-country and total-country results for the years 1998 and 2000 are 
discussed. In this section we try to identify two main elements. The first element considers 
extracted factors, i.e., whether case-by-case experiments and total-country analyses will recognise 
two or three characteristics by which corporate performance can be distinguished. The second 
element concentrates on the variable of ownership. Is ownership correlated with other variables or 
does it stand alone? If it is correlated to a factor with other variables, does it represent a 
characteristic that suggests difference in performance from state-owned companies? The last 
section offers conclusion by way of discussion of the overall results.
5.2 The Type-One Factor analysis
Theoretical benchmarks for the school of thought supporting the superiority of the private sector 
and privatisation point to the idea that state-owned enterprises are inefficient and wasteful. In 
chapter one, we looked at different schools of thought supporting privatisation as a remedy against 
the inefficiency of state-owned companies. In chapter two, we examined different empirical studies. 
Some comparative studies have found that private companies are more efficient than state-owned 
companies. Ownership is seen as one of the most important influences on corporate performance. 
In order to investigate this claim, we carried out an empirical study through use of factor analysis.
For the two years of 1998 and 2000 data were collected representing aspects of company 
performance for fourteen European countries across state, mixed and private ownership. Factor 
analysis was based on the use of four variables: turnover, profit, tasset (total assets), and total 
number of employees, plus two created variables, which were PROD, PROF and, along with one 
categorical variable, owners (ownership).
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Total-country analysis was done through taking the samples from each country involved.
Factor analysis outputs were taken from each experiment and the main elements are summarised in 
two tables: the component matrix, and the rotated component matrix. The former will be the main 
focus. In general, the many other results computed confirm those presented here and do not warrant 
what is already a dry and repetitive summary of our empirical investigations.
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Austria
For Austria, data were compiled for seventy companies for 1998 and for sixty companies for 2000. 
Descriptive statistics for the two years are presented in Table A l. There are limited numbers of non­
private companies to include within the empirical analysis (and these declined slightly between the 
two years), correspondingly limiting the number of private companies that it was decided to 
incorporate. Leaving aside the relatively small number of mixed companies, the tables indicate a 
wide range of performance, although with a relatively small standard deviation for PROD for both 
private and state-owned companies.
Al
Descriptive Statistics For Four M ixed Com panies Austria 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Two Mixed Companies Austria 2000
M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
T U RN O V ER 2917 1915762 525386 929201 TU RNOV ER 7723 680289 344006 475576
PROFIT -874927 11317 -213574 440944 PRO FIT 1768 32661 17214 21844
TASSETS 70470 7506825 2025362 3655781 TASSETS 29962 1758554 894258 1222299
EM PLOYEE 22 4162 1291 1927 EM PLOYEE 48 2750 1399 1911
OW NERS 0.5 0.99 0.63 0.24 OW NERS 0.6 0.75 0.68 0.1
PROD 64.02 460.3 239.64 177.8 PROD 160.9 247.38 204.14 61.15
PRO F -210.22 514.42 80.59 307.32 PROF 11.88 36.83 24.35 17.65
Descriptive Statistics For Fifteen State Companies A ustria 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Eleven State Companies Austria 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 898 1070587 291129 341658 TURNOV ER 15725 1520625 326491 424990
PROFIT -378 245362 36019 66084 PROFIT -67336 38709 7794 29055
TASSETS 5869 5654416 943991 1507437 TASSETS 34242 1882217 438520 548818
EM PLOYEE 2 2401 872 769 EM PLOYEE 251 33421 4073 9752
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 52.22 1277.56 382.89 314,29 PROD 12.72 336.82 167,69 105.11
PRO F -11.44 967.7 102,32 251.15 PROF -39.4 29.21 4.24 18.2
D escriptive Statistics For Fifty-One Private Com panies Austria 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Forty-Seven Private Companies Austria 2000
M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RN O V ER 430 150391 32179 20741 TU RNOV ER 53147 3487039 265744 510262
PROFIT -10635 24492 2310 5800 PROFIT -53039 155884 12462 30419
TASSETS 5425 588613 46649 91528 TASSETS 16807 4032791 319355 690794
EM PLOYEE 10 610 177 128 EM PLOYEE 44 5073 996 1067
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.7 1969.42 312.84 332.63 PROD 68.5 1543.62 343.19 336.62
PROF -53,17 603.35 34.27 108.95 PROF -36.81 96.24 15.17 24,2
For both years, only two factors explained more than an average amount of variance. These are 
indicated in Table A2, together with the amount of variance explained by each factor. In each case,
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the main component can be designated as size (although profit is negative for 1998 probably an 
artefact of the sample for which overall profit is negative across all companies), with some loading 
of this towards performance (PROD and PROF) in 2000. For 1998, the second component is 
attached to performance but with a negative association with private ownership. This result is 
reversed for 2000. For that year, there is considerable difference between the original and the 
rotated (not shown) component matrices. Across the results, this is unusual and might be explained 
by the even smaller number of non-private companies in the later year for Austria.
A2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 1 
(Size/Perf)
Component 2 
(Perf/Own)
Turnover 0.944 -0.004 0.880 -0.242
Profit -0.693 0.356 0.846 0.192
Total Assets 0.862 0.242 0.626 -0.439
Number of 
Employees 0.931 -0.141 0.342 -0.739
Ownership -0.505 -0.374 0.061 0.635
Prod 0.082 0.676 0.555 0.404
Prof -0.081 0.867 0.581 0.543
Variance
Extracted 46.417 22.204 37.815 24.223
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Belgium
For Belgium one hundred and one hundred and twenty companies for the years 1998 and 2000
respectively have been taken as a sample of the three types (state, mixed, and private). Table B1 
shows descriptive statistics for the two years. Relatively small standard deviations for EMPLOYEE 
and PROD for mixed companies of the year 2000 are recognisable.
B1
Descriptive Statistics For Five M ixed Companies Belgium  1998 Descriptive Statistics For Two M ixed Companies Belgium  2000
M inim um M axim um Mean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 2051 2661300 563845 1173760 TU RNOV ER 14286 14515 14400 162
PROFIT -14201 75837 11483 36507 PROFIT -26 2358 1166 1686
TA SSETS 2139 2707969 794676 1151458 TASSETS 5874 146730 76302 99600
EM PLO Y EE 2 9411 1967 4164 EM PLOYEE 18 94 56 54
OW NERS 0.5 1 0.81 0.19 OW NERS 0.8 0.82 0.81 0.02
PROD 168.9 2193.83 817.44 837.45 PROD 151.98 806.38 479.18 462.73
PROF -2950.06 545.25 -488.16 1397.38 PROF -0.28 130.99 65.36 92.82
Descriptive Statistics For Fifty-Nine Private Com panies Belgium 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Sixty-Five Private Companies Belgium 2000
M inim um M aximum Mean Std, Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 21023 8750438 774204 1647371 TURNOV ER 146559 8237821 1467247 1536347
PROFIT -31502 1203336 45033 178622 PROFIT -77985 432620 54654 102813
TASSETS 6740 13716241 762278 2181541 TASSETS 74583 5709256 940987 1207557
EM PLOYEE 22 31321 2320 5655 EM PLOYEE 17 46131 4101 7367
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 39.22 21174.18 1049.2 2774.97 PROD 68.88 95550.31 4862.14 14588.92
PROF -33.01 814.2 27.2 109.78 PROF -873.69 1564.44 50.46 242.91
Descriptive Statistics For Thirty-Six S tate Com panies Belgium  1998 Descriptive Statistics For Fifly-Tliree S tate Companies Belgium 2000
M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std, Deviation
TURN O V ER 979 2010620 128564 361931 TURN O V ER 462 4981551 254590 802472
PROFIT -12728 210040 11083 41633 PRO FIT -264379 453441 13721 102873
TASSETS 2489 3578501 202042 650365 TASSETS 4438 11145163 735606 1967023
EM PLOYEE 7 41432 1339 6880 EM PLOYEE 2 40324 1621 6359
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 48.53 8718.81 688.92 1443.87 PROD 24.72 1809.08 331.96 357.47
PROF -208.18 2302.02 75.66 396.46 PRO F -40895.98 6167.14 -500.13 5763.27
As can be seen in Table B2, three factors explain more than average amount of variance for both 
years. The first component for the year 1998 indicates that the variables turnover, profit, total assets 
and employee, variables representing size, are significantly correlated to the factor. The second 
component discloses that PROD and PROF are significantly correlated to it. The third factor shows 
a higher correlation coefficient (0.881) for only a single variable, ownership. The Belgian case for
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the year 1998 indicates clearly through table B1 how variables representing size, performance, and 
ownership are correlated to three extracted factors. The three characteristics, size, performance, and 
ownership, have been well established throughout the overall results for the year 1998. Moreover, 
it can be emphasised that ownership stands alone. So ownership barely figures as the third factor 
extracted and also has little association with other measures of performance.
For the year 2000 the characteristic of size is established through component 1. The second factor 
picks out PROF, negatively with total assets, and the third does associate ownership positively, if 
weakly, with PROD. It is rare if not unique in doing so. In short, there is no obvious intuitive 
interpretation of the second and third components for 2000.
B2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own)
Component 1 
(Size) Component 2 Component 3
T urnover 0.954 0.008 0.054 0.889 0.182 0.034
Profit 0.916 0.039 -0.058 0.640 0.163 -0.298
Total Assets 0.958 0.051 -0,048 0.711 -0.582 0.109
Number of 
Employees 0.798 -0.083 -0.117 0.741 -0.003 -0.360
Ownership 0.208 -0.136 0.855 0.463 0.442 0.354
Prod -0.049 0.713 0.479 0.182 0.247 0.835
Prof 0.047 0.795 -0.290 -0.114 0.875 -0.295
Variance
Extracted 47.862 16.699 15.231 35.939 20.299 16.304
145
Bulgaria
In this instance, data were collected for three hundred and forty companies for 1998 and for six 
hundred companies for 2000. Descriptive statistics for the two years are presented in Table BUI. 
Relatively small standard deviations for owners and PROD for the year 1998 and for employee,
owners and PROD for the year 2000 of mixed companies are observable.
BUI
Descriptive Statistics For Sixty M ixed Companies Bulgaria 1998 Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Four M ixed Companies Bulgaria 2000
M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 433 133947 8321 22115 TURNOV ER 212 16917 2058 2619
PROFIT -28212 4966 -681 4156 PROFIT -5311 3745 -152 783
TASSETS 399 118771 8248 18668 TASSETS 170 64440 3815 7727
EM LOY EE 98 5300 644 950 EM PLOYEE 31 1316 393 289
OW NERS 0.25 0.94 0.5 0.18 OW NERS 0.25 0.94 0.5 0.15
PROD 2.15 31.43 8.53 6.22 PROD 0.48 35.08 6.5 6.24
PRO F -10.2 2.71 -0.26 1.75 PROF -17.41 5.56 -0.39 2.06
Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Seventy- One Private Companies Bulgaria 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Three Hundred Private Companies Bulgaria 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation
TURNOV ER 160 894626 28696 77701 TURNOV ER 79 337180 15235 23457
PROFIT -19826 S2776 1179 7557 PROFIT -17540 19440 436 2516
TASSETS 240 509226 19135 45481 TASSETS 52 101982 11807 16089
EM LOY EE 14 10281 782 1285 EM PLOYEE 2 6235 534 704
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.57 2885.62 79,63 250.25 PROD 2.46 10011,66 132.15 624.96
PROF -13.18 71.57 2.78 8.82 PROF -62.74 130.21 1.73 10.51
Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Nine State Companies Bulgaria 1998 Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and N inety- six S tate Companies Bulgaria 2000
M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 121 1155996 28224 126545 TURN O V ER 47 929996 18473 83193
PROFIT -4064 180628 2750 18852 PROFIT -21928 149216 1112 13353
TASSETS 28 1730854 38486 184344 TASSETS 41 865374 20240 82180
EM LOY EE 17 32785 1363 4628 EM PLOYEE 17 25477 764 2419
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 0.66 342.91 15.9 36.05 PROD 0.68 4474,88 67.42 429.53
PROF -12.48 14.44 0.19 2,59 PROF -42.29 106.45 -0.53 9,96
From the Table BU2 for the years 1998 and 2000 two factors have been extracted. From Factor 
One for 1998, it can be ascertained that the first characteristic, size, is well established. Variables 
turnover, profit, total assets and employee are highly loaded with that component. But Factor Two 
shows that performance variables PROD and PROF, and ownership are significantly correlated to 
the factor. It can be confirmed that the ownership variable is retained with performance variables to 
build up a common factor, which does not confirm with other results in general.
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For the year 2000 the first characteristic, size, is established by virtue of turnover, profit, total assets 
and employee. The second characteristic, performance, is well established in the second factor by 
virtue of the PROD and PROF variables. It means that the two elements of size and performance for 
the year 2000 occupy large proportions of the total variance. The ownership variable is not picked 
up by either of the factors.
Bu2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf/Own)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Turnover 0.937 0.068 0.932 0.032
Profit 0.928 0.008 0.894 0.035
Total Assets 0.953 -0.068 0.929 -0.068
Number of 
Employees 0.859 -0.173 0.784 -0.131
Ownership -0.050 0.629 -0.066 0.372
Prod 0.089 0.698 0.044 0.776
Prof 0.160 0.698 0.120 0.796
Variance
Extracted 48.881 20.130 45.255 19.974
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Denmark
The sample size for Denmark for the year 1998 and 2000 consists of sixty and eighty companies, 
respectively (no mixed companies for the year 1998). The descriptive statistic for the different types 
of companies is shown in Table Dlwith nothing remarkable on which to comment except the 
absence of mixed companies for 1998.
D1
Descriptive Statistics For Forty-Three Private Companies D enmark 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Six M ixed Com panies D enmark 2000
M inimum M aximum Mean Std, Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 41197 2293033 259452 405303 TU RNOV ER 63142 662851 406176 282774
PROFIT -51828 212623 13265 37831 PROFIT -13889 167256 43630 67443
TASSETS 14666 1290765 174796 261930 TASSETS 73645 3156803 838040 1200642
EM PLOYEE 27 6037 960 1261 EM PLOYEE 177 3422 1245 1344
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 0.44 0.95 0.68 0.2
PROD 66,33 2727.53 496.5 678,51 PROD 169.74 2761.88 719.84 1010.84
PROF -219.61 483.21 17.89 82.74 PROF -78.47 696.9 119.42 287.41
Descriptive Statistics For Seventeen S tate Companies D enmark 1998 D escriptive Statistics For Forty-Four Private Companies D enmark 2000
M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
T U RN O V ER 10460 1365048 239162 403442 TU RNOV ER 13591 312737 103408 45945
PROFIT -25213 174767 8142 44167 PROFIT -8049 22794 2773 6513
TA SSETS 2983 1912505 347893 545431 TASSETS 6581 161319 65313 37308
EM PLOYEE 7 2889 437 702 EM PLOYEE 62 1331 540 372
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 98,38 10859.83 1228.06 2682.56 PROD 71.32 1278.24 295.62 263.61
PROF -990.54 865.18 9.18 349.5 PROF -30.27 76.36 7.49 18.95
Descriptive Statistics For Thirty State Companies D enmark 2000
M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURNOV ER 5294 3494961 481968 850339
PRO FIT -116100 433258 39440 103165
TASSETS 2823 3706780 590605 1089113
EM PLOYEE 23 9523 984 1951
OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 46.4 7532.04 953.93 1488.82
PROF -114.5 2957.06 190.99 572.53
As shown by the factor analysis output summarised in the Table D2, for the year 1998 three factors 
and for the year 2000 two factors have been extracted. For the year 1998 in the first factor, 
turnover, profit, total assets and employee are most weighted in the factor significantly occupying 
the highest score variance. The results underscore the first characteristic, size. The second factor
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establishes the second characteristic, performance, with PROD and PROF having the highest 
weights. Ownership is the only highly loaded item in the third extracted factor. This result 
demonstrates that ownership and other corporate performance activities are separate from one 
another. The results as a whole parallel other results found for other countries in the study. For the 
year 2000 only two factors explained more than an average amount of variance. The first 
component reveals higher correlations among some variables representing size like turnover, profit 
and total assets with variables representing the performance, PROD and PROF, but also with some 
negative amount with ownership. Factor 2 indicates that number of employees positively, and 
PROD and PROF negatively are highly loaded compared with the others variables. As a result, one 
characteristic, size and performance, can be ascertained through component 1, which is not 
generally the case in study results. Through component 2, unusually, employment is loaded heavily 
alongside performance but negatively so. Among all of the variables, only ownership is not 
significantly correlated to any factors for 2000.
D2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own)
Component 1 
(Size/Perf)
Component 2 
(Perf/Employee)
T urnover 0.949 -0.098 -0.081 0.753 0.476
Profit 0.815 0.202 0.238 0.819 -0.028
Total Assets 0.833 -0.048 -0.398 0.8 0.38
Number of 
Employees
0.842 -0.377 0.085 0.364 0.699
Ownership 0.025 -0.375 0.857 -0.513 0.003
Prod 0.093 0.839 -0.059 0.69 -0.667
Prof 0.289 0.746 0.439 0.61 -0.707
Variance
Extracted
43.72 22.798 16.558 44.591 25.797
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Finland
Sample sizes of one hundred and ten and two hundred companies have been used for Finland, for 
the years 1998 and 2000, respectively. Descriptive statistics for our samples of mixed, private and 
state companies for the years 1998 and 2000 are presented in Table FI. As far as the table is 
concerned three is nothing remarkable on which to comment on that.
FI
Descriptive Statistics For Six M ixed Com panies Finland 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Eight M ixed C om panies Finland 2000
M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation Minimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 82259 10063608 3324792 3491841 TURN O V ER 80132 10482093 2998287 3286576
PROFIT -4906 440142 179039 192792 PRO FIT -10599 1730732 379857 579463
TASSETS 715320 13040599 4112434 4509247 TASSETS 430000 13797467 4180187 4724421
EM PLOYEE 29 19003 10620 6301 EM PLOYEE 49 16220 9553 5108
OW NERS 0.4 0.71 0.54 0.1 OW NERS 0.4 1 0.58 0.2
PROD 145.02 2836.52 706.87 1051.47 PROD 75.56 1635.35 443.44 512.22
PROF -0.35 1468.88 259.36 592.77 PRO F -2.31 699.2 120.34 240.17
Descriptive Statistics For Fifly-Six Private Com panies Finland 1998 Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Seventeen Private Companies Finland 2000
Minimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RN O V ER 22307 7329901 290417 991687 TURNOV ER 3219 3123878 213734 442139
PROFIT -12526 155158 9397 25404 PROFIT -43307 162170 9464 28949
TASSETS 6499 2968691 187123 460998 TASSETS 3823 3407494 182271 443929
EM PLOYEE 12 11172 1001 2151 EM PLOYEE 28 23480 1139 2811
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 59.81 3631,45 474.43 712.44 PROD 42.63 7295.81 316.86 695.55
PROF -22,3 499.01 20.79 67.11 PROF -176.83 423.22 8.94 45.92
Descriptive Statistics For Forty-Eight State Com panies Finland 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Seventy-Five S tate Companies Finland 2000
M inim um M axim um Mean Std. Deviation Minimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 3633 2716595 182538 423631 TURN O V ER 1594 4798003 220825 631886
PROFIT -18086 318480 14306 47264 PROFIT -52999 224171 14103 44722
TASSETS 773 7938643 330998 1163037 TASSETS 1367 9405995 316826 1157086
EM PLOYEE 11 9994 60S 1504 EM PLOYEE 10 9373 555 1190
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 52.08 12104.34 812.4 2159.67 PROD 7.62 15327.61 712.94 1896.39
PROF -283.43 606.48 28.74 116.49 PROF -274.61 587,42 28.64 104.96
For 1998 and 2000, two factors have been retained explaining more than an average amount of 
variance, as indicated in the Table F2. For both years the main component can be designated as size. 
The second component is attached to performance for both years with a negative association with 
ownership. From these results it is clear that two characteristics can be established for both years:
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size and performance. This outcome is similar to other cases. The variable ownership does not 
occupy a relatively significant share of common variance; hence it is not highly loaded with either 
of the two extracted factors for both years.
F2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
T urnover 0.942 -0.008 0.934 -0.041
Profit 0.908 0.084 0.780 0.080
Total Assets 0.959 0.082 0.942 -0.004
Number of 
Employees 0.930 -0.072 0.835 -0.169
Ownership 0.038 -0.521 -0.013 -0.441
Prod -0.079 0.715 0.007 0.811
Prof -0.007 0.637 0.137 0.797
Variance
Extracted 50.060 17,264 44.062 21.766
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France
The data 011 five hundred companies were used for factor analysis for the year 1998 and six hundred 
companies for the year 2000. Descriptive statistics for our samples summarised in the Table FR1 
show that the standard deviations for the variables OWNERS and PROD of mixed companies for 
both years are relatively small.
FRl
Descriptive Statistics For Seven M ixed Com panies France 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Seven M ixed Com panies France 2000
M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RN O V ER 6691 28757032 4857182 10649770 TURM OVER 49791 31333687 828G693 11922596
PROFIT 2032 3150187 518386 1165902 PROFIT -12909 2520727 433313 929212
TASSETS 8757 53853759 8755345 19948860 TASSETS 305589 120578958 25463172 44471034
EM PLOYEE 28 169099 26494 63080 EM PLOYEE 190 302221 79707 120226
OW NERS 0.51 0.99 0.7 0.2 OW NERS 0.5 0.95 0.61 0.15
PROD 67.46 646.4 294.88 181.64 PROD 50.42 293.1 195.17 79.55
PROF 2.89 627.53 128.31 229.06 PROF -67.94 15.06 -9.58 30.84
Descriptive Statistics For Tw o Hundred and F ifty  Private Companies France 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Three Hundred and Thirteen Private Companies France 2000
M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RN O V ER 9070 24803407 412274 2096641 TURM O V ER 14327 29225172 322018 2366381
PRO FIT -236501 1158558 15755 95286 PROFIT -140053 1556728 9632 96809
TASSETS 3155 34581729 477848 3220790 TASSETS 5966 39991067 408655 3523120
EM PLOYEE 14 118272 1971 11310 EM PLOYEE 10 143014 1632 11757
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 33.91 117163.94 1032.59 7791.89 PROD 23.35 5347.96 307.5 441.2
PROF -674.66 190.79 10,0G 58.34 PROF -213.17 416.49 10.93 37.29
Descriptive Statistics For Tw o Hundred and Forty-three State Companies France 1998 D escriptive Statistics For Two Hundred and E ighty State Companies France 2000
M inim um M aximum Mean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 2578 43432051 529063 3254234 TURM OVER 501 33187156 453227 2503097
PROFIT -115258 1997970 14310 133669 PROFIT -141989 1070004 20292 110182
TASSETS 1455 52204585 704560 4525115 TASSETS 1065 113696G47 919632 7300393
EM PLOYEE 4 210437 2881 17414 EM PLOYEE 6 216605 2560 16207
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 16.96 21711.38 567.71 2049.87 PROD 0.36 8109.09 393.95 759.76
PROF -520.61 312.52 5.15 67.31 PROF -893.01 5567.28 29.29 344.16
Table FR2 shows that three factors explain more than an average amount of variance for the year 
1998. The variables with higher weight in component 1 are turnover, profit, total assets and 
employee. The second component shows that PROD and PROF are highly loaded, one positively 
and one negatively. The last component shows that the only variable that is highly loaded is
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ownership, with the correlation coefficient of (0.911). Again we can conclude that three 
characteristics (size, performance, and ownership) can be extracted from the analysis. Also, with 
respect to corporate performance, ownership is not associated with other elements such as turnover 
and profit.
The result for 2000 indicates that two factors have been retained. Factor 1 shows that turnover, 
profit, total assets and employee are highly loaded with it. Factor 2 identifies that the two highly 
loaded variables are: PROD and PROF. Two characteristics can be identified: size and 
performance. The ownership variable remains insignificant as in many other cases.
FR2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 1 Component 2(Size) (Peri) (Own) (Size) (Peri)
Turnover 0.976 0.03 0.005 0.973 -0.008
Profit 0.887 -0.035 0.046 0.87 0.052
Total Assets 0.982 0.01 -0.01 0.956 -0.001
Number of 
Employees 0.957 0.013 -0.022 0.88 -0.037
Ownership -0.02 -0.003 0.911 -0.043 -0.343
Prod -0.01 0.734 0.317 -0.033 0.759
Prof 0.018 -0.742 0.307 0.009 0.737
Variance
Extracted 51.733 15.591 14.686 48.495 17.743
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Germany
For this country data on five hundred companies for the year 1998 and four hundred and sixty 
companies for the year 2000 have been used. The descriptive statistic table, G l, shows relatively 
small standard deviations for variables OWNERS and PROD of mixed companies for both years.
G l
Descriptive Statistics For Sixty-Seven M ixed Companies G erm any 1998 D escriptive Statistics For Fifty-Two M ixed Companies Germ any 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 3903 18293431 375579 2225013 TURNOV ER 20378 31559799 697227 4365256
PROFIT -6417 761171 16235 92708 PROFIT -23263 1896361 41227 262615
TASSETS 7508 14762455 443311 1799788 TASSETS 14753 139835674 2899992 19363993
EM PLOYEE 12 258491 4243 31537 EM PLOYEE 12 319998 6536 44325
OW NERS 0.03 1 0.65 0.22 OW NERS 0.03 1 0.59 0.23
PROD 52.47 2907.09 452.46 436.74 PROD 41.91 2419.3 422.25 380.37
PROF -16.93 311.13 28.22 43.12 PROF -254.78 187.6 24.19 69.8
D escriptive Statistics For Two Hundred and Fifty-N ine Private Com panies Germ any 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Two Hundred and Thirty-O ne Private Companies G erm any 2000
M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 933 70777272 867631 4998466 TURNOV ER 48107 45491258 999605 3825942
PRO FIT -76420 3151441 56709 309067 PROFIT -157813 1051163 35200 130053
TASSETS 4131 66826508 690085 4451137 TASSETS 11073 20780876 643511 2226661
EM PLOYEE 13 401000 3674 26342 EM PLOYEE 78 234351 4612 19060
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 32.6 173130.15 1216.81 10817.99 PROD 13.65 15S29.85 298.6 1049,94
PROF -2053.44 6909.04 38.36 454.67 PROF -62.11 1133.11 16.99 81.51
Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Seventy-Four State Companies G erm any 1998 Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Seventy-Seven State Companies G erm any 2000
M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 19251 22125656 538645 2401814 TURNOV ER 651 21453908 347245 1713730
PRO FIT -72337 986583 15774 90044 PROFIT -183309 536341 8495 53100
TASSETS 12099 40789406 753697 3315585 TASSETS 11439 17223106 510315 1794625
EM PLOYEE 9 198989 2566 15899 EM PLOYEE 11 76392 1449 6319
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 26.1 17950.9 645.81 1727.83 PROD 0.68 19370.84 560.05 1585.75
PROF -248.6 420.02 14.33 65.07 PROF -608.93 394.09 9.59 92,84
From Table G2 it can be seen that three factors explained more than an average amount of variance 
for the year 1998. The variables that are again loaded more heavily than others with Factor 1 are 
turnover, profit, total assets and employee. PROD and PROF are highly loaded with Factor 2. In 
the last factor the only variable that has a significant correlation coefficient is ownership (0.993). 
This demonstrates again that it is possible to establish three characteristics: size, performance, and 
some sort of ownership. Ownership again remains unlinked to other characteristics.
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Table G2 also indicates that three factors have been extracted for the year 2000. Factor 1 tells the 
same story as the preceding case. The variables turnover, profit, total assets and employee are 
weighted heavily with the component 1. The second component gives information about two 
highly loaded variables, PROD and PROF. The last factor indicates that only one variable, 
ownership, with the associated value of (0.888), is highly loaded.
It is possible to establish three characteristics: size, performance, and some type of ownership. 
Variables that are normally used as corporate performance indicators are not associated with 
ownership through any particular factor.
G2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own)
T urnover 0.967 -0.031 -0.019 0.907 0.020 -0.015
Profit 0.712 0.010 0.122 0.920 0,062 0.060
Total Assets 0.946 -0.131 -0.068 0.891 -0.035 -0.108
Number of 
Employees 0.939 -0.173 -0.037 0.963 -0.067 -0.049
Ownership 0.044 0.066 0.991 0.095 -0.228 0.888
Prod 0.153 0.972 -0.045 0.013 0.783 -0.166
Prof 0.161 0.971 -0.040 0.044 0.714 0.451
Variance
Extracted 46.688 27.718 14.373 48.605 16,932 14.831
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Italy
This case uses data on seventy and ninety companies for the years 1998 and 2000, respectively. 
Descriptive statistics of our samples are summarised in the Table II. It can be emphasised that
there is nothing remarkable in the table which to comment on.
I t
Descriptive Statistics For Three M ixed Companies Italy 1998 D escriptive Statistics For Four M ixed Companies Italy 2000
M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 60028 52952981 26049041 26458343 TURN O V ER 180530 62012301 22929949 28039907
PROFIT 63 4894620 3251364 2815765 PROFIT -232132 10113614 3320092 4822215
TASSETS 108488 56198657 34993915 30444994 TASSETS 381324 53358643 26582288 28075597
EM PLOYEE 907 100212 58748 51638 EM PLOYEE 2762 85377 47912 37902
OW NERS 0.3 0.95 0.65 0.33 OW NERS 0.3 0.68 0.55 0.17
PROD 66.18 704.87 340.62 328.68 PROD 65.36 858.62 344.12 354.45
PROF 0.07 64.69 37.87 33.68 PROF -7.42 140.03 43.6 67.44
Descriptive Statistics For Thirty-Seven Private Com panies Italy 1998 D escriptive Statistics For Forty-Five Private Companies Italy 2000
M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 530159 11624046 2257270 2358631 TURN O V ER 62934 10042627 1256921 2058257
PROFIT -898316 2772996 136194 492169 PROFIT -563992 1867768 64843 301793
TA SSETS 206396 28148330 3055696 5289132 TA SSETS 36227 18719288 1360199 3141189
EM PLOYEE 263 45457 6883 9996 EM PLOYEE 55 40208 3761 7675
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 132.84 9785.11 1194.22 2238.2 PROD 128.7 3237.35 690,9 829.74
PROF -24.88 266.36 38.65 64.62 PROF -27.96 188.51 17.41 36.02
Descriptive Statistics For Thirty State Companies Italy 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Forty-One State Companies Italy 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 3188 13485967 739350 2563343 TURNOV ER 2216 12476428 941226 2333531
PROFIT -127744 623653 19396 116750 PROFIT -738516 1444363 63958 323565
TASSETS 3690 9402395 632180 1930255 TASSETS 3961 16797354 1244243 3278134
EM PLOYEE 8 18405 1518 4211 EM PLOYEE 18 45865 3001 8302
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 17.33 5283.69 612.02 980.54 PROD 44.3 14737.52 1286.89 3173.76
PROF -116.93 213.88 11.99 51.99 PROF -163.71 538.43 35.39 124.75
The results of factor analysis are indicated in Table 12. They show that two factors have been 
extracted for the year 1998. The first factor demonstrates that turnover, profit, total assets and 
employee numbers are heavily weighted. The second factor indicates that PROD and PROF are 
highly loaded. Two characteristics are well established: size and performance. The type of 
ownership in this case is unimportant with respect to corporate performance.
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The result for the year 2000 demonstrates that two factors have been extracted. Like the year 1998, 
size and performance as two main characteristics are well established. Similarly to many other 
cases, the type of ownership does not occupy a significant part of the common variance; therefore, it 
is not strongly correlated to either of the two factors.
12
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Turnover 0.944 -0.008 0.975 -0.004
Profit 0.931 0.006 0.935 0.031
Total Assets 0.972 -0.075 0.977 -0.067
Number of 
Employees 0.948 -0.122 0.909 -0.127
Ownership 0.140 0.367 -0.014 -0.296
Prod -0.028 0.921 -0.014 0.916
Prof 0.181 0.914 0.186 0.893
Variance
Extracted 52.221 26.262 52.000 24.946
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The Netherlands
Data of ninety companies for the year 1998 and two hundred companies for the year 2000 were 
taken and factor analysis was subsequently carried out. The descriptive statistics table, N l, 
demonstrates that the standard deviations of variables OWNERS, PROD and PROF for mixed 
companies of both years are relatively small.
m
Descriptive Statistics For Five M ixed Com panies The Netherlands 1998 D escriptive Statistics For Five M ixed Com panies T he N etherlands 2000
M inim um M aximum Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation
TU RN O V ER 48351 9450434 3871809 4766100 TU RNOV ER 37423 12571998 4612216 5871537
PROFIT 9854 1650721 517980 697194 PROFIT 9612 1916832 582786 807817
TASSETS 126587 15947021 4928545 6615133 TASSETS 101410 49749230 11875797 21350588
EM PLOYEE 122 101582 28916 43206 EM PLOYEE 138 129675 37417 55119
OW NERS 0.25 0.76 0.45 0.21 OW NERS 0.25 0.76 0.45 0.21
PROD 85.72 396.32 236.87 138.66 PROD 71.3 322,75 201.43 117.84
PROF 7.19 82.68 44,89 37.06 PROF 6.01 81.26 40.88 34.65
Descriptive Statistics For Forty-Five Private Com panies The Netherlands 1998 Descriptive Statistics F or Sixty-Four Private Companies The N etherlands 2000
M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation Minimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 69354 31128203 2567097 4679778 TURNOV ER 85536 7643699 1374920 1566807
PRO FIT -2275 920737 136731 213493 PROFIT -318730 1550926 105272 260092
TASSETS 19303 13667415 1711665 2819660 TASSETS 38218 8250715 1375272 1983846
EM PLOYEE 69 214000 15299 39117 EM PLOYEE 35 53800 6301 10478
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 12.36 8677.1 907.83 1516.87 PROD 74.97 13470.54 1040.92 2158.88
PROF -32.97 1438.83 71.57 245.74 PROF -189.72 1475.67 63.51 219.34
Descriptive Statistics For Forty S tate Com panies The Netherlands 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Fifty-One State Companies The N etherlands 2000
M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 3609 9231654 556697 1563141 TURNOV ER 6245 7408581 632635 1393620
PROFIT -86361 148271 12725 34071 PROFIT -1359876 3953731 66425 615087
TASSETS 5641 8792478 665326 1645742 TASSETS 4984 33272026 1550091 5047508
EM PLOYEE 13 23794 1931 4555 EM PLOYEE 14 22853 2095 4806
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 48.12 24507.96 1148.57 3912.76 PROD 52.29 385107 8550.39 53913.51
PROF -1151.48 787,45 43.16 278.55 PROF -679.94 3604.49 163.95 750.04
The story here is the same as in the case of Italy. Table N2 illustrates that two factors have been 
retained for the year 1998. Through the first factor, it can be observed that turnover, profit, total 
assets and employee are heavily weighted within the associated component. The second factor 
reveals that two variables, PROD and PROF, are highly loaded. From these results it is possible to
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establish two characteristics, size and performance. The ownership characteristic has little 
correlation with the two factors and it is unimportant when considering corporate performance.
For the year 2000 three factors are extracted. The first factor, as usual, demonstrates that turnover, 
profit, total assets and employee are highly loaded within the associated factor. The variables 
PROD and PROF are highly loaded in the second factor. The third factor shows that only the 
ownership variable has a significant correlation coefficient, with a value of (0.935). From these 
three factors, three characteristics of corporate performance can be recognized: size, performance, 
and the kind of ownership. This is consistent with most of the preceding cases.
Nt
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 Component 2 Component 1 Component 2 Component 3(Size) (Perf) (Size) (Peri) (Own)
Turnover 0.897 -0.015 0.964 -0.119 0.043
Profit 0.853 0.137 0.721 0.112 0.035
Total Assets 0.858 0.024 0.699 -0.287 -0.323
Number of 
Employees 0.756 -0.135 0.681 -0.386 0.028
Ownership 0.345 0.047 0.076 -0.277 0.935
Prod -0.084 0.811 0.238 0.813 0.084
Prof 0.034 0.848 0.382 0.851 0.13
Variance
Extracted 42.379 20.229 37.287 24.556 14.37
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Norway
The data on one hundred and twenty and two hundred Norwegian companies for the years 1998 and 
2000, respectively, have been collected to complete the factor analysis for this country. Descriptive 
statistics of our samples for two years 1998 and 2000 are presented in the Table NOl with nothing 
on which to comment.
NO l
Descriptive Statistics For Fourteen M ixed Com panies N onvay 1998 D escriptive Statistics For Thirty-Three M ixed Com panies N onvay 2000
M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation M inim um M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 3923 12824737 988828 3410396 TURN O V ER 2935 23524439 1305084 5037340
PROFIT -244 767237 59384 203948 PROFIT -20324 4302537 238876 939441
TASSETS 2985 14960658 1163070 3974785 TASSETS 1713 22190654 1415935 5200076
EM PLOYEE 18 9329 808 2456 EM PLOYEE 16 10293 704 2336
OW NERS 0.25 0.9 0.5 0.17 OW NERS 0.25 0.9 0.5 0.19
PROD 26.13 34203.22 2889.1 9059.38 PROD 25.21 22167.39 1385.27 3897.76
PROF -1.21 1812.87 157.66 479.94 PROF -307.93 1993.66 124.7 387.52
Descriptive Statistics For Sixty-Three Private Companies N onvay 1998 Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and One Private Companies N onvay 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RN O V ER 377 10941711 389465 1386022 TURNOV ER 190 4218986 273771 619934
PROFIT -176974 307830 8392 47211 PROFIT -11682 907313 19966 92703
TASSETS 9044 7153158 254509 917755 TASSETS 193 17714200 385278 1800323
EM PLO Y EE 32 4912 491 670 EM PLOYEE 14 7400 534 877
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 3.77 113976.15 2813.08 14438.02 PROD 0.33 29096.46 1846.62 4178.51
PROF -1843.48 2033.02 47.79 366.62 PROF -118.46 10681.11 233.43 1181,54
D escriptive Statistics For Forty-Three State Companies N onvay 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Sixty-Six State Companies Norw ay 2000
M inim um M axim um Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 1215 3734211 268653 664624 TURNOVER 74 3374131 178819 484230
PROFIT • -51711 512895 21171 90638 PROFIT -35260 541094 21583 82115
TASSETS 840 5234211 376280 880291 TASSETS 264 3531107 248700 575595
EM PLOYEE 12 3978 448 918 EM PLOYEE 10 4064 349 806
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 11.72 5042.44 805.91 1272.64 PROD 0.26 9216.57 776 1707.34
PROF -1017.04 767.95 37.52 243.44 PROF -770.67 6680.18 173.33 864.53
The output, which is shown in the Table N 02, shows that three factors have been extracted for the 
year 1998. The variables of turnover, profit, total assets and employee are heavily weighted in the 
first factor. Items PROD and PROF are highly loaded in the second factor, while the other 
variables are insignificant. The last factor has just one highly loaded variable, the ownership, with
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associated value of (0.973). From this analysis, once again, it is found that three characteristics of 
corporate performance are well established, namely size, performance, and the kind of ownership.
The table below demonstrates that two factors have been extracted for the year 2000. The variables 
of turnover, profit, total assets and employee are highly loaded within the first extracted factor that a 
common characteristic, size, can be established. The second component demonstrates that two 
variables, PROD and PROF are highly loaded.
From the above result, like many other cases, it is again possible to establish two characteristics of 
corporate performance; that is, size and performance.
No2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Turnover 0.953 -0.267 0.014 0.982 -0.074
Profit 0.747 0.574 0.026 0.959 -0.07
Total Assets 0.981 -0.02 -0.032 0.925 0.085
Number of 
Employees 0.779 0.313 0.055 0.844 -0.25
Ownership -0.026 -0.166 0.973 0.074 0.244
Prod 0.38 -0.782 0.04 0.195 0.849
Prof -0.147 0.715 0.229 0.113 0.792
Variance
Extracted 45.765 23.553 14.363 50.111 21.239
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Poland
Three hundred and forty companies of different types (state, mixed, and private) have been chosen
for the year 1998 and a larger sample of four hundred and twenty companies has been selected for 
the year 2000. Table PI introduces the descriptive statistics for our samples for both years 1998 and 
2000 with nothing on which to comment.
PI
Descriptive Statistics For N ineteen M ixed Com panies Poland 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Thirty-Three M ixed Companies Poland 2000
M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum M ean Std. Deviation
T U RN O V ER 1617 576727 53288 134438 TU RNOV ER 574 1377894 131441 292892
PRO FIT -21910 3096 -798 5231 PROFIT -17856 182400 6629 32080
TASSETS 1756 496029 59625 135698 TA SSETS 457 1804279 141113 329255
EM PLOYEE 34 4199 678 994 EM PLOYEE 44 18562 1310 3271
OW NERS 0.16 1 0.51 0.21 OW NERS 0.16 1 0.53 0.22
PROD 6.8 285.26 63.99 73.53 PROD 1.31 4746.63 237.95 819.43
PROF -29.69 78.93 3.14 19.79 PROF -55.2 261.1 8.77 48.02
Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Seventy-Three Private Com panies Poland 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Two Hundred and Fifteen Private Companies Poland 2000
M inimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RN O V ER 192 2680347 185420 349224 TURNOV ER 6084 3903277 237027 385026
PROFIT -377199 102665 -469 33276 PROFIT -195310 478874 3506 38962
TA SSETS 1276 6592793 138982 522266 TASSETS 2680 7964693 182722 622054
EM PLOYEE 10 214135 2914 17955 EM PLOYEE 11 101255 2052 8436
OW NERS 1 I 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.64 35728.55 652.77 3008.75 PROD 6.33 14990.84 679.79 1430.01
PROF -240.76 792.54 3.91 70.63 PROF -1128.96 385.1 -1.12 96.37
Descriptive Statistics For O ne Hundred and Forty-Eight State Companies Poland 1998 Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred and Seventy-Two State Companies Poland 2000
M inim um M aximum Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 1736 3829119 122158 360037 TURN O V ER 1325 3314315 123906 313334
PROFIT -192053 68787 33 21860 PROFIT -94524 110168 1762 16281
TASSETS 840 3917758 141376 460369 TASSETS 953 3692635 119066 347714
EM PLOYEE 41 47350 1957 5428 EM PLOYEE 16 32500 1609 3842
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 6.91 7960.75 139.32 667.3 PROD 7.5 6628.63 178.24 625,36
PROF -298.86 116.79 1.37 28.35 PROF -159.08 289.92 5.18 30.22
Factor analysis results are shown in Table P2. Two factors for the year 1998 have been extracted. It 
can be seen that turnover, total assets and employee are highly loaded within factor 1, but profit also 
is negatively loaded. Looking at the second factor, it can be seen that two items, PROD and PROF, 
are highly loaded. From the first factor it can be recognised that size is a characteristic of corporate
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performance. The second factor emphasises the role of a second characteristic, performance. 
Ownership is not an influential variable in either factor.
According to Table P2, three factors have been extracted for the year 2000. The result shows that 
turnover, profit, total assets and employee are heavily weighted within the first factor. The first 
characteristic, size, is well established. PROD (negatively), profit and PROF are highly loaded with 
the second factor. The third factor demonstrates that ownership is the only highly loaded variable. 
This emphasises the third characteristic, the kind of ownership but with little correlation with other 
variables. The results here are mixed and not open to immediate interpretation, although they do not 
seem to support a strong relationship between private ownership and performance. Thus may be a 
consequence of an economy still in transition or restating its effects, a matter beyond the scope of 
this study.
P2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own)
Turnover 0.717 0.244 0.892 -0.167 0.021
Profit -0.715 0.216 0.625 0.581 0.222
Total Assets 0.921 0.029 0.909 -0,122 -0.184
Number of 
Employees 0.914 -0.024 0.738 0.201 -0.193
Ownership 0.061 0.189 0.166 -0.319 0.75
Prod 0.031 0.905 0.193 -0.665 0.372
Prof -0.071 0.9 -0.092 0.764 0.495
Variance
Extracted 38.834 25.32 37.578 22.112 15.25
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Portugal
This exercise uses the data on sixty Portuguese companies of different kinds of ownership for the 
year 1998, and the same number for the year 2000. Descriptive statistics for those companies are 
introduced in the Table POl, According to the table relatively small standard deviations of 
variables OWNERS and PROD for mixed companies and PROD for state companies for the year 
1998 as well as OWNERS of mixed companies and PROD of private and state companies for the 
year 2000 are observable. But it is the small number of mixed and state-owned companies that is
apparent, inevitably questioning the usefulness on including this country
POl
Descriptive Statistics For Five M ixed Companies Portugal 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Five M ixed Companies Portugal 2000
M inim um M aximum M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 34569 1256955 356881 509250 TURNOV ER 23 1932701 452194 832154
PROFIT -67823 17180 -22089 35446 PROFIT -73242 81215 -15717 63232
TA SSETS 197755 1857196 836622 795921 TASSETS 85179 2012418 813216 962736
EM PLOYEE 1651 8603 4015 2772 EM PLOYEE 6 4189 1683 1629
OW NERS 0,49 1 0.77 0.23 OW NERS 0.4 I 0.63 0.26
PROD 20.94 146.11 66.51 52,38 PROD 3.87 3158.01 659,9 1397.01
PRO F -28,91 2 -9.38 12,94 PROF -52.69 132.7 19.2 71.57
Descriptive Statistics For Forty-Seven Private Com panies Portugal 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Forty-Six Private C om panies Portugal 2000
M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 31077 1545100 179097 327857 TURN O V ER 26785 1753844 167847 270818
PROFIT -145063 220508 5665 40153 PROFIT -12441 125973 6748 19327
TASSETS 12935 2104603 193865 431286 TASSETS 8160 1205537 157535 245902
EM PLOYEE 83 11644 1085 1901 EM PLOYEE 108 14847 1057 2184
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 11.93 1531.2 254.47 267.74 PROD 27.87 1092.96 263.19 221.94
PROF -65.73 43.9 4.08 14.54 PROF -21.19 72.32 9.33 15.07
Descriptive S tatistics For Eight State Companies Portugal 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Nine S tate Companies Portugal 2000
M inim um M axim um Mean Std. Deviation M inimum Maximum M ean Std, Deviation
TURN O V ER 560 587698 167249 213622 TURN O V ER 1906 775745 289233 286074
PROFIT -23207 32968 2233 16875 PROFIT -160329 151695 14591 87452
TASSETS 10374 1819718 446503 628148 TASSETS 66520 2571036 954089 968373
EM PLOYEE 19 3061 1103 1212 EM PLOYEE 25 17844 2771 5692
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 23.78 429.5 179,84 145.02 PROD 19.98 793.07 268.78 266
PROF -36.45 27.7 1.61 19.37 PROF -79.41 110.48 13.17 58.98
Nonetheless the results for these two years are shown in Table P02. Three factors have been 
retained for the year 1998. According to the first factor, the variables turnover, total assets and
employee are heavily weighted. The second factor demonstrates that PROD and PROF are highly
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loaded, although other variables enter also. The last factor picks up PROD as the only highly 
loaded variable. Through components 1 and 2 the characteristic of size and performance will be 
well established. Through the last component it is possible to establish a characteristic of 
productivity again with other variables present. However, it is anomalous with respect to other 
findings, and not open to natural interpretation.
For the year 2000 the Table P02 shows that two factors have been extracted. The variables of 
turnover, profit, total assets, PROD, and PROF are highly loaded in the first factor. Through 
component 2 it can be seen that variables profit, ownership and PROF have higher correlation 
coefficients (not significantly) than the other variables. Common characteristics relevant to 
preceding findings cannot be extracted through components 1 and 2. Ownership again has no strong 
relationship with the extracted factors.
Po2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Prod)
Component 1 
(Size/Perf)
Component 2 
(Profit/Own/Prof)
Turnover 0.869 -0.103 0.429 0.881 -0.166
Profit 0.727 0.479 -0.345 0.725 0.445
Total Assets 0.815 -0.305 -0.07 0.582 -0.682
Number of 
Employees 0.729 -0,524 0.115 0.306 -0.745
Ownership -0.131 0.363 0.42 -0.399 0.487
Prod 0.134 0.553 0.68 0.7 0.343
Prof 0,476 0.725 -0.386 0.809 0.498
Variance
Extracted 39.159 22.44 15.839 43.395 26.402
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Sweden
The data on 756 companies are used to investigate corporate performance through factor analysis
for the year 1998 as well as a similarly large sample size of 750 companies for the year 2000. 
Descriptive statistics presented in Table SI indicate relatively small standard deviations for 
OWNERS of mixed companies for both years and for PROD of mixed companies for the year 1998.
S I
Descriptive Statistics For Thirty-Three M ixed Com panies Sweden 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Thirty-Seven M ixed Companies Sweden 2000
Minimum M aximum M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 5753 7119836 439244 1343146 TURNOV ER 6543 6629749 321562 1156097
PRO FIT -145904 843320 27131 151138 PROFIT -83464 1241800 52986 212492
TA SSETS 2460 8231485 664638 1608261 TASSETS 2607 13005670 631663 2215779
EM PLOYEE 10 31320 1524 5520 EM PLOYEE 10 30307 1471 5421
OW NERS 0.5 0.99 0.76 0.16 OW NERS 0.5 0.99 0.73 0.17
PROD 58.37 1368.96 373.14 277.26 PROD 55.44 5175.69 455.74 876.26
PROF -241.61 119.11 13.79 59.71 PROF -619.45 290.91 13.92 128.75
Descriptive Statistics For Three Hundred and Seventy-N ine Private Companies Sweden 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Three Hundred and Seventy-Five Private Companies Sweden 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 4 10370798 145840 663508 TU RNOV ER 2237 8095914 123963 533422
PROFIT -78007 760203 9961 52544 PROFIT -42154 573473 10709 48105
TA SSETS 555 12572634 192847 799610 TASSETS 502 11706322 191462 799231
EM PLOYEE 2 53493 598 3239 EM PLOYEE 3 46025 555 2896
OW NERS I 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.04 16150.2 618.72 1270.11 PROD 33.05 6623.64 612.2 925.15
PROF -2785.96 15281.85 76.5 821.4 PROF -1277.38 2467.56 46.73 210.76
D escriptive Statistics For T hree Hundred and Forty-Four S tate Companies Sweden 1998 Descriptive Statistics For T hree Hundred and Thirty-Eight State Companies Sweden 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 485 3554398 126053 383262 TURNOV ER 380 3845689 132696 393405
PRO FIT -352190 867696 10740 67109 PROFIT -293042 549944 7904 51944
TASSETS 888 10340653 285021 964158 TASSETS 1628 12188543 278808 1003940
EM PLOYEE 6 42108 617 3289 EMPLOYEE 10 41522 698 3375
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 23.07 3931.6 492.23 540,48 PROD 32.78 4831.88 462,32 481.85
PROF -182 1383.04 49.76 146.08 PROF -357.64 992.23 39.53 116.05
Factor analysis results are given in Table S2 for the year 1998 and 2000. It demonstrates that two 
factors have been extracted for the year 1998. Variables turnover, profit, total assets and employee 
are heavily loaded in the first component. In the second factor, the performance variables, PROD 
and PROF, are highly loaded. The same result is retained for the year 2000.
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This investigation demonstrates that two characteristics can be established: size through the first 
component and performance through the second component for both years. In other words, 
corporate performance is characterised by size of the corporation on the one hand, and performance 
011 the other hand for both years. In this case, ownership cannot be included as a possible 
characteristic.
S2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Turnover 0.951 -0.023 0.966 -0.030
Profit 0.854 0.081 0.851 0.160
Total Assets 0.914 0.002 0.925 -0.005
Number of 
Employees 0.869 -0.068 0.856 -0.136
Ownership -0.002 0.115 -0.004 0.323
Prod -0.014 0.893 -0.047 0.758
Prof 0.026 0.890 0.068 0.746
Variance
Extracted 46.093 23.050 46.468 18.296
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The UK
The data of 200 companies each for the years 1998 and 2000 were researched to complete the factor
analysis. No mixed companies are included in this investigation. Descriptive statistics for both 
years are introduced in Table U1 with nothing on which to comment.
U1
D escriptive S tatistics For One Hundred and Ten Private Com panies The UK 199S Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred Private Companies The UK 2000
M ini nui m M axim um M ean Std. D eviation M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 9404 13309100 2273237 2962621 TU RNOV ER 10043 17454491 3743685 3870097
PROFIT -495092 2934923 211972 492575 PROFIT -4930862 4836778 241639 900756
TASSETS 14881 35314111 2725210 5971282 TA SSETS 14875 81214563 5704809 10540423
EM PLOYEE 24 87384 9335 16158 EM PLOYEE 70 93519 15432 22580
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 38.42 11417.36 848.72 1803.05 PROD 34.17 14435.66 996.02 2409.45
PROF -116.33 1442,25 61.16 184.82 PRO F -1689.56 1763.83 51.45 295.28
Descriptive Statistics For N inety State Companies The UK 1998 Descriptive Statistics For One Hundred State Companies The UK 2000
M inim um M aximum M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 2030 2096157 194914 407563 TURNOV ER 715 3S27962 260775 694308
PROFIT -265754 284146 433 57930 PROFIT -244108 294027 36S7 53414
TASSETS 1543 3768425 245987 614248 TASSETS 1261 10487281 446384 1592839
EM PLOYEE 11 14235 924 2002 EM PLOYEE 10 11514 923 1956
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 36.88 4187.61 381.97 633.27 PROD 27.49 9434.17 567.46 1267.29
PRO F -1276.86 302,84 -34.72 230.86 PROF -1251.83 1301.01 23.3 239.86
Factor analysis results are reported in Table U2 for the year 1998 and 2000. The results for the 
years 1998 and 2000 highlight the extraction of two components. The first component shows that 
the variables turnover, profit, total assets, employee and ownership are highly loaded. The second 
component indicates that PROD and PROF are highly loaded. The first components of both years 
demonstrate that variables representing size of companies are correlated within a factor including 
ownership, which is unusual according to our preceding findings. The second components for both 
years again establish performance as a common characteristic.
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U2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size/Own)
Component 2 
(Pert)
Component 1 
(Size/Own)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Turnover 0.883 -0.115 0.894 -0.041
Profit 0.824 0.016 0.481 0.339
Total Assets 0.801 -0.113 0.688 -0.115
Number of 
Employees 0.761 -0.344 0.807 -0.270
Ownership 0.553 0.276 0.690 0,038
Prod 0.086 0.796 0.053 0.734
Prof 0.299 0.735 0.133 0.795
Variance
Extracted 44.012 19.914 37.886 19.631
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Total-Country Analysis
The investigation continues by combining sample data from all countries together. As a result, two 
sample sizes of 3316 companies for the year 1998 and 3960 companies for the year 2000 are
obtained. Descriptive statistics are summarised in Table T1 with nothing on which to comment.
T1
Descriptive Statistics For Two Hundred and Twenty-Eight M ixed Com panies Total Countries 
1998 Descriptive Statistics For Two Hundred and N inety-Eight M ixed Companies Total Countries 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. D eviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 433 52952981 934976 4671242 TURN O V ER 23 62012301 999872 5129795
PROFIT -874927 4894620 82886 524370 PROFIT -232132 10113614 116364 733225
TASSETS 399 56198657 1321886 6356906 TASSETS 170 139835674 2061670 12152641
EM PLO Y EE 2 258491 4397 23078 EM PLOYEE 6 319998 5146 29650
OW NERS 0.03 1 0.61 0.22 OW NERS 0.03 1 0.56 0.2
PROD 2.15 34203.22 432.87 2290.93 PRO D 0.48 22167,39 366.93 1431.36
PROF -2950.06 1812.87 22.91 260.9 PRO F -619.45 1993.66 28.2 155.06
D escriptive Statistics For O ne Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty-Three Private Companies Total 
Countries 1998 Descriptive Statistics For Two Thousand and S ixty-Three Private Companies Total Countries 2000
M inim um M aximum M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 4 70777272 560430 2513325 TU RNOV ER 79 45491258 545532 2056698
PROFIT -898316 3151441 35397 204484 PROFIT -4930862 4836778 27901 224626
TASSETS 240 66826508 561648 2891526 TASSETS 52 81214563 609513 3147266
EM PLOYEE 2 401000 2642 14937 EM PLOYEE 2 234351 2460 10622
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.04 173130.15 819.1 5966.61 PROD 0.33 95550.31 658.64 3036.9
PROF -2785.96 15281.85 35.84 434.03 PROF -1689.56 10681.11 31.27 296.38
D escriptive Statistics For One Thousand Three Hundred and Forty-Five State Companies Total 
Countries 1998
Descriptive Statistics For One Thousand Five Hundred and Ninety-N ine State Companies Total 
Countries 2000
M inim um M aximum M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 121 43432051 285136 1730674 TU RNOV ER 47 33187156 261159 1337740
PROFIT -352190 1997970 10441 80839 PROFIT -1359876 3953731 13362 137331
TASSETS 28 52204585 413548 2392611 TASSETS 41 113696647 469984 3388221
EM PLOYEE 2 210437 1583 9913 EM PLOYEE 2 216605 1381 7779
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 0.66 24507.96 496.06 1475.18 PROD 0.26 385107 694.38 9706.4
PROF -1276,86 2302.02 20.42 148.33 PROF -40895.98 6680,18 18.24 1084.07
From Table T2 it can be seen that two components are extracted for the year 1998. The first 
component proves that turnover, profit, total assets and employee are highly loaded, with higher 
respective correlation coefficients. The second component demonstrates that the two variables, 
PROD and PROF, are heavily weighted. These results confirm that it is possible to establish two
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characteristics: size and performance. Ownership remains unestablished as a characteristic with 
lower correlation coefficients for both components.
For the year 2000 the SPSS analysis extracts two components. The first component reveals that 
turnover; profit, total assets and employee are highly loaded. The second component demonstrates 
that the PROD and PROF variables are heavily weighted. Two characteristics can be found from 
this analysis; size from the first factor and performance from the second. Among the variables, 
ownership demonstrates a less influential role in both factors.
T2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
T urnover 0.948 0.012 0.940 0.024
Profit 0.800 0.020 0.691 0.093
Total Assets 0.937 -0.044 0.877 -0.067
Number of 
Employees 0.846 -0.101 0.850 -0.080
Ownership 0.065 0.136 0.060 0.037
Prod 0.064 0.798 0.032 0.728
Prof 0.051 0.794 0.019 0.752
Variance
Extracted
44.907 18.528 40.849 15,962
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5.3 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the performance of private and state owned enterprises together and 
sought to find out whether or not one is superior to the other.
Type-one factor analysis compared the performance of state, mixed and private companies, using 
data from the years 1998 and 2000. Fourteen European countries were chosen for this 
investigation: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, German, Italy, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK. Data on turnover, profit, total assets, the 
number of employees, ownership, productivity (PROD) and profitability (PROF) was collected and 
factor analysis was used for the years 1998 and 2000. The size of the sample taken for each country 
was restricted by the availability of the data on state-owned companies; the more data available on 
state-owned companies, the larger the size of the sample. The last part of the type one-factor 
analysis was devoted to total-country analysis, in which the sample data from each country was 
combined for the years 1998 and 2000.
Thirty factor analyses of two years (1998 and 2000), including the total-country approach, show 
that in ten cases, three factors are extracted and in twenty cases, two factors are extracted. In most 
cases of three extracted factors, the characteristics of size, performance, and some type of 
ownership are well established, hi most cases of two extracted factors, the characteristics of size 
and performance are recognised. The first findings (the cases of three factors) demonstrate that 
corporate performance is a function of three separate characteristics; variables representing size, 
performance, and ownership are correlated in separate factors. The latter findings (the cases of two 
factors) demonstrate a similar outcome but here the type of ownership is not a separate 
characteristic of corporate performance.
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What can be concluded explicitly is that, in the three-characteristic cases, ownership is a unique 
characteristic and does not share common traits with either size, or performance. Moreover, in the 
two-characteristic cases, ownership is not even a characteristic of corporate performance. These 
findings undermine theories, which argue that ownership is an influential aspect of corporate 
performance.
Our findings in many cases confirm that size and performance are two characteristics of corporate 
performance, while in some other cases the characteristics are increased to size, performance and 
some sorts of ownership. As a result, it can be concluded that ownership is not correlated to any 
other variable such as size and performance. Moreover, it is not an influential aspect of corporate 
performance since, in most cases, it takes up a smaller area of common variance shared by all 
involved variables.
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Appendix 1
Brief Notes on the Data Sources, etc.
In general, in undertaking an empirical exercise of the sort included in this thesis, considerable 
attention has to be devoted to searching out data sources, and ensuring they are suitable and 
compatible. In short, it is desirable to deal with the following issues.
a) What sources have been used?
b) What alternative data sources were available but not used?
c) In what way did the sources meet the specific requirements of the study?
d) In particular, what data were used from each of the sources?
e) How and why is the data from different sources comparable? In particular, are there any 
measurement considerations that have to be made pooling data?
To a large extent, these issues are addressed directly in the account of the data that follows that is, 
in large part, drawn from the data sources themselves. But, as a preliminary, it is worth highlighting 
a number of more general points, specific to our study. First, ideally, we would have liked to have 
deployed a very wide range of variables reflecting enterprise characteristics and performance. In 
practice, the ready and cheap availability of such data is a serious problem. Very little choice is 
open, especially when considering the necessity of availability of data on state-owned companies. 
In short, in effect, there has been very little choice in what data to use, both in teims of sampling 
and the variables attached to the samples.
Second, even on this limited basis, it would be desirable in principle to confirm consistency across 
the data, especially for the purposes to hand. We have no reason to believe that the data collected
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discriminates one way or the other in examining the impact of ownership on firm characteristics and 
performance. But, as in the construction of data itself, the toil and trouble of testing this (rather than 
constructing a data set of one’s own), would be extremely arduous.
Third, it is only to a limited extent that such interrogation, and possibly amendment, of the data set 
can be undertaken without prior preconceptions about performance and the impact of ownership 
upon it. Put another way, and a point to be taken up in the concluding remarks in the thesis, careM  
scrutiny of the data would itself be tantamount to undertaking a whole series of case studies. If so, it 
might be preferable to do this directly rather than indirectly through data modification. In other 
words, if, for example, we wish to modify measurement of capital assets in order to take account of 
excess capacity, it makes more sense to do tins in the context of sectoral studies and other 
considerations than through what is liable to be some more or less arbitrary adjustment of the data.
Fourth, more specifically, in the broader analytical and ideological context of our study, the thrust is 
to demonstrate that the case in favour of privatisation as improving performance is far from bome 
out by a “first cut” consideration of the data. Marginal returns in terms of research results through 
taking a “second cut” by the arduous task of refining the data are liable to be less than those gained 
through concerted case study analysis (which is, in effect, what is data refinement in a narrow way).
O f course, this can be interpreted as, and in essence is, making a virtue out of necessity. The data 
sources are limited, interrogating and improving them is liable to be less rewarding than more 
rounded research. This is the light in which to locate the following discussion of the data 
themselves.
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The sources that have been used for collecting data are: Dataatream, Amadeus, ‘Major companies 
of Europe’ and Statistics Sweden. There are many different data sources available nowadays. Most 
of them are useful for collecting data of non-state companies. Datastream is a well-known 
expensive data source, which gives nearly all information about company accounts of non-state 
companies. It has been available to SAOS students through a share agreement with Birkbeck. As 
can be seen below, Amadeus collects data from 30 different sources, with corresponding advantage 
over consulting those sources individually. But, collecting data on state-owned enterprises is more 
difficult. This is because fewer sources contain such information, and the number of state-owned 
companies has shrunk since 1980s when an extensive privatisation programme began to be earned 
out by many government from European countries. For our propose Datastream is useful for 
collecting data of private and mixed companies. Amadeus and ‘Major Companies of Europe’ is 
useful for data on state-owned enterprises. Statistics Sweden is used in order to find data regarding 
concentration for measuring competitiveness in a sector.
Datastream supplies current as well as historical data for international equity, bond, commodities, 
and foreign exchange and futures markets. A wider range of information from company accounts to 
macroeconomic statistics is available from this source. Due to availability of company accounts 
information is provided for maximum of 10 years. Company accounts data are based on the 
currency of the country in which the company is registered.
Amadeus provides data on 5 million public and private companies. Data are collected from 30 
sources and from 26 European countries. It is claimed that additional criteria have been employed 
in order to prevent any bias in coverage towards countries where information is more readily 
available. A total of 3 million ownership links are also provided. ‘Major companies of Europe’ 
(Western Europe companies serials), a hard printed source, has been published by Graham &
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Trotman from 1983 is also useful for data on state-owned and mixed enterprises since mix of 
ownership is given in percentages. Statistics Sweden is a central government authority for official 
statistics and other government statistics and in this capacity also has the responsibility for 
coordinating and supporting the Swedish system for official statistics.
Dtaastream provides company accounts data as consolidated accounts; parent accounts are only 
used when consolidated accounts are not available. The Profit and Loss Accounts are presented 
through using published and adjusted form. The later will vary from country to country. As it 
mentioned in the main body of the text we have used four of their variables for our research: 
turnover, profit, total assets and number of employees. Datastream has composed those variables as 
follow:
Total sales is presented as net of sale related taxes excluding additional incomes, rental incomes and 
other operating incomes when the goods and services are being sold to third parties. Furthermore, 
any revenues from non-industrial activities like insurance, property, investment and loan financing 
are not taken into account.
Operating profit is calculated based on operation activities excluding initially financial income / 
expense, financial and extraordinary provisions and extraordinary profits / losses. Adjustments to 
the published figure in this regard made by Datastream are: capital grants and investment credits, if 
treated as operating incomes by the company, are excluded from operating profit. Furthermore, 
operating profit also adjusted for any special non-recurring items.
Total number of employees is presented as the average number of employees as published by the 
company. If the average numbers is not available then the year-end number is presented.
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A standard method is being used to disclose aggregate values as follow: for each company in the list 
the latest value available is used for calculating aggregate values for the latest year. Annualised data 
is always used to calculate aggregate values. Data of those companies, which do not have a 
financial period of 12 months, are converted to a 12-month base (see Datastream package for 
details).
With the use of enterprise data from different sources, there is the possibility of inconsistency- 
either in the “row” data themselves or in how they have constructed. Some checking indicate this is 
not the case and, for example, similar methods around exchange rates have been used.
Exchange Rates
Amadeus uses a monthly electronic feed of exchange rates from the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund). The data supplied lists the monthly exchange rates of each currency to the US dollar. The 
package uses the nearest exchange rate to the period end data of the financial accounts based on the 
US dollar as a ‘cross-referencing base for any financial accounts presented in a local currency. For 
those countries, which have been using fixed national currency to the Euro, the package uses the 
appropriate fixed conventional rate to convert all available years of data. The year 1999 rate is used 
as the based year. On the other hand, for the other countries not having fixed national currency to 
the Euro, the package uses the variable exchange rate from 1999 onwards for converting all 
available years of data (see Amadeus package).
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Chapter 6
Results from the Empirical Study (Part Two)
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents research findings relating to the effects of privatisation on companies’ 
performance. We will focus in particular on the question of whether the characteristics of ownership 
and concentration have substantial effects on corporate performance.
Type two-factor analysis is devoted to the investigation of privatisation performance. Data on 
European privatised (as opposed to private) and state-owned companies were collected for two 
years, 1998 and 2000. This exercise was repeated with the same variables as those used in the type 
one-factor analysis, i.e., turnovers, PROD and PROF, total assets, total number of employees and 
ownership. For this experiment ownership is divided into two categories, with values of 0 and 1 
assigned to state and privatised companies, respectively. The number of state-owned and privatised 
companies of the type two experiments is listed in Table 3.
Table 3
Samples for Type-Two Factor Analysis 
Comparison between state owned and privatised companies
1998 2000
Pr
iv
at
is
at
io
n
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce In the Ownership Variable (0) 
for State and (1) for Privatised 
Companies
State Owned 58 54
Privatised 52 56
Total 110 110
Type three-factor analysis was carried out to investigate further characteristics of the ownership 
variable using four methods. The first method used the same variables as those used in the 
privatisation performance analysis along with a new variable, Sale-Year. This new variable
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designates the number of years for which a company has been privatised; a value of 0 is used to 
identify state-owned companies. This is to assess whether length of time since privatisation has any 
significance.
Table 4
Samples for Type-Three Factor Analysis
Method One
1998 2000
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 
of 
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
va
ri
ab
le
State and Privatised Company Comparison 
with a New Variable (0) for State 
Companies and Number of Years Since 
Privatisation for Privatised Companies
State-Owned 58 54
Privatised 52 56
Total 110 110
Method Two
C
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
 
of
 
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
va
ri
ab
le Cross-Country 
Analysis with a New Variable (0) for State 
and Private Companies and (1) for 
Privatised Companies
State-Owned Companies 1344 1601
Private Companies 1962 2347
Privatised Companies 52 56
Total Companies 3358 4004
Method Three
1998 2000
C
ha
ra
ct
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ic
 
of
 
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
va
ri
ab
le
Cross-Country Analysis with a New 
Variable (0) for State and Private 
Companies and Number of Years Since 
Privatisation for Privatised Companies
State-Owned Companies 1344 1601
Private Companies 1962 2347
Privatised Companies 52 56
Total Companies 3358 4004
Method Four
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
 
of
 
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
va
ri
ab
le
Cross-Country Analysis with a New 
Variable (0) for State, Number of Years for 
Privatised Companies Since Privatisation 
and Maximum of Years Since the First 
Privatisation for Private Companies
State Owned Companies 1344 1601
Private Companies 1962 2347
Privatised Companies 52 56
Total Companies 3358 4004
In the second, third, and fourth methods, the total-country sample, which consists of the whole 
sample taken from the sample of each country plus the privatised companies, is used for the years
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1998 and 2000. The numbers of state-owned, private, and privatised companies of this type of 
experiment are listed in Table 4. The second method uses the same variables as those in the type 
one experiment, plus a new variable called Newone in which a value of 0 is assigned to state and 
private companies and a value of 1 is assigned to privatised companies. The purpose is to test 
whether privatisation as such makes a difference as opposed to remaining in state or private 
ownership.
The third method uses the same procedure with the exception that the new variable, called Newtwo, 
is designed so that 0 is assigned to both state and always-private companies, and the number of 
years a company has been privatised is assigned to privatised companies. The same purpose as in 
the previous method applies. This experiment was also conducted for the two years of 1998 and 
2000 .
The fourth method was conducted with the same variables as before for the years of 1998 and 2000; 
but the new variable was set differently. In this new variable, which is called Newthree, 0 is 
assigned to state companies, the number of years since privatisation is assigned to privatised 
companies, and the maximum number of years since the first privatisation among all privatised 
companies is assigned to private companies. The purpose once again is the same as that in the two 
preceding methods.
The last investigation is designed to assess the effect of concentration on corporate performance. It 
measures the degree of monopoly/competition in a sector, and can give some indication of how 
competitive a market is. The simplest measure of industrial concentration involves adding together 
the market share of the largest so many firms: for instance, the largest four. This would give what is 
known as the ‘ 4-firm concentration ratio’. The Swedish samples for the years 1998 and 2000 are
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used, including a new variable, concentration. Ideally, the same exercise would be carried out for 
other countries but this would prove too costly in time and funding. The same applies to the 
thwarted intention of including sectoral import and export ratios as factors representing 
competitiveness, not least in addition because of the non-traded character of many of the enterprises 
covered.
This chapter is organised as follows. The second section looks at the results taken from the type 
two-factor analysis. In this section the performance of state and privatised companies for the two 
years 1998 and 2000 will be considered. Again, two major elements, extracted factors and 
character of ownership, will be discussed to ascertain the main characteristics of corporate 
performance and ownership. The third section is dedicated to a discussion of the third experiment 
(the type-three factor analysis), which concerns the characteristics of the ownership variable. This 
is done by creating a new variable based on different types of ownership and examining how this 
new variable performs in the factor analysis. The fourth section looks at the effect of concentration 
on corporate performance by using the Swedish samples. The last section offers some concluding 
remarks.
6.2 The Type-Two Factor analysis
The type-two factor analysis investigates the effects of privatisation on corporate performance by 
comparing the performance of state and privatised companies for two years, 1998 and 2000. The 
aim is to discover which and how many characteristics can be established to explain the 
performance of state and privatised companies. For these reasons, data of state and privatised 
companies are collected using the same variables as type one factor analysis. Table 3 shows the 
number of companies of both types that are used for the analysis; the SPSS outputs for two years, 
1998 and 2000, are reported in Table T2.2.
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Privatisation performance
One hundred and ten companies were used to carry out the factor analysis. Of these, for the year 
1998 fifty-eight were state and fifty-two privatised; for the year 2000, fifty-four were state and fifty- 
six privatised. . Descriptive statistics of our samples for two years are presented in Table T2.1 with 
nothing on which to comment.
T2.1
Type Tw o Factor Analysis For Fifty-Two Privatised Companies 1998 Type Tw o Factor Analysis For Fifty-Six Privatised Companies 2000
M inim um M aximum Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 12199 6S296456 6570717 13546400 TURN O V ER 11065 146305580 8689896 23589882
PROFIT -51569 6918492 647665 1399835 PRO FIT -1469708 16733811 966826 2972349
TASSETS 14358 84490101 9154841 16878473 TASSETS 10279 144140555 12175954 28079073
EM PLOYEE 19 169099 20168 34926 EM PLOYEE 21 188866 19930 36217
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 16.14 2836.52 335.46 430.57 PROFD 25.79 5085.68 537.94 960.41
PROF -44,93 1468.88 55.2 203.88 PROF -81.78 2643.1 93.79 364.62
Type Two Factor Analysis For Fifty-Eight State Companies 1998 Type Tw o Factor Analysis For Fifty-Four State Companies 2000
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 21532 21614464 2097349 4204912 TURNOV ER 21499 8461975 1434489 1859649
PROFIT -265754 986583 61727 168390 PROFIT -397094 1007453 77850 196226
TASSETS 7450 52204585 3056352 8756680 TA SSETS 3324 16105575 1789536 2834465
EM PLOYEE 12 210437 13935 38523 EM PLOYEE 14 61184 6615 12327
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 20.67 12104.34 1051.81 2448.54 PROFD 15.41 26554.3 1458.82 3899,47
PROF -1219.06 213.88 -12.93 206.03 PROF -323.89 1525.09 64.11 232,52
The variable ownership, as usual, is treated as a categorical variable. State-owned companies are 
designated 0 and privatised companies 1. The SPSS result presented in Table T2.2 shows that three 
components have been extracted for the year 1998. The first component indicates that the variables 
turnover, profit, total assets and employee are highly loaded. The second component indicates two- 
loaded variables, PROF and ownership. The third component indicates that two variables PROD 
and PROF are heavily weighted. These results establish size as the first characteristic. From the 
second component, a characteristic of ownership and profitability is indicated. The interesting point 
that is notable about this finding is that the most data for privatised companies is for companies that 
were privatised in 1997 and 1998. This indicates that the year before and the years of privatisation 
are critical for governments. Their intentions are to help companies that are ready for sale to be
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more profitable and productive than before in order to realise more money at the point of sale. This 
claim is confirmed by the experiment for the year 2000, in which there is no sign of a characteristic 
of ownership and performance. The third component confirms a characteristic of some soil of 
performance for the year 1998.
The analysis for the year 2000 finds that two components are extracted. The first component shows 
that turnover, profit, total assets and employee are heavily weighted. PROD and PROF are highly 
loaded in the second factor. According to the Table T2.2 the first extracted factor is a characteristic 
of size. The second factor demonstrates a characteristic of performance. The results clearly show 
that ownership is not a strong element of corporate performance. It seems as if the privatisation 
effect erodes relatively quickly, questioning a cause-effect relationship between the weak evidence 
found for 1998.
T2.2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Own/Prof)
Component 3 
(Perf)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Turnover 0.947 -0.105 0.044 0.948 0.07
Profit 0.863 0.038 0.078 0.879 0.129
Total Assets 0.977 -0.115 0.016 0.959 0.007
Number of 
Employees 0.838
-0.201 -0.053 0.82 -0.109
Ownership 0.327 0.759 -0.051 0.348 -0.141
Prod -0.14 -0.464 0.76 -0.074 0.888
Prof 0.062 0.557 0.69 0.019 0.872
Variance
Extracted 48.995 16.687 15.246 48.432 22.907
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6.3 The Type-Three Factor analysis
The type three-factor analysis specifically explores the variable ownership and is primarily a 
supplement to the two preceding approaches. This type of analysis is done using four methods.
Method one
Factor analysis is carried out for the years 1998 and 2000 using the data found for privatisation 
performance, including a new variable (Saleyear) in which 0 is given to state companies and the 
number of years since privatisation has taken place for each privatised company is given to that 
company. Descriptive statistics are given for the new variable saleyear for privatised companies; 
otherwise table T2.1.
T3.M1.1
Type Three Factor Analysis For Fifty-Two Privatised Companies 1998 M ethod 1 Type Three Factor Analysis For Filly-Six Privatised Companies 2000 M ethod 1
M inimum M axim um M ean Std, Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
SALEYEAR 1 22 6.02 6.16 SALEYEAR 3 24 7.79 6.07
Table T3.M1.2 shows that for the year 1998 three components are extracted. The first component 
indicates that the variables turnover, profit, total assets, employee and saleyear are highly loaded. 
The second component reveals that owners and the new variable (saleyear) are heavily weighted. 
The third component shows that the performance variables, PROD and PROF, are highly loaded. 
As a result, two characteristics can be established, ownership and performance from component 2 
and 3. From the first component, a common characteristic of size can be discerned. From the 
results it appears as if early privatisation may have been large but without impact on performance.
For the year 2000 factor analysis extracted three factors. The first component shows that the 
variables turnover, profit, total assets, employee and saleyear are highly loaded. The second 
component illustrates how the performance variables, PROD and PROF, are heavily weighted. The 
last component shows that the variables owners and the new variable (saleyear) are highly loaded 
than others. Two characteristics are established: performance, and some type of ownership
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corresponding to components 2 and 3 in that order. Results are similar as for 1998 except for second 
and third components have switched places.
T3.M1.2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size/Saleyear)
Component 2 
(Own)
Component 3 
(Perf)
Component 1 
(Size/Saleyear)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own)
T urnover 0.929 -0.208 0.038 0.922 0.069 -0.256
Profit 0.863 -0.044 0.082 0.857 0.128 -0.219
Total Assets 0.957 -0.231 0.011 0.933 0.006 -0.234
Number of 
Employees 0.795 -0.362 -0.060 0.795 -0.110 -0.197
Ownership 0.416 0.791 0.004 0.458 -0.138 0.794
Prod -0.153 -0.311 0,704 -0.085 0.888 -0.078
Prof 0.069 0.299 0.748 0.052 0.873 0.231
SALEYEAR 0.568 0.602 -0.025 0.636 0.004 0.655
Variance
Extracted 45.997 17.542 13.351 46.380 20.044 16.577
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Method Two
Data that were collected for total-country analysis, plus the data 011 privatised companies, is used 
for this new approach. Descriptive statistics of our samples are presented in Table T3.M2.1. There 
is nothing remarkable on which to comment.
T3.M2.1
Type T hree Factor A nalysis For Two Hundred and Twenty-Eight M ixed Com panies 1998 M ethod
2
Type Three Factor Analysis For Two Hundred and N inety-E ight M ixed Companies 2000 M ethod
2
M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 433 52952981 934976 4671242 TURN O V ER 23 62012301 999872 5129795
PROFIT -874927 4894620 82886 524370 PROFIT -232132 10113614 116364 733225
TASSETS 399 56198657 1321886 6356906 TASSETS 170 139835674 2061670 12152641
EM PLO Y EE 2 258491 4397 23078 EM PLO Y EE 6 319998 5146 29650
OW NERS 0.03 1 0,61 0.22 OW NERS 0.03 1 0.56 0.2
PROD 2.15 34203.22 432.87 2290.93 PROD 0,48 22167.39 366.93 1431,36
PROF -2950.06 1812,87 22.91 260.9 PROF -619.45 1993.66 28.2 155.06
NEW ONE 0 1 0.02 0.15 NEW ONE 0 1 0.02 0.15
Type T hree Factor A nalysis For Seven Hundred and Eighty-Five Private Companies 1998 M ethod
2
Type Three Factor Analysis For Two Thousand One Hundred and Seven Private Com panies 2000 
M ethod 2
M inimum M axim um M ean Std. D eviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 160 70777272 497579 3158165 TURN O V ER 79 146305580 701494 4245537
PROFIT -236501 2308015 21120 131714 PROFIT -4930862 16733811 43362 489435
TASSETS 240 66826508 449173 3201651 TASSETS 52 144140555 802726 4996168
EM PLOYEE 10 401000 2199 16494 EM PLOYEE 2 234351 2744 11483
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.57 173130.15 862.69 7656.28 PROD 0.33 95550.31 656.S2 3008.84
PROF -674.66 6909.04 23.37 256.76 PROF -1689.56 10681.11 32.54 298.92
N EW ONE 0 1 0 0.04 NEW ONE 0 1 0.02 0.15
Type T hree Factor Analysis For One Thousand T hree Hundred and Forty-Five State Companies 
1998 M ethod 2
Type Three Factor Analysis For One Thousand Five Hundred and Ninety-N ine State Companies 
2000 M ethod 2
Mini mu in M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std, Deviation
TURN O V ER 121 43432051 285136 1730674 TURNOV ER 47 33187156 261159 1337740
PROFIT -352190 1997970 10441 80839 PROFIT -1359876 3953731 13362 137331
TASSETS 28 52204585 413548 2392611 TASSETS 41 113696647 469984 3388221
EM PLOYEE 2 210437 1583 9913 EM PLO Y EE 2 216605 1381 7779
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 0.66 24507.96 496.06 1475.18 PROD 0.26 385107 694.38 9706.4
PROF -1276.86 2302.02 20.42 148.33 PROF -40895.98 6680.18 18,24 1084.07
NEW ONE 0 0 0 0 NEW ONE 0 0 0 0
A new variable (Newone) is introduced and set such that 0 is given to state and private and 1 to 
privatised companies. The SPSS results for the years 1998 and 2000 are given in Table T3.M2.2. 
From the table, it can be seen that three components are extracted for the year 1998. The first 
component shows that the variables turnover, profit, total assets and employee are highly loaded.
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The second component shows that the variables PROD and PROF are highly loaded. The third 
component demonstrates that owners and the new variable (Newone) are highly loaded than the 
others. Three characteristics are established: size, performance and some type of ownership, 
corresponding to the components that found them. The same method as the preceding case was used 
for the year 2000. The analysis extracts three components. Turnover, profit, total assets and 
employee are highly loaded within the first factor. PROD and PROF are highly loaded within the 
second component. The third component shows that the variable Owner and the new variable 
(Newone) are heavily weighted than the others. According to these results, a characteristic of size 
can be established from the first component. The second component establishes the characteristic of 
performance as in most previous cases. The last component is characteristic of some type of 
ownership as the ownership goes with the new variable in a factor. Together these results do not
suggest that privatised companies are distinctive in performance. 
T3.M2.2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 1 Component 2 Component 3(Size) (Perf) (Own) (Size) (Perf) (Own)
Turnover 0.945 0,014 -0.090 0.944 0.020 -0.059
Profit 0.830 0,011 0.010 0.803 0.061 -0.027
Total Assets 0.945 -0.034 -0.079 0.897 -0.057 -0.107
Number of 
Employees 0.816
-0.085 -0.150 0.748 -0.089 -0.107
Ownership 0.097 0.127 0.860 0.085 0.056 0.891
Prod 0.047 0.800 -0.079 0.020 0.732 -0,121
Prof 0.042 0.795 -0.070 0,018 0.748 0.011
NEWONE 0.395 -0.010 0.498 0.403 0.041 0.445
Variance
Extracted 41.361 16.201 12.948 38.362 13.940 12.913
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Method Three
Method Three uses total-country data plus privatised company data with a new variable (Newtwo) 
in which 0 is assigned to both state and private companies and the number of years since 
privatisation has taken place is assigned to each privatised company. Descriptive statistics are 
introduced in Table T3.M3.1 with nothing on which to comment.
T3.M3.1
Type Three Factor A nalysis For Tw o Hundred and Twenty-Eight M ixed C om panies 1998 M ethod
3
Type Three Factor Analysis For Two Hundred aud N inety-Eight M ixed Companies 2000 M ethod
3
M inim um M axim um M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 433 52952981 934976 4671242 TURNOV ER 23 62012301 999872 5129795
PROFIT -874927 4894620 82886 524370 PROFIT -232132 10113614 116364 733225
TASSETS 399 56198657 1321886 6356906 TASSETS 170 139835674 2061670 12152641
EM PLO Y EE 2 258491 4397 23078 EM PLOYEE 6 319998 5146 29650
OW NERS 0.03 1 0,61 0.22 OW NERS 0.03 1 0.56 0.2
PROD 2.15 34203.22 432.87 2290.93 PROD 0.48 22167.39 366.93 1431.36
PROF -2950.06 1812.87 22.91 260.9 PROF -619.45 1993.66 28.2 155.06
N EW TW O 0 2 0.03 0.22 NEW TW O 0 4 0.08 0.55
Type T hree Factor Analysis For One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty-Five Private 
Companies 1998 M ethod 3
Type Three Factor Analysis For Two Thousand O ne Hundred and Seven Private Companies 2000 
M ethod 3
M illinium M axim um M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 4 70777272 676641 3214280 TURNOV ER 79 146305580 701494 4245537
PRO FIT -898316 6918492 46597 290274 PROFIT -4930862 16733811 43362 489435
TASSETS 240 84490101 729453 3875761 TASSETS 52 144140555 802726 4996168
EM PLOYEE 2 401000 2976 15545 EM PLOYEE 2 234351 2744 11483
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.04 173130.15 806.49 5896.64 PROD 0.33 95550.31 656.82 3008.84
PROF -2785.96 15281.85 35.61 428.95 PROF -1689.56 10681.11 32.54 298.92
N EW TW O 0 22 0.17 1.45 NEW TW O 0 24 0.2 1.58
T ype Three Factor Analysis For O ne Thousand T hree Hundred and Forty-Five State Companies 
1998 M ethod 3
Type T hree Factor Analysis For One Thousand Five H undred and Ninety-N ine State Companies 
2000 M ethod 3
M inim um M aximum Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 121 43432051 285136 1730674 TU RN O V ER 47 33187156 261159 1337740
PROFIT -352190 1997970 10441 80839 PROFIT -1359876 3953731 13362 137331
TA SSETS 28 52204585 413548 2392611 TASSETS 41 113696647 469984 3388221
EM PLOYEE 2 210437 1583 9913 EM PLOYEE 2 216605 1381 7779
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 0,66 24507.96 496.06 1475.18 PROD 0.26 385107 694.38 9706.4
PROF -1276.86 2302.02 20.42 148.33 PROF -40895.98 6680.18 18.24 1084.07
NEW TW O 0 0 0 0 NEW TW O 0 0 0 0
Three factors have been extracted for the year 1998. As can be seen in Table T3.M3.2, the 
variables turnover, profit, total assets and employee are heavily loaded within the first factor. 
PROD and PROF are highly loaded within the second factor. The variable owner is highly loaded
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within the third component with correlation coefficients of (0.926). As a result, three characteristics 
can be established. The first component establishes the characteristic of size. The second one 
confirms the establishment of performance as another characteristic. The last one establishes 
ownership as a characteristic. The new variable (Newtwo) is not highly correlated to any factors. 
For the year 2000 three components are extracted. In the first component turnover, profit, total 
assets, employee and the variable Newtwo are highly loaded. PROD and PROF are highly loaded 
within the second component. The only variable, which has a higher correlation coefficient in factor 
3, is the owner, with a correlation coefficient of (0.945). From the first component, a common 
characteristic cannot be established. The second component demonstrates another characteristic of 
performance. The last component displays the last characteristic, some sort of ownership. It is 
possible that longer established privatised companies are larger, more so in 2000 than 1998, but
otherwise are not distinctive. 
T3.M3.2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perl)
Component 3 
(Own)
Component 1 
(Size/Newtwo)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own)
Turnover 0,943 0.017 -0.075 0.946 0.017 -0.036
Profit 0.833 0.012 0.018 0.811 0.065 0.004
Total Assets 0.945 -0.031 -0.071 0.889 -0.065 -0.108
Number of 
Employees 0.807 -0.078 -0.141 0.730 -0.105 -0.124
Ownership 0.093 0.125 0.926 0.084 0.055 0.945
Prod 0.046 0.800 -0.065 0.019 0.728 -0.137
Prof 0.039 0.795 -0,083 0.020 0.748 0.016
NEWTWO 0.466 -0.029 0.334 0.529 0.060 0.266
Variance
Extracted 41.968 16.205 12.623 39.530 13.948 12.644
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Method Four
The last investigation on type-three factor analysis uses data from the total-country analysis and 
privatised companies to investigate the characteristics of the ownership variable. Descriptive 
statistics of our samples are presented in Table T3.M4.1 with nothing on which to comment.
T3.M4.1
Type T hree Factor A nalysis For Tw o Hundred and Twenty-Eight M ixed C om panies 1998 M ethod
4
Type Three Factor Analysis For Tw o Hundred and N inety-Eight Mixed Companies 2000 M ethod
4
M inim um M aximum M ean Std. Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TU RNOV ER 433 52952981 934976 4671242 TU RNOV ER 23 62012301 999872 5129795
PROFIT -874927 4894620 82886 524370 PROFIT -232132 10113614 116364 733225
TASSETS 399 56198657 1321886 6356906 TASSETS 170 139835674 20G1670 12152641
EM PLOYEE 2 258491 4397 23078 EM PLOYEE 6 319998 5146 29650
OW NERS 0.03 1 0.61 0.22 OW NERS 0.03 1 0.56 0.2
PROD 2.15 34203.22 432.87 2290.93 PROD 0.48 22167.39 366.93 1431.36
PROF -2950.06 1812.87 22.91 260.9 PROF -619.45 1993.66 28.2 155.06
NEW THREE 0 2 0.03 0.22 NEW THREE 0 4 0.08 0.55
Type T hree Factor A nalysis For One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty-Five Private 
Companies 1998 M ethod 4
Type Three Factor Analysis For Two Thousand One Hundred and Seven Private Companies 2000 
M ethod 4
M inim um M axim um Mean Std, Deviation Minimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 4 70777272 676641 32142S0 TURNOV ER 79 146305580 701494 4245537
PRO FIT -898316 6918492 46597 290274 PROFIT -4930862 16733811 43362 489435
TA SSETS 240 84490101 729453 3875761 TASSETS 52 144140555 802726 4996168
EM PLOYEE 2 401000 2976 15545 EM PLOYEE 2 234351 2744 11483
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.04 173130.15 806.49 5896,64 PROD 0.33 95550.31 656.82 3008.84
PROF -2785.96 15281.85 35.61 428.95 PROF -1689.56 10681.11 32.54 298.92
NEW THREE 1 22 21.59 2.68 NEW THREE 3 24 23.64 2.54
Type T hree Factor A nalysis For O ne Thousand T hree Hundred and Forty-Five S tate Companies 
1998 M ethod 4
Type Three Factor Analysis F or One Thousand Five Hundred and N inety-N ine State Companies 
2000 M ethod 4
M inimum M axim um M ean Std. D eviation Minimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 121 43432051 285136 1730674 TURN O V ER 47 33187156 261159 1337740
PROFIT -352190 1997970 10441 80839 PROFIT -1359876 3953731 13362 137331
TASSETS 28 522045S5 413548 2392611 TASSETS 41 113696647 469984 3388221
EM PLOYEE 2 210437 1583 9913 EM PLOYEE 2 216605 1381 7779
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 0.66 24507.96 496.06 1475.18 PROD 0,26 385107 694.38 9706.4
PRO F -1276.86 2302.02 20.42 148.33 PROF -40895.98 6680.18 18.24 1084.07
NEW THREE 0 0 0 0 NEW THREE 0 0 0 0
A new variable (Newthree) is added to the conventional variables in which 0 is assigned to state 
owned companies, the number of years since the sale year of that company is assigned to each 
privatised company, and private companies are assigned a value equal to the maximum number of 
years since the first privatisation among all privatised companies used for the experiment.
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Table T3.M4.2 shows three components have been extracted for the year 1998. Turnover, profit, 
total assets and employee are heavily weighted within the first component. Owners and Newthree 
are highly loaded in the second component. In the third component, PROD and PROF hold the 
higher correlation coefficients. The same results have been retained for the year 2000.
From these findings, three characteristics of size, ownership and performance are well established 
for both years. It can be concluded that the new variable, which is in fact another aspect of the 
ownership variable, has a commonality only with the ownership variable (as expected) and not with 
any other characteristics.
T3.M4.2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 1 Component 2 Component 3(Size) (Own) (Perf) (Size) (Own) (Perf)
Turnover 0.951 -0.054 0.017 0.949 -0.046 0.025
Profit 0.825 -0.041 0.013 0.801 -0.059 0.064
Total Assets 0.946 -0.085 -0.025 0.903 -0.078 -0.047
Number of 
Employees
0.831 -0.065 -0.080 0.761 -0.038 -0.079
Ownership 0.124 0.972 -0.071 0.111 0.978 -0.008
Prod 0.053 0.090 0.797 0.021 -0.002 0.737
Prof 0.044 0.068 0.798 0.018 0.017 0.747
NEWTHREE 0.093 0.976 -0.064 0.083 0.981 -0.005
Variance
Extracted 39.999 24.077 16.095 36.963 24.159 13.935
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6.4 Type Four Factor Analysis
Type-four factor analysis has been earned out in order to ascertain the effect of concentration on 
corporate performance. Swedish samples for the year 1998 and 2000 have been used with an 
additional variable called concentration. As mentioned earlier in the introduction to this chapter, 
concentration gives the degree of monopoly/ competitiveness in a sector. Concentration is measured 
by taking the turnover of the four biggest companies of a sector divided by the total turnover o f that 
sector, which can be called the ‘concentration ratio’. With the addition of this variable the total 
number of variables for carrying out factor analysis increases to 8.
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Sweden (Concentration)
The Swedish sample, which comprises of 756 companies for the year 1998 and 750 companies for 
the year 2000 with the new variable, concentration, has been used for carrying out factor analysis. 
Descriptive statistics presented in Table T4.S1 indicate relatively small standard deviations for 
OWNERS of mixed companies for both years and for PROD of mixed companies for the year 1998.
T4.S1
Type Four Factor Analysis For Thirty-Three M ixed Companies 1998 Sweden (Concentration) Type Four Factor Analysis For Thirty-N ine M ixed Companies 2000 Sweden (Concentration)
M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M aximum Mean Std. Deviation
TURN O V ER 5753 7119836 439244 1343146 TURNOV ER 6543 6629749 286568 1079648
PROFIT -14S904 843320 27131 151138 PROFIT -83464 1241800 47460 202871
TASSETS 2460 8231485 664638 1608261 TASSETS 2607 13005670 562748 2083506
EM PLOYEE 10 31320 1524 5520 EM PLOYEE 10 30307 1193 4905
Concentration 0.15 1 0.52 0.29 Concentration 0.14 1 0.54 0.27
OW NERS 0.5 0.99 0.76 0.16 OW NERS 0.5 0.99 0.74 0.17
PROD 58.37 1368.96 373.14 277.26 PROD 55.44 5175.69 480.04 860.63
PROF -241.61 119.11 13.79 59.71 PROF -619.45 393.06 21.3 139.72
Type Four Factor A nalysis For T hree Hundred and Seventy-N ine Private Companies 1998 Sweden 
(Concentration)
Type Four Factor Analysis For Three Hundred and Sixty-Eij;ht Private Companies 2000 Sweden 
(Concentration)
M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
T U RN O V ER 4 10370798 145840 663508 TURN O V ER 2237 8095914 124768 538162
PRO FIT -78007 760203 9961 52544 PROFIT -42154 573473 10706 48449
TA SSETS 555 12572634 192847 799610 TASSETS 502 11706322 194025 806489
EM PLOYEE 2 53493 598 3239 EM PLOYEE 3 46025 559 2922
C oncentration 0.15 1 0.39 0.24 Concentration 0.08 1 0.38 0.25
OW NERS 1 1 1 0 OW NERS 1 1 1 0
PROD 0.04 16150.2 618.72 1270.11 PROD 33.05 6623.64 624.2 936.62
PROF -2785.96 15281.85 76.5 821.4 PROF -1277.38 2467.56 47.21 212.6
Type Four Factor A nalysis For Three Hundred and Forty-Four State Companies 1998 Sweden 
(Concentration)
Type Four Factor Analysis For Three Hundred and Forty-Three State Companies 2000 Sweden 
(Concentration)
M inimum M axim um M ean Std. Deviation M inimum M axim um Mean Std. Deviation
TU RN O V ER 485 3554398 126053 383262 TURN O V ER 380 3845689 134539 406475
PRO FIT -352190 867696 10740 67109 PROFIT -293042 549944 8328 53777
TASSETS 888 10340653 285021 964158 TASSETS 1628 12188543 280054 1016420
EM PLOYEE 6 42108 617 3289 EM PLOYEE 10 41522 718 3418
Concentration 0.15 1 0.44 0.3 Concentration 0.08 1 0.46 0.29
OW NERS 0 0 0 0 OW NERS 0 0 0 0
PROD 23.07 3931.6 492.23 540.48 PROD 32.78 4831.88 454.87 478,01
PROF -182 1383.04 49.76 146.08 PROF -357.64 992.23 38.45 113.8
From Table T4.S2 for the year 1998 it can be seen that four variables, representing the size of 
companies, turnover, profit, total assets and the number of employees, are highly loaded. Factor 2 
shows that two variables, which represent performance, PROD and PROF, are highly loaded. Factor
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3 shows that two variables are highly loaded within that factor, concentration and owners, one 
positively and one negatively. From these results three characteristics can be established, size from 
factor 1, performance from factor 2 and concentration and ownership from factor 3. It can be 
emphasised that concentration, which represents the degree of competitiveness of a sector, is not 
correlated to those variables representing size and performance in a factor. The same results are 
maintained for the year 2000.
From these two analyses it can be emphasised that concentration has the same destiny as ownership 
in many previous analyses, since it is not correlated to a factor including other variables 
representing size and performance. As a result, it can be established that it is not a permanent 
characteristic o f corporate performance, as size and performance are. However, it appears that 
privately owned firms are more concentrated in less concentrated sector given the inverse 
relationship between ownership and concentration for the third factor in each year (albeit with 
reversed signs).
T4.S2
1998 2000
Variables Component 1 (Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own/Concen)
Component 1 
(Size)
Component 2 
(Perf)
Component 3 
(Own/Concen)
Turnover 0.951 -0.025 0.032 0.966 -0.016 -0.029
Profit 0.853 0.078 0.041 0.849 0.176 0.017
Total Assets 0.913 -0.001 0.022 0.923 0.033 -0.034
Number of 
Employees 0.870 -0.068 -0.012 0.859 -0.126 -0.045
Concentration 0.096 0.056 -0.735 0.124 -0.470 0.562
Ownership -0.006 0.107 0.739 -0.018 0.433 -0.630
Prod -0.013 0.893 -0.015 -0.051 0.640 0.408
Prof 0.028 0.889 -0.032 0.060 0.697 0.385
Variance
Extracted
40.411 20.183 13.630 40.794 16.910 12.907
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6.5 Conclusion
The second type of factor analysis (type-two) was designed to investigate privatisation performance 
by comparing the performance of state and privatised companies for two years: 1998 and 2000. 
Data on state and privatised companies were used using the above-mentioned variables. The result 
for the year 1998 shows that three characteristics (size, ownership-and-profltability, and 
performance) have been established. The second characteristic, ownership-and-profitability, has 
been seen as a clear sign of government intentions to enhance the performance of the company for 
sale in order to earn more money from the sale. This result was different from the result for the 
year 2000, which showed that only two characteristics are established: size and performance. Once 
more it can be emphasized that size and performance are the two main characteristics of 
privatisation performance, while ownership does not occupy a similarly prominent position.
The type-three factor analysis is used to investigate the characteristics of ownership more precisely. 
Four methods or techniques have been used, through the creation of a new ownership variable that 
has slightly different interpretations in different experiments. In most cases, the ownership variable 
and the new ownership variable are correlated to the same component but not with other 
components representing other characteristics. This clearly highlights that ownership, which is a 
characteristic of corporate performance, remains unique; it does not have the potential to build a 
separate characteristic with variables representing either size or performance.
The last factor analysis was carried out to find out about the effect of concentration on corporate 
performance. The Swedish samples were used including a new variable, concentration. The results 
showed the same characteristic as the ownership variable, indicating that concentration is not a 
prominent feature in corporate performance.
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Chapter 7 
Summary and General Conclusions
The question of whether the private sector, including privatised companies, has outperformed the 
public sector has been the main concern of this thesis. Economic theories have suggested that 
ownership and competitive environment have major impacts on economic efficiency, creating 
potential incentives for managements to reduce costs and maximise productive efficiency in order 
to survive in a competitive environment. The aim of this thesis was to put such theories to the test, 
asking which sector, public or private, has performed better, and to what extent ownership and 
competitive environment are influential aspects of corporate performance.
Public sector and government economic activities in West European countries resulted in the first 
instance from recognition of the inadequacies of the private sector and market provision. As Clarke 
describes it (1993, 207), in the early nineteenth century local commissions were established to 
provide street lighting, cleaning, road building, sewers, water supply and public health. Later, local 
authorities began to build low-cost public housing to get the urban population out of the slums, and 
local education authorities were set up to provide mass education to those neglected by the private 
schools, finally to ensure a low-cost, reliable service, public utilities were established by local 
councils providing public transport, water, gas and electricity supply. Building on this, the aim of 
nationalisation and the welfare state in the European countries following the Second World War 
was the establishment of a sustainable economic infrastructure, reliable social provision, and by 
cross-subsidy, a comprehensive service which would be available to all ordinary people.
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In this light privatisation and its various implementations should be viewed from a number of 
different aspect, ranging from the motives for the policy through to its social and political effects. 
Copying privatisation techniques from other countries without regard for the conditions that each 
particular country has in terms of its economic, political and social structure may lead to completely 
different outcomes. Fine (1997b, p.391-392) emphasises that, it is almost impossible to ignore the 
wider economic, political and ideological conditions as well as the sectorally specific details 
attached to particular privatisations. Conditions that are not only taken for granted in developed 
countries but are also presumed to be neutral in their effects, cannot be overlooked elsewhere except 
in that market-led pan-globalisation view in which appropriate social economic mechanisms are 
miraculously conjured forth merely by virtue of the need for them.
It can thus be concluded that privatisation, from a theoretical point of view, does not have a general 
theory or explanation. Because a given sector differs from others in so many respects (such as its 
finance, technological prospects, political context, market structure, market position, etc.), 
privatisation will be different across sector and country and any generalisation is likely to be 
erroneous.
The privatisation process involves some perverse effects. Breaking down the natural monopoly of 
the public sector and creating a competitive environment through the denationalisation of state 
enterprise is the main presumed goal. If the aim were to obtain an immediate political gain or 
immediate revenues, then the effect is to introduce another monopoly, this time with private 
ownership. As Vickers and Yarrow (1988) demonstrate, the privatisation of telecommunication and 
gas has led to a situation in which taking on the problem of the new monopoly is presumed to be an 
easy task for the British government.
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The claim that privatisation will lead to a higher level of consumer democracy is also problematic. 
The position of the consumer in relation to the privatised industry is often one of considerable 
anxiety. As Clarke explains (1993, p.221), ‘The fear of consumer bodies is that privatisation of vital 
utilities of water, gas, electricity and telephone will seriously threaten the most vulnerable sections 
of society as directors demand higher profits and shareholders higher dividends, both taking 
precedence over service, with falling standards, higher prices, and greater number of 
disconnections*.
The motives for privatisation vary considerably, from a politically driven conviction that 
privatisation is best to a simple wish to avoid failure in the face of poor performance in nationalised 
industries. The range of different motives might include the ideological, which seeks to limit state 
economic activities in order to stimulate individual and private sector initiatives; the wish to 
undermine trade union power in order to reduce public sector borrowing; the aim of enhancing 
efficiency (profitability) in production in order to create a competitive environment in which 
consumers are better off; the creation of a laissez-faire economy, relaxing every possible restriction 
in order to spread capitalism among people through offering share ownership (Wiltshire, 1987).
Privatisation as an economic programme should be seen as a segment of a broader plan to regulate 
the structure of the economy by the use of microeconomic complements macroeconomic monetarist 
policy, as manifested in the Conservative industrial policy programme in 1979. Additionally, 
privatisation should be seen as a political strategy, aiming to shift the balance of power in favour of 
the free market. It has been argued that one o f the supposed principles of laissez-faire is to reduce 
the economic activity of the state. This is also one of the main characteristics of Thatcherism. 
However, what happened was that intervention by the government continued, but with other forms 
and under different agencies. Consequently, two unsurprising outcomes appeared: economic
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power has become concentrated in the hands of fewer people, and political control over that power 
has weakened (Fine, 1992).
In order to provide adequate answers to the questions mentioned earlier, the issue of how corporate 
performance should be measured came under consideration. Measuring corporate performance has 
been found to be highly complex and controversial, as different economic theories have suggested 
different methods. Most importantly, these economic theories seem to be one-sided in their 
assumption of the superiority o f the private sector and privatisation, and therefore they have not 
given enough attention to the issue of measurement. Economic theories such as those of the 
property rights school, principal agents theory, public choice school, Austrian school of economics 
and the new synthesis including the new political economy, new institutional economics and neo- 
Austrian economics have been found to be ignoring the issue of how to measure corporate 
performance, while the conventional method of measuring corporate performance suggested by 
neoclassical theorists, using total factor productivity, has been found to be problematic.
Empirical studies looking at the comparative performance of public and private sectors and 
privatisation performance next came under consideration. There are numerous studies, looking at 
different aspects of the relationship between public and private sector, and using different methods 
with different criteria. The results of those studies showed a mixed picture, some indicating the 
superiority of the private sector over the public, and some the reverse. Most of these studies used 
the conventional way of measuring corporate performance, as suggested by the neoclassical 
approach. We found these results unsatisfactory, particularly because the method makes a number 
of initial assumptions, which may not in all cases be justified. As a result, the procedure measures 
something else rather than total factor productivity, which is assumed to be the residual in the 
relation between inputs and outputs.
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In order to examine whether empirical evidence supports the theoretical claims in favour of private 
sector performance superiority and privatisation performance compared to public sector while 
avoiding the problems associated with these conventional methods of assessing corporate 
performance, we decided instead to adopt a different method, factor analysis.
Four types of factor analysis experiments were earned out. The type-one factor analysis compared 
the performance of state, mixed and private companies through the use of variables such as 
turnover, profit, total assets, number of employees, profitability (represented by a variable,, PROF), 
productivity (represented by a variable, PROD) and ownership, for two years, 1998 and 2000. 
Fourteen European countries were chosen and data for each of the three types of companies - state, 
mixed and private - were collected. This type of experiment was ended by carrying out a total- 
country analysis comprised of all samples used for each country experiment again for two different 
years, 1998 and 2000.
The results show that in two-thirds of the cases two characteristics were well established: the size 
and the performance of enterprises and in most of the rest at least three characteristics emerged: the 
size and the performance before and some sort of ownership as well as a third factor. From the two 
factor cases, ownership does not figure as a significant factor between firms. From the three factor 
cases ownership does emerge as a difference between firms but not in a way that connects it with 
other aspects of performance. In short, ownership is not an important distinguishing factor in 
performance.
The type-two factor analysis looked at the privatisation performance by comparing the performance 
of state-owned and privatised companies in European countries for two years, 1998 and 2000. The 
1998 experiment showed that again two of the preceding characteristics found in the previous type
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of experiment, the size and the performance, were established. The third characteristic was a case of 
correlation between variables ownership and one of the performance representatives, PROF with 
that factor. The interesting point about this finding was that since the data collected on privatised 
companies related mostly to the years 1997 and 1998 it indicated the attempts by governments from 
different countries to improve the performance o f those companies before selling them on in or the 
selection of more profitable companies for sale.. Significantly the results from the year 2000 did not 
support the above result concerning profitability and ownership and confirmed the same result 
found where two characteristics were extracted, as in the previous type of experiment.
The next type of factor analysis was accomplished to find out more about the characteristic of the 
variable ownership. This was done by using four different methods, adding a new variable of 
ownership reflecting duration of private or impact of privatisation (in relation to state and private 
firms). . Again, no evidence was found of privatisation impacting separately upon performance.
The last type of factor analysis was earned out to determine whether competitiveness is a 
significant part of better corporate performance, as some theories have claimed. For Sweden, 
“concentration” (measuring competitiveness of a company) was added for the years 1998 and 2000. 
Once again this had little effect on the impact of ownership as a distinguishing feature of coiporate 
performance, although private companies seem more likely to seek out select sheltered from 
competition.
Our overall conclusion is that corporate performance is characterised by two characteristics such as 
size and performance in most cases. Also in some cases it is characterised by differences of 
ownership. But ownership has remained insulated without having high correlation with other 
variables forming other characteristics such as size and performance. This finding contradicts most
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theoretical claims made by different schools in favour of the superiority of the private sector and 
privatisation. Finally, 011 the limited case study considered we conclude that competitiveness is not 
a significant characteristic of corporate performance.
There are two major reservations concerning our analysis. First, although our empirical results are 
extremely powerful, it should be emphasised, as discussed in Chapter 4, that factor analysis is not 
theory-based, and its results, as such, do not test theories or hypotheses within them. Put purely and 
simply, we have shown in a limited way and on a limited data set (in scope across firms, countries 
and time) and in variables (measuring firm characteristics) that there is 110 immediate association 
between firm performance and form of ownership (private or public). The most immediate 
conclusion to draw is that ownership as such is not a major factor in firm performance. But 
alternative hypotheses can be put forward that suggest otherwise, and it is not too difficult to play 
devil’s advocate on behalf of the privatisation lobby. For example, it might be argued that the 
privatisation threat has imposed a discipline on the public sector, through demonstration effect and 
encouraging restructuring or closure of those state-owned firms that do not perform well. 
Otherwise, for example, it might be expected that profitability would be consistently higher in the 
private sector given its need to make profits to survive and the greater dispensation to pursue 
profitability in being free of state “interference”. The results of this thesis cannot be used to reject 
such hypotheses out of hand.
But it can offer a response. As suggested in Chapters 2 and 3, the theories in favour of privatisation 
have rarely, if ever, carried through their arguments to direct empirical investigation of the 
mechanisms by which they are supposed to be realised -  whether it be the freedom to innovate of 
the neo-Austrian school or the rent-seeking of the neo-liberals. Rather, these arguments are 
presumed to lead to empirical outcomes reflecting superior private firm performance by measure of
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profitability, productivity or whatever. And like the theory, the evidence is often presumed to be 
supportive. This thesis has shown this not to be the case to an extent that, arguably, goes beyond 
most of what has been done before. Interpreting this evidence is another matter. But the onus has 
been shifted onto those who favour privatisation. They must show that the apparent uniformity of 
performance across forms of ownership is, paradoxically, a consequence of the superiority of 
private ownership. Our suspicion is that this cannot and will not be done, not least because 
corporate performance (and the role of ownership) is extremely variable according to 
circumstances, and any general theory will founder on the diversity of the specific.
Second, necessarily, our empirical work is based upon limited data sets, particularly for the 
numbers of firms that are of state or mixed ownership. In addition, the number of variables that can 
be used to assess firm characteristics in general, and performance in particular, is also extremely 
limited. Further, even with these limitations, there is the problem of standardisation in definition of 
the variables and their appropriateness in view of the distortions that arise out of differences in 
accounting practices and the vagaries of exchange rate movements, etc. Almost indefinite effort 
could be spent in constructing a more satisfactory data set for the purposes of our analysis.
But it is our suspicion, and this is the lesson to be drawn for future research, that this would not be 
the best way to proceed in assessing the impact of privatisation. One major conclusion to be drawn 
from our, and other theoretical and empirical research, is that there can be no general theory of 
privatisation and its consequences. Outcomes are bound to depend upon too wide a range of factors 
and how they interact with one another in specific country, sector and corporate context (including 
political and other factors). Accordingly, the way forward is to accept that privatisation needs to be 
assessed in a case study methodology in order to be able to accommodate such differences. This 
seems to be the appropriate response to those who would take, in light of first reservation expressed
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above, the view that our general results indicate that even performance across ownership is 
indicative of the virtues of privatisation in view of their impact on the non-private. This would have 
to be demonstrated rather than posited as a speculative hypothesis. And, in view of the second 
reservation, detailed cases studies also seem to be appropriate. Indeed, in order to address the 
problems of comparability of data, etc, across companies to make a fair assessment of performance, 
it is almost inevitable that case-study-type considerations will need to be incorporated in any case. 
Why not make a virtue out of necessity and proceed from an original goal of general empirical 
comparisons to, what they will allow for, case study analysis.
In short, with reservations, our thesis indicates that there is no empirical case for supporting the 
hypothesis that privatisation is a major, general source of enhanced performance or, indeed, a 
means of distinguishing between films in other respects. However, rather than taking this as a 
conclusion with “closure”, we prefer to see it as the basis for more situated analyses of privatisation, 
and of industrial policy more generally. Industrial performance does need to be assessed, and policy 
made, in terms of a wide range of variables. One of these is ownership whose impact should be 
assessed in relation to other factors and not, otherwise, unduly exaggerated.
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